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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to enhancing the knowledge about financial inclusion
by focusing on its consequences in emerging economies. Chapter 1 emphasizes the
importance of financial inclusion, defined as access to and use of financial services,
and relates the different chapters to the overall topic. Chapter 2 analyzes whether
the mode of providing access to finance itself changes financial behavior and business
outcomes. It analyzes a randomized controlled trial which provided a one-time cash
transfer to micro and small entrepreneurs in Kampala, Uganda, in 2013. One half of the
treatment group received the transfer in cash, the other half had the money transferred
on their bank accounts, which we assume to work as a soft commitment device inducing
entrepreneurs to rather use the money for business related expenses. We do not find any
direct effect of the transfer on monthly profits and capital stock. However, we detect
positive short-term treatment effects on the more “upstream” variables inventories and
sales for entrepreneurs in the account treatment group.
Chapter 3 analyzes determinants of financial inclusion and focuses on financial lit-
eracy as a possible demand side driver of inclusion. It combines cross country data on
financial literacy with information on financial inclusion, financial infrastructure, and
other country characteristics. We establish a robust positive relation between financial
literacy and four different dimensions of financial inclusion. Considering institutional
variation across countries and regarding “access to finance”, financial literacy and finan-
cial infrastructure mainly substitute each other. With regards to the “use of finance”,
higher financial literacy strengthens the effect of more financial depth. To respond to
reverse causality concerns, we employ an instrumental variable strategy, which sup-
ports a causal interpretation of our results. Further robustness checks do not alter the
findings either.
Last, Chapter 4 points out a possible drawback of using financial services. It asks
whether too high expectations regarding future income may actually harm households
and lead them to accumulate too much debt. We collect extensive data on debt and
borrowing behavior of households in rural Thailand which enable us to calculate both
expectations about future monthly income as well as various debt indicators. Control-
ling for specific household characteristics, we find a strong relationship between our two
measures of biased expectations and (over-)indebtedness. The more quantitative expec-
tation measure is stronger related to objective debt and the more subjective expectation
measure is rather related to our subjective debt measure. An additional lab-in-the-field
experiment shows that over-confidence is indeed related to over-borrowing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth
is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the
sake of something else.
- Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, I.5 -
Money is one of the key prerequisites for leading a good life. Individuals who face a
lack of money do not just fall short of sufficient finances, but they are restricted in their
freedom to attain the desired set of functionings that they deem important for their
lives (Sen, 1999, 2003). Clearly, then, finances are ‘not the good we are seeking’ but they
are ‘for the sake of something else’. In the same manner, the proficient management
of finances is not an end in itself. Rather, the ability to save, invest, borrow, and to
take out insurances is an important functioning that helps individuals increase their
freedom and live the lives they envision.
Most individuals in industrialized countries are able to conveniently deal with fi-
nancial matters using a diverse range of services offered by banks, insurances, and
other financial service providers. However, access to such services is far from universal
in developing and emerging economies. Households in these economies have developed
sophisticated coping mechanisms in response to the lack of formal financial services
(Collins et al., 2009; Banerjee and Duflo, 2012). Yet, these mechanisms cannot fully
offset the effect of not having access to formal financial infrastructure. Therefore, indi-
viduals face greater risks with regards to unexpected shocks, they are constrained in
taking out loans keeping them from investing in their education, health, or businesses,
and their ability to save is limited due to insufficient safe storage places for money
1
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(Collins et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2013; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a; Dupas et al., 2018).
On a global scale, access to formal financial services is propagated as a key enabler to
achieving various of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Eradicating poverty (SDG
1), ending hunger (SDG 2), achieving good health (SDG 3) and gender equality (SDG
5) might be the most prominent goals that are connected to having access to finance
(Klapper et al., 2016).
Financial inclusion, defined as access to and use of formal financial services, has
hence been pushed forward by both researchers and high level policy makers alike such
as the G20 via the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, the United Nations, the
World Bank, and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion. And indeed, there is good news.
Since 2011, the number of adults owning a bank account worldwide has increased from
51 percent to 69 percent in 2017 (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2018). These are 1.2 billion
adults who have gained access to financial services since 2011. The unprecedented surge
in digital financial access contributes a fair share to this development. For example,
studies related to digitized payment systems find more efficient service delivery and
higher trust in the transfer providers and granting access to formal digital savings
products indicates positive household welfare impacts (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2017;
Karlan et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, about 1.7 billion people remain unbanked (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al.,
2018). The World Bank Group has, therefore, committed to the “Universal Financial
Access Initiative” ambitiously envisioning that all adults worldwide will be able to
access a formal bank account by the year 2020.
Simultaneously, a new frontier with respect to financial inclusion is emerging: It is
to move beyond access, to reach an active and informed usage of financial products.
Currently already, one fifth of formal bank accounts are dormant and two-thirds of
mobile money accounts are not used regularly (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2018).
All initiatives for enhanced access to finance will fail to make a long-lasting impact,
unless proponents of financial inclusion ensure that customers are able to make an
informed and beneficial use of products, which are tailored to their needs and well
regulated. Therefore, improved access to available financial products must be conjoined
with capacity building on how to use them in order to help customers make informed
decisions.
This dissertation contributes to advancing the understanding of financial inclusion
with special focus on its consequences in emerging economies. First, it considers the
effects of access to finance on business outcomes of micro and small enterprises (MSEs)
(Chapter 2). It analyzes whether a financial product itself changes financial behavior
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and business outcomes, thereby adding a new finding to the literature on cash transfers
in the business realm. The subsequent chapter elaborates on the individual skill set that
is beneficial for successful financial inclusion. On a macro level, it shows that financial
literacy is an important driver of both access to and use of finance (Chapter 3). The last
chapter focuses solely on the usage side and points out downsides of financial inclusion
processes (Chapter 4). Due to their focus on the demand side, chapters 3 and 4 add
an important and understudied aspect to the discussion of financial inclusion.
Road Map
Chapter 2, co-authored with Tevin Tafese, examines the effect of accessing formal
finance for MSEs in Uganda. Providing access to finance for entrepreneurs follows the
rationale that businesses have great growth potential because they likely realize high
marginal returns to capital in response to the injection of financial means into the
enterprises. Cash transfers are a way to alleviate possible constraints and have been
thoroughly studied (see, for example, with respect to MSEs de Mel et al., 2008, 2012;
Fafchamps et al., 2014; Berge et al., 2015; Blattman et al., 2016).
We add to the existing body of research by conducting a randomized controlled
trial, which has a special twist. In addition to paying transfers, we vary the mode
of receiving the money and analyze whether enterprises prosper relatively more upon
obtaining a transfer into their bank account contrary to receiving the money in cash.
Thereby, we implicitly assume the bank account to work as a commitment device, i.e.
beneficiaries are more likely to use the money for business related expenses as opposed
to on-the-go purchases, which might rather be made when the money is received in
cash.
Hence, Chapter 2 ultimately evolves around the question if access to formal financial
services and products themselves may drive positive changes in financial behavior.
While we do not find any overall direct effects of the transfer on profit and capital stock,
we detect positive treatment effects in the short term on more “upstream” business
variables, specifically on inventories and sales. For these outcomes, the bank account
indeed serves as a commitment device altering financial behavior because the effects
are only traceable for the ‘account treatment’ group and not for those who received
the money in cash.
Next, the dissertation turns to analyzing determinants of financial inclusion. Re-
search at the country level has shown that better financial inclusion is related to char-
acteristics such as more financial depth, clearer legal requirements, or low cost banking
services (Allen et al., 2016). These determinants are solely related to the supply side
of financial markets. Yet, functioning financial markets need not only adequate infras-
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tructure, but also informed customers, i.e. those with high financial literacy. Informed
customers will more likely make sophisticated financial decisions and demand higher
inclusion themselves. Therefore, Chapter 3 studies financial literacy and its role in
advancing financial inclusion at the country level. This becomes feasible thanks to
combining data on financial inclusion from the Global Findex Database with newly
available macro data that contain information about the state of financial literacy in
143 countries (Klapper et al., 2015; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2018).
We contribute twofold to the literature. First, we indeed find a positive relation be-
tween financial literacy and four measures of financial inclusion. Two of these measures
are rather concerned with providing access to financial services (account ownership,
debit card ownership). The other two measure the extent to which these services and
products are used (actively saving at a formal financial institution, using a debit card in
the last year). The relation persists even when controlling for institutional and country
characteristics. Second, financial literacy has a differing effect depending on the type
of financial inclusion. Regarding the access to finance, the marginal effect of financial
literacy decreases with higher financial depth, i.e. literacy can be substituted with a
better institutional environment. However, with regard to the use of financial products,
financial literacy and depth complement and even re-inforce each other. To respond to
reverse causality concerns, we employ an IV strategy, which supports a causal interpre-
tation of our results. In conclusion, we show that an informed client base equipped with
sufficient financial literacy is as important to advancing the cause of financial inclusion
as is increasing financial depth. The chapter is joint work with Antonia Grohmann and
Lukas Menkhoff and has been published in World Development.
While Chapter 3 finds that the individual skill set matters to benefit from access
to and use of finance, the last chapter points out a possible drawback of supply side
led financial inclusion. Analyzing data from rural households in Thailand, it examines
how overly positive expectations regarding future household income drive current debt
levels and the likelihood to be over-indebted. Chapter 4 is joint work with Melanie
Koch and Wiebke Stein.
Thailand is a prime example to study the consequences of financial access, as
more than 80% of the population have quite recently gained access to bank accounts
(Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2018). We elicit extensive data that allows us to compile differ-
ent debt indicators and to precisely calculate subjective expected household income,
which includes measures on different moments of the expected income distribution.
We find a robust relationship between biased income expectations and (over)-
indebtedness. The more income households expect to generate in the future, the more
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debt they accumulate, even to a point where it becomes detrimental to their financial
health. While accumulating debt with rising income is common and desirable, expec-
tations about rising income do not account for the possibility that the future income
will fail to rise as high as expected - making households more likely to become over-
indebted.
The results vary with respect to different debt and expectations indicators. ‘Hard’
or objective debt measures, such as the debt service to income ratio, are more affected
by the subjective expectation bias, which compares the amount of current and future
expected income. In contrast, the qualitatively elicited financial forecast error is more
strongly associated with ‘soft’ or subjective debt indicators measuring financial distress
rather than actual debt. These results persist also with various robustness specifica-
tions. Additionally, certainty about future income affects debt holdings, too. The more
certain respondents are about their income expectations, the more debt they accu-
mulate. Paired with the uncertain environment the households are situated in, this
increases the likelihood of falling into debt.
A lab-in-the-field experiment underpins these results by showing that overconfi-
dence regarding income is systematically related to over-spending. However, it cannot
establish causality because the exogenously varied level of self-confidence does not
result in a significant difference regarding the propensity to over-borrow. The paper
contributes to the small but growing literature on (over-)indebtedness and its drivers.
From a policy perspective, the findings call for building and improving knowledge about
financial products on the one hand, and about households’ financial situations on the
other hand.
In conclusion, this dissertation offers insights into financial inclusion in emerging
economies. There remain two contributions particularly noteworthy to the reader and
for the advancement of access and use of financial services in general. First, not only the
possibility to access finances bears positive outcomes on development but the mode of
accessing these resources alters financial decisions themselves. This may have far reach-
ing implications regarding the design of financial products. For example, government
transfers could be rolled out on bank accounts such that households’ savings behav-
ior is influenced positively. Moreover, formal financial service providers should develop
products conducive to their clients’ ‘financial health’ - especially in the context of
emerging economies, where access to finance has spread only recently (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
et al., 2017). Second, the skills and financial behavior of customers matter for the use
of financial infrastructure. Hence, from a demand side point of view, policies should
center around fostering financial knowledge and transparently communicating benefits
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and drawbacks of financial products, such that trust in the formal financial system is
built and a deepening of financial inclusion beyond access becomes feasible.
Chapter 2
Rethinking the Effectiveness of
Cash Transfers - Evidence from a
Field Experiment in Uganda1
with:
Tevin Tafese
1 This paper builds upon the author’s master thesis. We would like to thank seminar participants
in Hannover and Hamburg for helpful comments and suggestions on this essay, in particular Lena
Giesbert, Stephan Klasen, Jann Lay, Lukas Menkhoff, Sebastian Prediger, and Helke Seitz.
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2.1 Introduction
Cash transfer programs have spread rapidly across over 120 countries in recent years
and are a popular tool to fight poverty (World Bank, 2018a). The expansion of cash
transfer programs has been accompanied by a growing body of studies evaluating their
efficacy.2 Indeed, most of them positively affect a broad range of outcomes, such as
children’s educational attainment (Baird et al., 2014), access to and use of health care
facilities (Cahyadi et al., 2018), nutritional status (Manley et al., 2013), and household
consumption (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016).
A special type of cash transfers are grant or loan focused programs aimed at individ-
uals who want to establish micro or small enterprises (MSEs) or who already run them.
While these programs vary in size and scope, they follow the rationale that the (poten-
tial) entrepreneurs have good ideas and stamina, hence, might realize high returns to
capital, but are financially constrained to borrow, save, or invest (Banerjee and Duflo,
2012; Dupas and Robinson, 2013b).3 Cash transfers or grants may alleviate these finan-
cial frictions and help entrepreneurs grow their businesses and increase earned income
(Blattman et al., 2018).4 Acknowledging the popularity and policy relevance of cash
transfer programs, a substantial body of research discusses whether the mechanism of
cash injections lifting capital constraints holds true, and if yes, under which conditions
(see de Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; de Mel et al., 2012; Fafchamps
et al., 2014, among others). We build upon this existing work and examine whether a
cash transfer of 300,000 Ugandan Shilling (UGX, about 100 PPP USD) to 96 micro
and small entrepreneurs in Kampala, Uganda, affects their businesses’ profitability.
Adding to the well developed literature on cash transfers, we introduce a special
twist in our randomized controlled trial: We additionally examine whether the impact of
the cash transfer varies with the mode of receiving it. Research in behavioral economics
and psychology shows that people’s actions often hinge on the default option, i.e.
individuals do not make an active choice but silently agree to the default that is put in
place for them (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Somville and Vandewalle, 2018). Following
this logic, we test whether the mode (i.e. the default option) of receiving the unexpected
cash transfer affects MSE owners differently due to their initial inertia. That is, half of
our treatment group received the transfer directly in cash, while for the other half of
2 For a comprehensive and rigorous review of the literature consult Bastagli, Hagen-Zanker, Harman,
Barca, Sturge, and Schmidt (Bastagli et al.).
3 Baird et al. (2018) coin the channel through which these transfers work the “self-employment
liquidity effect”.
4 We omit discussing the literature on microcredit here although it is based on a similar mechanism.
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the treatment group, we deposited the respective amount on their bank accounts. We
assume that business owners who received the transfer in cash are more likely to spend
the money right away as it is immediately available. Receiving the money on the bank
account, however, might work as a soft commitment device for these entrepreneurs and
help them to use it in a more organized manner, such as for business investments. All
treated businesses are located in the urban centre of Kampala and bank branches or
ATMs are nearby. Thus we expect transaction costs for the account treatment arm to
be negligible. Any impact of the treatment for the latter group would consequently be
due to the “default-option” effect of depositing it in the account and not due to high
transaction costs. Following de Mel et al. (2008) and using detailed survey information
on both entrepreneurs’ businesses and households, we study the impacts of the cash
transfer on business profits and capital stock. Furthermore we investigate whether
inventories, sales, and (business) savings change in response to the positive shock. As
the randomized trial is embedded in a longer term project on micro-enterprise growth
in sub-Saharan Africa, we are able to trace entrepreneurs not only in the short term (i.e.
6 months after they receive the cash grant), but up to four years after the intervention.
Beneficiaries report a significantly different usage of the transfer by treatment arm
when asked about the subsequent use of the money in the short-term follow-up six
months after the intervention: Entrepreneurs in the account treatment save signifi-
cantly more of the transfer compared to the cash receivers. In contrast, those in the
cash treatment arm report to invest significantly more money into their businesses.
These responses indicate that depositing the transfer on the bank account may possi-
bly work as a soft-commitment device and that entrepreneurs in the cash treatment
arm nevertheless use the money for business purposes despite money being fungible
and the enumerators not framing what beneficiaries should do with the transfer.
Our intent-to-treat effects, however, do not mirror these self-reported survey results.
Although we find weak evidence for positive treatment impacts on upstream business
variables such as inventories and sales for the account treatment group in the short
term, they do not translate into sustained higher capital stocks or profits. In line with
Fiala (2018), we do not detect any overall direct effect of the cash transfer on profits and
capital stocks for any of the treatment arms, in the studied time period. Further, our
heterogeneous treatment effects analysis reveals that men and women are not affected
differently by the grant, neither in the cash nor in the account group. We find evidence
for heterogeneous treatment effects only with respect to the level of education and
baseline business savings of the entrepreneur. In both treatment arms, entrepreneurs
with higher baseline business savings generate higher monthly sales. Interacting the
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treatment with high education at baseline (i.e. at least having completed the A-levels),
results in higher savings for entrepreneurs in both treatment groups. However as before,
profits and capital stocks remain unaffected. Summarized, the way the money is handed
out to recipients does not affect its subsequent use. Perhaps more importantly our
(non-)results fail to provide evidence for the cash transfer to have an effect on micro
and small enterprises. In line with a number of recent studies, our findings call into
question the effectiveness of cash transfers as a means to spur growth in micro and
small enterprises.
Literature
The paper relates to two main strands of literature: (i) We add to the extensive body of
research on micro enterprise growth by presenting heterogeneous results with respect
to the initial capabilities the entrepreneurs have to run their business successfully.
Furthermore we are able to show mid to long term results of cash transfers for micro
and small businesses. (ii) Studying different modes of receiving the transfer allows us
to examine whether the transfer on a bank account induces a default effect and hence
influences financial decision making behavior.
(i) Cash transfer programs are typically seen as an effective tool to help firms over-
come credit constraints and increase business profits in the short and medium term
(e.g. de Mel et al., 2008, 2012). Among others, Blattman et al. (2016) vary the type
of a cash transfer by additionally providing business training and supervision on top
of a cash grant to “ultra-poor” women in Uganda and find large income gains after
18 months. In Sri Lanka and Ghana, micro and small business owners receive grants
either in cash or in-kind (de Mel et al., 2012; Fafchamps et al., 2014). They result in
positive effects on earnings for existing entrepreneurs in the short and medium term,
whereby in Ghana, only female entrepreneurs benefit from the in-kind grant and there
is no effect from providing cash. Other studies also fail to find overall significant ef-
fects of cash transfers: Berge et al. (2015) for example state that cash grants are often
consumed quickly instead of being used for investments by the entrepreneur. They
find positive heterogeneous results of the intervention with the effect being more pro-
nounced for male-led enterprises. Studying a grant, loan, and training intervention,
Fiala (2018) cannot report any income effects from the grant treatment arm on neither
female or male led businesses. He also fails to find an impact of any treatment for
female businesses. A cash grant for young men engaged in petty crime in Monrovia,
Liberia, also does not find lasting effects on business outcomes, which may be due to
the dire conditions the men live in as the authors suggest (Blattman et al., 2017).
Newer studies explore whether cash transfer programs prevent the inter-generational
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transmission of poverty. In a 10-year follow-up of a cash transfer in Ecuador, Araujo
et al. (2017) report at most modest effects from the intervention on schooling outcomes
of children. Blattman et al. (2014) and Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) present positive
short-term results of two distinct cash transfer interventions on skilled self-employment
and psychological well-being, respectively. Blattman et al. (2018) and Haushofer and
Shapiro (2018), however, find that these effects dissipate over time. Blattman et al.
(2018) point out that the convergence effect of the control group over time is often
neglected in short term studies. Cash transfers might just shift entrepreneurial invest-
ments in time, but, as time goes by, non-treated entrepreneurs may also accumulate
money and realize similar investments causing the initial effects on earned income to
fade away. Our study adds to the longer term literature by accounting for changes up
to four years after the intervention took place.
Another part of the literature on micro enterprise growth deals with the heterogene-
ity of the informal sector beyond the effect of entrepreneurs’ gender. It distinguishes
between a lower tier home to necessity entrepreneurs or survivalists and an upper tier
consisting of high growth enterprises (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). Grimm et al.
(2012) develop the concept of “constrained gazelles” entrepreneurs, i.e. business own-
ers who exhibit high growth entrepreneurial potential (e.g. a high education, yet young
age of the firm) but are limited by the lack of capital. This group tries to reach the
upper tier but fails to do so. Evidently, exactly targeting these gazelles would improve
the effectiveness of cash transfer programs. More recent studies succeed in identifying
this special subgroup of entrepreneurs either via community panel decisions (Hussam
et al., 2018) or through business plan competitions (Fafchamps and Woodruff, 2016;
Fafchamps and Quinn, 2017; McKenzie, 2017). Winners from these competitions are,
among other things, more likely to be self-employed and to have more employees com-
pared to those that rank second or third in the competition. Hence, cash transfers
prove especially useful when targeted at the most promising group of (potential) en-
trepreneurs. Our heterogeneous findings are in line with this evidence as we check for
characteristics that determine successful entrepreneurship such as the level of education
and the amount of savings.
(ii) The intervention studied here exploits variation in the mode of payment. We
hypothesize that the deposit in the bank account works as a soft commitment device
and hence enables us to study financial behavior. Research on savings behavior in
particular finds that opposed to standard models of decision making, individuals tend
to stick to the default option more often as is predicted (Choi et al., 2003). These
“default options” may be used to “nudge” people toward an outcome profitable for
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them (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Empirical examples for this are for example the
research on 401(k) savings plans (Madrian and Shea, 2001) and on (default) organ
decisions (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). More similar to the context our work is based
in, Fafchamps et al. (2014) detect a “flypaper effect” when in-kind transfers are made
into small businesses in urban Ghana. While there is no effect on business outcomes for
the group that received cash, the in-kind transfers remain in the business and result
in increased profits for larger enterprises. A similar mechanism may play a role in
our intervention. Business owners’ inertia may keep them from directly consuming the
transfer deposited in the account and rather help them use it for productive purposes.
Lastly, our paper is related to work by Somville and Vandewalle (2018) and Brune
et al. (2017) who study the effect of a cash transfer on savings behavior. These papers
provide money either in cash or on a bank account to households in India and Malawi.
While Somville and Vandewalle (2018) confirm a direct and large impact of the repeated
small transfers on household savings, Brune et al. (2017) find that a one-time-transfer
only has limited effects on consumption and savings. Brune et al. (2017) explain these
differing results by the fact that Somville and Vandewalle (2018) repeatedly deposit
money in individual bank accounts and only find significantly different results after
individuals have already received the transfers for several weeks. The work presented
here examines a one-time cash transfer as in Brune et al. (2017) and differs from the
two studies cited above mainly in terms of the target group. We specifically focus on
business owners and do not only study the direct effects on the account savings balance
but take into account business related outcomes such as profits, capital stock, sales,
and business inventories.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the study background and
Section 2.3 the data used. It discusses the procedure of randomly allocating treatment
and control groups, presents an attrition analysis and describes what respondents sub-
jectively state to use the transfer for. Section 2.4 describes the estimation strategy along
with main treatment results and heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 2.5 discusses
limitations of our study and presents robustness tests before Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Background and Study Design
In this section we first briefly introduce the context the intervention was held in and
then proceed to describe the experimental set-up in more detail.
Background
The study took place in urban Kampala which is the capital of Uganda. The country
has seen considerable economic growth that slowed down from on average 7 percent
annually during 1990-2010 to 4.5 percent p.a. in the five years prior to 2016, which
also comprise the intervention period (World Bank, 2018b). In 2013, the time when
the intervention set in, about 81 percent of the working-age population were self-
employed, predominantly working in agriculture, followed by micro-enterprises. The
latter cover about 90 percent of private sector production and employ over 2.5 million
people (Fiala, 2018). While population growth and increased life expectancy will add
more and more young people to the labor force in the future, they will face few wage
employment opportunities and thus, self-employment is likely to expand. The majority
of micro enterprises, however, face various constraints to business growth, of which lack
of capital and missing skills are most important.
The intervention tackles capital constraints in particular and focuses on the dif-
ference between transferring an unconditional grant directly in cash versus on a bank
account. In 2017, 59 percent of Ugandans owned some form of formal bank account com-
pared to 44 percent in 2014 and 20 percent in 2011 (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2015, 2018).
Account ownership has been boosted substantially by the spread of mobile money
accounts which outweigh by far the sole ownership of a bank account at a financial in-
stitution. Hence, provided that the account treatment really induces a soft-commitment
effect, using the financial infrastructure via (mobile) cashless banking could promise
an avenue for scalable interventions lifting capital constraints from business owners in
the future.5
Experimental Design
The intervention was conducted by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies
(GIGA, Hamburg) in collaboration with the Centre for Basic Research in Kampala.
5 Somville and Vandewalle (2018) motivate their research by efforts of the Indian government to
spread cashless banking throughout the sub-continent. While they do not examine the policy’s
consequences for micro enterprises, this paper shows possible implications for this sub-group.
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The study is part of a wider research project on “Performance and Dynamics of Micro
and Small Firms in Developing Countries”. Listing of businesses for the final sample
was carried out together with the first baseline survey in October 2012. In April 2013, a
second baseline survey was conducted followed by the implementation of the treatment.
Trained enumerators interviewed the sample in a follow-up survey in October 2013
succeeded by further surveys in October 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Entrepreneurs
answered comprehensive questionnaires covering firm characteristics and performance,
and provided information on personal and household characteristics including their
financial situation and behavioral attitudes. We calculate a pooled treatment effect
over all waves alongside a short-term effect including October 2013 and October 2014
and a rather long-term effect covering possible impacts from 2015 to 2017.
The overall baseline sample was drawn using a two-stage sampling procedure. A
subset of this sample was eligible to participate in the intervention in either the con-
trol or the treatment groups. It was drawn in the following way: First, 16 out of 220
geographical business zones in Kampala were randomly selected and all firms were
listed therein.6 Second, 450 micro or small enterprises were randomly drawn strati-
fied by industry branches.7 Finally, a random sub-sample of entrepreneurs was chosen
to participate in the cash transfer intervention. In order to effectively capture micro
and small enterprises, the random sample excluded enterprises with more than five
employees and the ten percent enterprises with highest capital stocks (measured in
October 2012). Table 2.1 shows the distribution of businesses across industries. Note
that businesses in the “hair dressing and beauty” industry were oversampled in order
to balance out male over-representation in branches such as “retail electric, phones,
household appliances and related services” or “manufacturing”.
[Table 2.1 about here.]
To avoid a possible “double-intervention”, only banked entrepreneurs were eligible for
the money transfer: The treatment effect would otherwise not be distinguishable from
either opening a bank account per se or depositing the cash grant on the account had
non-banked entrepreneurs been included in our sample draw. In fact, baseline data
reveal that non-banked entrepreneurs exhibit significantly lower profits and capital
6 We applied cluster sampling: The zones were selected with a probability proportionate to the number
of enterprises listed within them.
7 Industries were divided in “hair dressing and beauty”, “manufacture of printing/paper products and
related services”, “manufacture of textile/wearing apparel (tailors) and related services”, “manu-
facturing (remaining sectors)”, “retail and wholesale (remaining sectors”, “retail clothing, footwear,
and leather”, “retail electric, phones, household appliances and related services”, and “other”.
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stock, and lower levels of education. We therefore cannot draw conclusions on the
effect of the transfer on the overall population but have to restrict our contribution to
banked persons who, as already mentioned, represent more than half of the Ugandan
population.
The experiment had two treatment arms. Originally, 50 businesses were randomly
drawn to receive the cash transfer directly while 50 other enterprises were assigned
to receive the grant on their bank account. 80 entrepreneurs were sampled for the
banked control group. Several businesses had stopped working or shifted premises or
could not be tracked for other reasons at the time when the intervention was to be
realized (April 2013). These entrepreneurs were randomly replaced with other business
owners that had answered the baseline survey from October 2012 already. Furthermore,
three businesses differed in their intended and actual treatment status.8 Thus, in the
main part of this paper, we estimate intent to treat estimates based on assignment to
treatment in October 2012.
The final sample for our analysis is shown in Table 2.2.9 Differences in planned
and actual number of respondents arise due to the following reasons: One entrepreneur
was listed twice and randomly selected for both the cash and the account transfer.
We dropped these observations from our sample since receiving double the amount of
money could distort our results. One business owner assigned for the account treatment
was dropped from the sample because an employee instead of the actual owner had
been interviewed. Furthermore, two entrepreneurs from the intended control and the
cash groups, respectively, could not be interviewed at time of the intervention and did
not get replaced. Last, baseline data for one entrepreneur in the account treatment
group was deleted, because a wrong person had been interviewed. This explains why
there is an additional respondent in the account treatment group in April 2013.
[Table 2.2 about here.]
The transfer amounted to 300,000 UGX which represents roughly monthly pre-intervention
profits for the median firm in our sample. Receipt of the transfer was framed as remu-
neration for participation in the survey. Business owners were free to use the money as
8 One entrepreneur was assigned to receive the account transfer, but turned out not to have a bank
account. Another business owner that was assigned to receive an account treatment actually received
the money in cash. The same happened for a person who was assigned for cash but who received
the money via a bank account transfer. These business owners differed in their intended and actual
treatment status.
9 Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the distribution of respondents who actually received the transfer
or were actually included in the control group. Higher numbers in the control group arise due to
more entrepreneurs having a bank account than previously stated at baseline in October 2012.
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they liked. In this, we follow de Mel et al. (2008) line of argument who state that not
restricting the use of funds results in more honest reporting in subsequent waves. While
the cash group received the money directly after they had responded to the April 2013
survey, the account treatment group received the money between one to fourteen days
after the interview had taken place due to the enumerator team rechecking banking
details and the banks’ need for time to transfer the money. The control group received
the standard remuneration of 7,000 UGX that was regularly paid out after answering
the questionnaire.
2.3 Data
This section explains how our main dependent variables are measured and deals with
differential attrition over time. It also provides baseline summary statistics and survey
results on what entrepreneurs state to use the cash transfer for.
2.3.1 Measurement of Main Variables
In line with de Mel et al. (2008), our main outcome variables are the firm’s monthly prof-
its and capital stock. Basic treatment effects on these variables are calculated both in
levels and logs to increase the robustness of the analysis. Furthermore, we test whether
the transfer affected the amount of business inventories, sales, and total savings.
As de Mel et al. (2009b) recommend, profits were elicited directly from the respon-
dent by asking a single survey question.10 According to them, this yields more precise
estimates and performs better than calculating profits from detailed expenditure and
revenue information. Field work experience confirms this view. Hence we are optimistic
to use a realistic profit measure in our analysis. Similar to profits, total monthly sales
are elicited directly from the entrepreneur.
Capital stock is derived from asking about business assets with respect to machinery,
furniture, business tools, vehicles, land and business premises, and other remaining
assets. Categorizing assets along these lines is supposed to help the entrepreneur recall
assets as comprehensively as possible. Business owners did not only report the quantity
but also the replacement value of assets at the time of the survey and whether they are
rented or owned. These pieces of information are provided in each wave whereas the
10 Enumerators ask the following: “What was the total profit the business made in the last four weeks
after paying all expenses including wages of employees, raw materials, items for resale, electricity,
water, fuel, rental etc.?” A second question elicits whether stated profits include the entrepreneurs
personal income. If this is not the case, personal income is added to the profit measure.
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replacement value of the former wave is repeated in the preceding survey as a built-in
anchor. Values are corrected for if the respondents state that the past replacement
value for a specific item is unrealistic. This is particularly done so for the October
2012 survey. While the replacement value accounts for asset depreciation, inflation is
not considered. The capital stock measure we use in our analysis comprises the various
asset groups except for the value of land and buildings because respondents find it hard
to state a specific value and tend to overstate these values.
More specifically, inventories include the value of all items held as consumables, raw
materials and finished goods. For the case of a carpenter for example, this means raw
materials being wooden planks and finished goods being a bed, window frame, door etc.
As the value of all raw materials and finished goods is asked generally without precisely
pinning down goods one by one, the values are likely prone to measurement error. How-
ever, entrepreneurs preponderantly reported to use the cash transfer to buy inventories
and equipment, so we include this measure in the regression analysis nevertheless.
Last, total savings amount to the sum of savings at home, savings on a bank account,
on a mobile money account, at a savings club, and savings that are kept with neighbors
or trusted friends. Business savings comprise only the money which is labeled for specific
use in the business. All monetary measures are deflated to price levels in 2011 and stated
in 1,000 UGX.
2.3.2 Sample Attrition
Short-term attrition between April and October 2013 was 3.4 percent while longer-
term attrition up to the latest survey in 2017 amounts to 36.6 percent. Table 2.2
suggests that a higher share of business owners from the control group could not be
interviewed in the follow-up waves contrary to the treated entrepreneurs. To test for
differential attrition in our sample, we regress interview status in the follow-up round on
treatment assignment for each wave separately and over all waves at once. We estimate
the regression in the following form (see Dupas and Robinson, 2013b):
yi = β0 + β1AccountTreatment+ β2CashTreatment+ i (2.1)
The dependent variable yi equals 1 if the person could not be surveyed in the respective
follow up wave, AccountTreatment and CashTreatment are dummy variables turning
one if the respondent received the grant on a bank account, or in cash, respectively. The
constant β0 reflects the likelihood of the omitted treatment group, i.e. the respondents
assigned to the control group, to not be followed-up. Table 2.3 depicts the results.
Chapter 2 18
[Table 2.3 about here.]
Entrepreneurs in both treatment arms were not more likely to be untracked in the
follow-up waves than their control group counterpart. Even contrary, those who received
the transfer in cash were more likely to be surveyed in the pooled regression over all
waves (Table 2.3, column (6)). There is, however, differential attrition with respect to
the control group as the coefficient for the constant is significantly positive throughout
the waves (except for October 2016). Perhaps control entrepreneurs expected some
kind of higher return for participation in the survey and refused to be interviewed
upon noticing there was no reward besides the remuneration fee to be gained.
Business owners who left the sample exhibit different characteristics than those who
stayed in the sample at baseline, i.e. during waves one and two. (for details see Table
A.2 in Appendix A). They were generally better off than those who were interviewed
in subsequent waves. Among other characteristics, these business owners were younger,
more aﬄuent, more likely to have a university degree and to speak English fluently.
Their firms were younger, they had higher start-up capital and savings while they
generated more profits and higher sales. Acknowledging these differences, we apply
Lee-bounds to our analysis in Section 2.5.
2.3.3 Summary Statistics and Balance Tests
We first present a short summary of important baseline characteristics for the whole
sample before we turn to evaluate the randomization procedure. McKenzie (2012) shows
that using multiple pre- and post treatment rounds in impact evaluations increases es-
timate precision especially when outcome variables are likely to be noisy and relatively
less auto-correlated such as - as he states - business profits, and household incomes and
expenditures. Thus, we use data from the first two pre-treatment rounds as an average
baseline and present summary statistics and results from balance tests regarding ran-
domization into treatment and control groups in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. Items that
were only elicited in one of the pre-treatment waves are marked with an asterisk.
[Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 about here.]
At baseline, there are more male than female business owners in our sample (59 percent
vs. 41 percent) who are mostly between 25 and 47 year old. 68 percent of entrepreneurs
are married and the median household has 5 members. 95 percent of sampled business
owners report to be literate. 10 percent did not finish primary school, 30 percent com-
pleted primary school, 24 percent finished middle school, 18 percent completed their
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A-levels and 15 percent completed university. The median business owner responds
correctly to 7 out of 10 questions testing financial literacy and works about twelve
hours a day for six days a week in the business. 84 percent of business owners are
rather impatient, i.e. they would prefer to receive 20,000 UGX in one week’s time over
receiving 30,000 UGX in five weeks’ time. Regarding firms at baseline, the median firm
age is about 5 years, it has one employee, and median monthly profits range at 350,000
UGX while the median capital stock lies at 738,000 UGX. The median business sells
items worth about 1,705,500 UGX a month and incurs costs of about 1,175,000 UGX
which are split into costs for raw materials, finished goods, and other expenses such
as business rent or electricity payments. Only 21 percent of all micro enterprises are
formally registered with the Ugandan revenue authority.
There are significant differences with regard to some baseline characteristics which
are most probably due to the small sample size.11 Specifically, entrepreneurs in the
account treatment group are less likely to work in the trade sector, but more likely
to work in the services or other business sectors (Table 2.4). Moreover, entrepreneurs
in the account group have significantly more employees and work slightly less in their
business than their control group counterpart. There is a higher share of business owners
with completed O-levels in the account group. While their businesses had significantly
less start-up capital at their command, their monthly value-added is higher than that
of the control group.
Entrepreneurs in the cash treatment group also differ from control business owners
in various ways (Table 2.5): On average, their households are significantly bigger and
they are older than those in the control group. They are less likely to work in the
central (and busy) division, but rather likely to operate in the Makindye Division a
little more outside of the city center. They rather work in the services and other sectors
as compared to the control group and - similar to the account treatment arm - there is
a higher share of entrepreneurs with completed A-levels. Also, businesses in the cash
treatment group produce more value added while having had less start-up capital at
hand.
Lastly, cash and account treatment also exhibit significant differences with respect
to the location of their work, the educational level, and entrepreneur’s age (Table
2.6). At least, differences between the two treatment arms are few and there are no
significant different business characteristics. This is good news since we are especially
11 One reason for the randomization failing partly might be that the randomization only happened
between treatment and control and not between the different treatment arms and the control group.
Differences between the overall treatment and control group are less pronounced.
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interested in whether the cash grant had a differential impact on either of the treatment
arms. However, acknowledging these differences, we control for baseline values of the
respective variables in each of the subsequent regressions.
2.3.4 Self-Reported Evidence on Use of Cash Transfer
In the first follow-up wave in October 2013, six months after the intervention had taken
place, business owners are asked to state what they used the money for. 10.4 percent (5
entrepreneurs) of those in the account group had not withdrawn any money yet. 30 out
of 48 account entrepreneurs withdrew at least some money from the transfer 1-2 weeks
after arrival. Three business owners in the account treatment saved the money for a
while and withdrew only in August 2013 or later. In the cash treatment arm almost
half of treated business owners (22 out of 46 persons) deposited between 40,000 UGX
and 300,000 UGX at their bank accounts after receiving the transfer.
[Figures 2.1 and 2.2 about here.]
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the subjectively stated use of the monetary transfer by
treatment group and by gender, respectively. Generally, entrepreneurs state to use the
money predominantly to invest in business inventory and equipment for current or new
businesses.
[Tables 2.7 and 2.8 about here.]
According to the subjective data, business owners in the cash group spend significantly
more money on business inventory and equipment than treated account entrepreneurs
(212,045 UGX vs. 167,917 UGX) (Table 2.7). Most entrepreneurs increase their ex-
penditures on stock depending on the business sector (e.g. electrical appliances, hair
products, clothes, fabric, timber, food). Some use the money as “top-up” and invest
larger amounts in, e.g. new machinery for wood workshops. Expenditures also include
costs for business rent, and electricity. Conversely, respondents in the account treatment
group save significantly more money than those in the cash group (42,708 UGX vs.
9,090 UGX). There are no other significant differences between the treatment groups.
Asked for whether any of the entrepreneurs in the treatment groups introduce new or
innovative products, two sided t-tests reveal no significant difference between the two
treatment arms and between treatment and control group.
Splitting treated entrepreneurs by gender reveals that women invest higher amounts
in business inventory and equipment for their current business as men while men invest
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also in new businesses (Table 2.8). Contrary to our expectations, women do not state to
use significantly more money for household expenditures than men. However, as money
is fungible these descriptive data only provide some rough pattern on the possible use
of the transfer.
2.4 Results
This section first explains the empirical strategy we employ before reporting the main
results of the cash transfer. We then proceed to present results from a heterogeneity
analysis with respect to the gender of the business owner, baseline educational status
and baseline (business) savings.
2.4.1 Estimation Strategy
To test the hypotheses introduced in Section 2.1, we estimate the following intention
to treat (ITT) model:
Yit = α + β1Accountit + β2Cashi,t + δt + θY¯i0 +
∑
γiXi0 + eit (2.2)
where i refers to a specific business, t is time and Yi,t represents the outcome of
interest. Accounti,t takes the value one from the first post-treatment round on if the
business owner was assigned to receive the transfer on the bank account. Likewise,
Cashi,t is a dummy variable which indicates whether the entrepreneur belongs to the
cash treatment arm. We include Y¯i,0 - the baseline outcome value of the dependent
variable for firm i - in the regression as it increases statistical precision (McKenzie,
2012). Additionally, the matrix Xi,0 controls for those baseline characteristics that
were different between treatment and control arms, i.e. the divisions and industries the
businesses operate in, educational levels and age of the entrepreneur, initial wealth, the
amount of start-up capital, the number of employees and firm age. In our analysis we
make use of two available baselines and pool them to increase statistical power, because
data on business outcomes are often found to be quite noisy (de Mel et al., 2009b).
Moreover, δt are wave fixed effects, and ei,t is the error term. All standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and robust.
To increase statistical power we present results from a pooled regression over all
waves as well as short term results only using data from the first two post-treatment
waves (October 2013 and October 2014) and longer term results using data from the
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last three survey waves (October 2015, October 2016, October 2017). We explicitly
include the long-term measure as recent research by e.g. Blattman et al. (2018) points
out the need for longer term evaluation of cash transfers.
To further lower the impact of outliers on our results, we adapt the trimming proce-
dure of de Mel et al. (2008) by trimming the top and bottom 5 percent of observations
whose profits change most positively and most negatively between waves. We include
both absolute as well as percentage changes in our measure.12
As already mentioned, we analyze heterogeneous treatment effects in a second step
employing a similar estimation framework as above:
Yit = α + β1Accountit + β2Cashit + β3malei0 + β4(Account ∗malei,0)
+ β5(Cash ∗malei0) + δt + θY¯i0 +
∑
γiXi0 + eit
(2.3)
The coefficients β4 and β5 display the interaction effect of being male and the respective
treatment. The coefficients β1 and β2 then measure the average effect of having received
the 300,000 UGX either on the bank account or cash on hands for treated women. The
overall impact of receiving the money by treatment group for males is measured by
β1 +β4 and by β2 +β5, respectively. In further regressions, we exchange the interaction
term male with baseline (business) savings and educational achievement.
2.4.2 Estimation of Basic Experimental Treatment Effects
We focus our main interest on business profitability variables in line with de Mel et al.
(2008) and test whether the cash grant had an impact on the firm’s capital stock and
deflated monthly profits. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present basic estimation results. Columns
(1) to (3) in each of the respective tables show estimation results in levels, columns (4)
to (6) depict results in logs.
[Tables 2.9 and 2.10 about here.]
Capital Stock and Profits Opposed to much of the literature on unconditional cash
transfers, we do not find a short term effect of the grant on either treatment arm with
respect to capital stock and monthly profits. Also, the various time dimensions do
not reveal much: all coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero,
hence we cannot detect a possible short-term effect fading out in the longer term or
vice versa, a longer term effect materializing when higher returns can be reaped from
12 Running the regressions with an untrimmed sample reinforces the need for truncation as coefficients
are unreasonably high and driven by outliers.
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initial investments. As the coefficients in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 switch signs across the
specifications, especially for profits and in the cash treatment arm, it seems reasonable
to conclude that it is not the small sample size which causes our non-findings.
Furthermore, we include the number of inventories and the amount of savings as
outcome variables, because the data on the self-reported use of the transfer indicates
significant differences among the treatment groups for these variables (see Figures 2.1
and 2.2 in Section 2.3). We measure savings as total savings the business owner has,
and savings specifically targeted at the business. Higher inventories might induce higher
sales in the long run, so we include this variable as our last outcome measure as well.
Tables 2.11 to 2.14 present regression results with respect to these four additional
outcome variables. As above, columns (1) to (3) depict results in levels, and columns
(4) to (6) show results in logs.
[Tables 2.11, 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 about here.]
Inventories The transfer has a significant positive effect on inventories in logs in the
short term for the account treatment arm (see Table 2.11, column (5)), which persists
also when we run the respective regressions with the untrimmed sample. Results for
the cash treatment group are also positive in the short term, but not significant. This
is encouragingly in line with our self-reported results regarding the use of the cash
transfer. Oddly, inventories decrease in the cash treatment arm in the long term.
Sales As presumed, higher inventories translate into higher sales (see Table 2.12,
column (1) and (2)). The effect of the treatment on account receivers is consistently
positive in all our specifications and significant in the short-term and pooled leveled
regressions. However, the size of the coefficients in the level regressions is unrealistically
high suggesting it is possibly driven by outliers. Yet, the results stay positive albeit not
significant in the log regressions which makes us confident to say that there is indeed
a positive effect of the transfer for the account treatment arm with respect to sales.
(Business) Savings Results with regards to total and business savings are incon-
clusive between the level and log regressions as coefficients change signs (see Tables
2.13 and 2.14). There is no direct and robust treatment effect of the cash transfer with
respect to (business) savings.
Summarized, these (non-)results fail to provide evidence for the cash transfer to
have a direct and robust effect on micro and small enterprise profits and capital stock.
However, we find modest positive treatment effects on the upstream outcome variables
inventories and sales which indicate that the account treatment arm benefited more
from the transfer than the cash treatment group. That is in line with our hypothesis
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of the account treatment arm working as a soft commitment device to use the cash
transfer for business related purposes.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity of Treatment Impacts
In what follows, we ask whether the provided cash grant had differing effects on
various subroups. In particular, the heterogeneity analysis examines whether varying
amounts of baseline savings affect business outcome variables differently. Furthermore,
we present results of interacting the treatment with gender and the baseline level of
education in the Appendix (Tables A.3 to A.14).
Interaction with baseline business savings
The high economic size of coefficients for most basic estimations (especially for capital
stock and inventories) suggests that entrepreneurs might have topped up the transfer
with own money to make bigger investments. To check for this, we interact the treat-
ment with the amount of business and total savings at baseline. The values are deflated
and demeaned such that a one unit change represents a deviation from mean baseline
(business) savings.
[Tables 2.15 to 2.22 about here.]
For capital stock as dependent variable, the interaction effect between higher baseline
business savings and the two treatment arms is negative throughout and significant for
the pooled and short term specifications (Table 2.15). The economic size of the interac-
tion is very small. This finding indicates that the capital stock of treated entrepreneurs
with lower baseline business savings increases relatively more compared to those with
higher baseline business savings. This negates the thought of entrepreneurs using their
savings to top up the cash transfer and increase the businesses’ capital stock.
However, having higher baseline business savings at one’s disposal results in signif-
icantly higher monthly profits for the account treatment arm in the short term in the
levels regression and for the cash treatment group in the long-term in the log regression
(Table 2.16). The sign of coefficients stays stable across all specifications only for the
account treatment group. We also find that entrepreneurs in the account group with
higher baseline business savings accumulate more inventories than those with lower
baseline business savings in the short term in the levels regression (Table 2.17). In the
long term, there are no significant interaction effects in neither group.
With regards to sales, entrepreneurs in both treatment arms who have higher busi-
ness savings sell more than those with lower savings (Table 2.18). The economic size
of the effect is rather small, though.
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There are two remarks to take away from the interaction of the treatment with
baseline business savings: One, there is no clear differential treatment effect with re-
gards to the treatment arms. The soft-commitment device does not work in this kind
of heterogeneity analysis. Two, while higher business savings do not positively affect
the capital stock of treated entrepreneurs, profits, inventories and sales are modestly
and positively affected from having more savings at baseline.
Interaction with baseline total savings
As is the case with business savings, we also find a negative interaction effect for those
business owners with higher savings at baseline for the account treatment arm with
respect to capital stock (Table 2.19). It is significant, but economically small in size.
The interaction term with respect to profits is similarly small and indicates a negative
treatment effect for those with higher savings at baseline compared to those with lower
savings at baseline, too.
Regarding inventories as dependent variable, interaction effects across both treat-
ment arms are rather inconclusive. While entrepreneurs with higher savings in the
account group benefit from the transfer and accumulate more inventories in the short
run directly after the intervention took place, inventories for business owners in the
cash group are positively affected in the short term, but negatively in the long term.
Last, the most conclusive results exist for the interaction of savings with treatment
when we consider monthly sales as outcome variable (Table 2.18). For the account treat-
ment arm only, the interaction is significant and positive indicating that entrepreneurs
with higher savings at baseline are able to sell more due to the cash transfer compared
to those with lower savings.
Similarly to business savings, capital stock and profits shrink the more savings
entrepreneurs accumulate due to the cash transfer while sales, however, increase with
the amount of savings entrepreneurs own. These findings do not clearly reveal whether
savings were used to top up the cash transfer and invest. However, at least for sales as
outcome variable, there is a positive interaction effect for the account treatment arm,
which suggests modest positive evidence for the soft commitment device being at work.
In concluding the heterogeneity analysis, we find some evidence that the more
savings entrepreneurs (especially in the account treatment group) have at baseline, the
more they sell due to the transfer. If treated entrepreneurs have higher business savings
in particular, monthly profits and inventories increase due to the cash transfer as well.
Also, as we show in the Appendix, higher educated entrepreneurs in any treatment
group save and sell relatively more compared to lower educated entrepreneurs. Last,
we cannot confirm that men and women benefit differently from the transfer.
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2.5 Robustness Tests and Discussion
In this section, we provide robustness results and discuss limitations of our study.
We apply Lee-Bounds to deal with differential attrition in our sample (Lee, 2009). To
construct these bounds, we trim the distribution of our outcome variables (i.e. here only
monthly profits and capital stock) for the intended treatment group by the difference in
attrition rates between treatment and control groups as a proportion of the retention
rate of the group assigned to treatment. We document 675 firm-period observations
out of 875 possible observations had there not been attrition. The attrition rate for the
treatment and control groups are 14.59 percent and 30.63 percent, respectively. Thus,
the difference between the two groups is 16.05 percentage points. Dividing this by the
retention rate of the intended treatment group yields 18.79 percent. We then trim the
treatment firm period observations by this proportion at the lower or the upper tail of
the distribution to obtain lower and upper bounds of our treatment estimates.
We expect the treatment effect to increase using the upper bounds as this is based
on the assumption that the least profitable entrepreneurs from the control group left
the sample. Indeed, results show that the impact of the transfer increases numerically
for all tested outcome variables, yet remains insignificant for both treatment groups
over all time horizons (columns (1)-(3) in the following Tables).
[Tables 2.23 and 2.24 about here.]
The lower bound dependent variables assume that only the most profitable entrepreneurs
in the control group left the sample. These variables trim the highest treatment obser-
vations in the sample. We expect the effect to diminish in our estimations, which we
also find w.r.t. our outcome variables. The treatment effect stays insignificant over all
specifications except one: In the pooled regression, the transfer seems to reduce capital
stock significantly for both treatment groups (Table 2.24, column (4)). This result is
somewhat troublesome as we know that there is a correlation between more aﬄuent
control entrepreneurs and attrition. On the other hand, the effect is only marginally
significant and does not occur in the short term or long term specification on its own.
Also, there is no economically meaningful explanation why the transfer should have
caused a negative effect on capital stock. All in all, the Lee-bound results confirm that
our overall null results hold and that it is not solely the most profitable control business
owners who leave the sample.
As further robustness checks we run quantile and fixed effects regressions. Quantile
regression offers a useful robustness check in our study because it is more robust against
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outliers in our outcome measures. Given that randomization was not successful with
respect to every variable, using firm fixed effects to further control for time-invariant
differences between the control and treatment groups is sensible. Quantile regressions
at the median as well as fixed effects regressions confirm our OLS (non)-findings by
and large.13
We are aware that our study suffers from data limitations, notably the small sample
size and noisy elicitation of business profits and other performance variables. To remedy
the first caveat, we present pooled results for all follow-up waves throughout the analysis
to increase statistical power. Nevertheless, we cannot fully rule out that the non-results
are due to power issues. Regarding the elicitation of business performance variables, we
face challenges common to this kind of survey work (de Mel et al., 2008, 2012): One,
business owners may unintentionally misreport profits and business assets because they
just do not know their exact value. As 76.8 percent of entrepreneurs report keeping at
least basic records, we are confident to state that they have a good sense of how their
businesses are doing, nevertheless. Further, we follow the best practice to directly elicit
business profits from the entrepreneur as de Mel et al. (2009b) show that this yields
more precise information than eliciting profits from revenue and cost data. Two, treated
entrepreneurs may strategically misreport business performance variables because they
expect more money to flow into their businesses. The cash transfer was, however,
provided without labeling its use for business purposes, so we do not think this bias
occurs in our data.
Another concern why we do not find robust direct effects of the treatment on the
treated business owners is that many of them state to use the money for additional or
new businesses of theirs. It is out of scope of our survey to follow up on these businesses.
We cannot rule out the existence of a direct effect of the intervention on total business
performance over all enterprises the business owner runs.
2.6 Conclusion
Cash transfer programs have seen a rise in popularity followed by expansion of these
programs nearly worldwide. It is crucial to know who actually benefits from receiving
them and which mode of payment may make the payments more effective. This pa-
per studies these questions in the setting of micro and small businesses. We evaluate
the impact of an unconditional one-time cash transfer on business profitability. The
13 The results are available upon request.
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transfer amounted to 300,000 UGX and was handed out differently depending on the
treatment arm: one group received the money in cash while the money was deposited
in respondents’ bank accounts for the other treatment arm. We hypothesize, one, that
the cash grant helps to lift binding capital constraints and yields a positive impact on
the treated businesses. Two, the transfer has a differential impact on business own-
ers depending on their treatment status, because the deposit on the account acts as
a soft-commitment device enabling the entrepreneur to spend the money on produc-
tive purposes rather than just consuming it away. So, is the provided transfer a good
way to remove credit constraints for micro and small entrepreneurs and did the ac-
count treatment arm react differently to receiving the money than the cash treatment
arm? Our analyses suggest that the transfer did not contribute significantly to allevi-
ate credit constraints which could consequently have spurred firm growth. In line with
Fiala (2018), we do not find direct effects of the grant on monthly profits, capital stock
or total savings. Yet, in the short-term, the amount of inventories and sales increases
significantly for the account treatment group. It therefore seems that more “upstream”
business variables are affected by the transfer in the hypothesized way, but the effect
does not trickle down to outcomes that are decisive for actual firm growth.
Our heterogeneity analysis reveals that men and women are not affected differently
by the grant, neither in the cash nor in the account group. We further find that the
more savings entrepreneurs in either treatment group have at baseline, the higher
are their sales due to the cash transfer. If savings are especially targeted for usage
in their businesses, having higher baseline business savings also affects the amount
of monthly profits, inventories, and sales positively due to the cash transfer. Last,
entrepreneurs with high education end up saving more of the transfer compared to
those with lower education. Regarding the heterogeneity with respect to higher savings
and high education at baseline, the results suggest that the transfer may rather help
the anyways better off entrepreneurs and may not change the situation for businesses
which are most credit constrained and/or self-employed out of necessity. Thus, the
transfer possibly benefits those that might have access to alternative sources of funding
anyways. Studies dealing with “constrained gazelles” (Grimm et al., 2012; McKenzie,
2017) find similar results. Further research should tackle the question whether the
“gazelle”-mechanism is at work by examining a variety of business characteristics that
determine entrepreneurial success - especially since we do not find this heterogeneity
for the interaction with savings and capital stock as outcome variable. Here, results
indicate the inverse - the lower the savings, the higher the impact of the transfer on
capital stock will be compared to those with higher savings.
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This paper adds to the literature on adequately targeting and designing cash trans-
fer interventions and at the same time leaves room for further research. For example,
what are the effects of digitizing payments at a larger scale going beyond the small
scope of the grant in our experimental setting? This question is likely to gain relevance
for policy makers as major emerging economies such as India are shifting to cashless
banking (Somville and Vandewalle, 2018). Higher powered impact evaluations are also
needed to confirm the different beneficial effect of cash transfers depending on business
owner’s ability. Lastly, while it is important to know who to target, research should not
forget to examine why capital constraints seem to remain for necessity entrepreneurs
and what ways there are to remedy them.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Industry Sampling Categories
Industry Frequency Percent
Hair dressing and beauty 19 10.86
Manufacture of printing/
paper products and related services 17 9.71
Manufacture of textile/
wearing apparel (tailors) and related services 16 9.14
Manufacturing (remaining sectors) 42 24.00
Other 11 6.29
Retail and wholesale (remaining sectors) 25 14.29
Retail clothing, footwear and leather (incl. 2nd hand) 27 15.43
Retail electric, phones, household
appliances and related services 18 10.29
N 175 100.00
Source: Own calculations
Table 2.2: Assigned Treatment for Baseline and Follow-up Waves
Oct.12 Apr.13 Oct.13 Oct.14 Oct.15 Oct.16 Oct.17 Total
Account
Treatment 47 48 48 46 43 38 34 304
Cash
Treatment 48 48 47 45 38 36 35 297
Control Group 79 79 74 59 50 49 42 432
N 174 175 169 150 131 123 111 1,033
Source: Own calculations
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Table 2.3: Analysis of Attrition - Intended Treatment
not
surveyed
in Oct. 13
not
surveyed
in Oct. 14
not
surveyed
in Oct. 15
not
surveyed
in Oct. 16
not
surveyed
in Oct. 17
not surveyed
in at least
one wave
Account =0.063∗∗ =0.148∗∗∗ =0.104∗ 0.096∗ =0.038 =0.101
Treatment (0.028) (0.054) (0.062) (0.053) (0.071) (0.079)
Cash =0.042 =0.147∗∗∗ =0.014 0.033 =0.115∗∗ =0.147∗∗
Treatment (0.035) (0.055) (0.074) (0.042) (0.058) (0.065)
Constant 0.063∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.020 0.143∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.046) (0.049) (0.020) (0.051) (0.058)
N 175 169 150 131 123 1033
Note: The dependent variable turns one if the firm was not tracked in the specified period, zero other-
wise. Regressions are OLS models with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 2.4: Baseline Balance - Account vs. Control Group
Obs. Account Mean Control Mean Difference p-value
Central Division 253 0.56 0.48 0.077 0.238
Kawempe Division 253 0.15 0.09 0.059 0.150
Makindye Division 253 0.02 0.05 =0.030 0.244
Nakawa Division 253 0.13 0.22 =0.089∗ 0.077
Rubaga Division 253 0.15 0.16 =0.017 0.718
Manufacturing 253 0.46 0.44 0.020 0.757
Trade 253 0.28 0.47 =0.180∗∗∗ 0.004
Services 253 0.15 0.06 0.084∗∗ 0.027
Other 253 0.11 0.03 0.080∗∗∗ 0.007
Male 253 0.63 0.58 0.049 0.440
Married* 127 0.62 0.65 =0.033 0.712
No primary Education 253 0.08 0.11 =0.030 0.453
Completed Primary Edu. 253 0.23 0.27 =0.041 0.476
Completed O-Level 253 0.34 0.21 0.130∗∗ 0.024
Completed A-Level 253 0.17 0.15 0.017 0.728
Completed University 253 0.15 0.19 =0.043 0.390
Owner Speaks English 246 0.76 0.71 0.050 0.396
1=Impatient 251 0.87 0.85 0.019 0.678
1=Present Biased* 127 0.52 0.65 =0.120 0.167
Household Size 253 4.76 4.63 0.120 0.681
Age 250 34.30 33.70 0.630 0.543
Household Wealth* 126 0.07 0.06 =0.001 0.907
Own-Account Worker 253 0.37 0.39 =0.024 0.705
Number of Employees 253 1.76 1.15 0.610∗∗ 0.020
Owner Labor Hours 241 302.1 321.7 =19.700∗∗ 0.040
Employee Labor Hours 253 309.1 266.8 42.300 0.375
Firm Age* 124 6.87 6.87 0.002 0.998
1=Formal Business* 126 0.28 0.22 0.061 0.438
1=Credit Constrained* 144 0.82 0.78 0.037 0.589
1=Demand Formal Loan* 126 0.79 0.77 0.015 0.845
Profits 249 1459.5 1156.0 303.500 0.576
Sales 249 6953.2 6373.4 579.700 0.716
Costs 253 5626.2 6431.4 =805.200 0.669
Capital Stock 251 1916.7 1995.8 =79.000 0.851
Value Added 249 1690.6 =114.0 1804.600∗ 0.080
Start-up Capital 248 2300.9 4824.6 =2523.800∗∗ 0.041
Inventories 236 7185.3 9311.7 =2126.400 0.392
Business Savings 240 1267.4 1207.5 60.000 0.908
Total Savings* 127 1493.2 1795.2 =302.000 0.635
N 253
Note: Characteristics denoted with an asterisk use values from one of the baseline surveys only, all
other measures depict the average of both baselines (October 2012 and April 2013). P-values for
tests of equality between account and control group. *, **, and *** on p-values denote significant
differences at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All values are given in 1000 UGX.
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Table 2.5: Baseline Balance - Cash vs. Control Group
Obs. Cash Mean Control Mean Difference p-value
Central Division 254 0.31 0.48 =0.170∗∗∗ 0.008
Kawempe Division 254 0.10 0.09 0.016 0.682
Makindye Division 254 0.15 0.05 0.095∗∗∗ 0.009
Nakawa Division 254 0.29 0.22 0.076 0.170
Rubaga Division 254 0.15 0.16 =0.019 0.693
Manufacturing 254 0.38 0.44 =0.068 0.288
Trade 254 0.40 0.47 =0.073 0.261
Services 254 0.15 0.06 0.083∗∗ 0.029
Other 254 0.08 0.03 0.058∗∗ 0.035
Male 254 0.63 0.58 0.043 0.503
Married* 129 0.76 0.65 0.110 0.213
No primary Education 254 0.06 0.11 =0.051 0.176
Completed Primary Edu. 254 0.35 0.27 0.082 0.169
Completed O-Level 254 0.19 0.21 =0.021 0.682
Completed A-Level 254 0.25 0.15 0.098∗ 0.053
Completed University 254 0.13 0.19 =0.065 0.179
Owner Speaks English 252 0.65 0.71 =0.059 0.328
1=Impatient 252 0.80 0.85 =0.054 0.271
1=Present Biased* 127 0.60 0.65 =0.041 0.643
Household Size 254 5.27 4.63 0.640∗∗ 0.021
Age 252 36.80 33.70 3.050∗∗∗ 0.005
Household Wealth* 127 0.07 0.07 0.004 0.759
Own-Account Worker 254 0.35 0.39 =0.038 0.544
Number of Employees 254 1.36 1.15 0.210 0.226
Owner Labor Hours 246 306.90 321.70 =14.900 0.118
Employee Labor Hours 254 319.80 266.80 53.000 0.282
Firm Age* 124 6.98 6.87 0.110 0.927
1=Formal Business* 126 0.23 0.22 0.019 0.807
1=Credit Constrained* 147 0.86 0.78 0.080 0.220
1=Demand Formal Loan* 127 0.85 0.77 0.082 0.263
Profits 247 1217.2 1156.0 61.200 0.878
Sales 249 9264.7 6373.4 2891.300 0.199
Costs 254 7244.2 6431.4 812.800 0.713
Capital Stock 250 2176.1 1995.8 180.300 0.671
Value Added 249 1912.7 =114.0 2026.800∗ 0.078
Start-up Capital 252 2228.6 4824.6 =2596.100∗∗ 0.036
Inventories 235 22239.4 9311.7 12927.700 0.115
Business Savings 238 761.9 1207.5 =445.500 0.326
Total Savings* 127 3273.1 1795.2 1477.900 0.217
N 254
Note: Characteristics denoted with an asterisk use values from one of the baseline surveys only, all
other measures depict the average of both baselines (October 2012 and April 2013). P-values for
tests of equality between account and control group. *, **, and *** on p-values denote significant
differences at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All values are given in 1000 UGX.
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Table 2.6: Baseline Balance - Account vs. Cash Group
Obs. Cash Mean Account Mean Difference p-value
Central Division 191 0.31 0.56 =0.250∗∗∗ 0.001
Kawempe Division 191 0.10 0.15 =0.043 0.370
Makindye Division 191 0.15 0.02 0.120∗∗∗ 0.002
Nakawa Division 191 0.29 0.13 0.170∗∗∗ 0.005
Rubaga Division 191 0.15 0.15 =0.002 0.976
Manufacturing 191 0.38 0.46 =0.088 0.219
Trade 191 0.40 0.28 0.11 0.105
Services 191 0.15 0.15 =0.002 0.976
Other 191 0.08 0.11 =0.022 0.606
Male 191 0.63 0.63 =0.007 0.926
Married* 96 0.76 0.62 0.140 0.148
No primary Education 191 0.06 0.08 =0.022 0.567
Completed Primary Edu. 191 0.35 0.23 0.120∗ 0.063
Completed O-Level 191 0.19 0.34 =0.150∗∗ 0.019
Completed A-Level 191 0.25 0.17 0.082 0.168
Completed University 191 0.13 0.15 =0.022 0.654
Owner Speaks English 186 0.65 0.76 =0.110 0.104
1=Impatient 189 0.80 0.87 =0.072 0.181
1=Present Biased* 96 0.60 0.52 0.083 0.416
Household Size 191 5.27 4.76 0.510 0.160
Age 190 36.80 34.30 2.420∗∗ 0.048
Household Wealth* 95 0.07 0.06 0.006 0.682
Own-Account Worker 191 0.35 0.37 =0.014 0.839
Number of Employees 191 1.36 1.76 =0.390 0.232
Owner Labor Hours 183 306.90 302.10 4.800 0.648
Employee Labor Hours 191 319.80 309.10 10.700 0.858
Firm Age* 94 6.98 6.87 0.110 0.938
1=Formal Business* 94 0.23 0.28 =0.043 0.640
1=Credit Constrained 115 0.86 0.82 0.043 0.530
1=Demand Formal Loan* 95 0.85 0.79 0.067 0.400
Profits 188 1217.2 1459.5 =242.3 0.689
Sales 188 9264.7 6953.2 2311.6 0.398
Costs 191 7244.2 5626.2 1618.0 0.443
Capital Stock 185 2176.1 1916.7 259.3 0.531
Value Added 188 1912.7 1690.6 222.1 0.863
Start-up Capital 188 2228.6 2300.9 =72.3 0.885
Inventories 175 22239.4 7185.3 15054.1 0.149
Business Savings 180 761.9 1267.4 =505.5 0.247
Total Savings* 96 3273.1 1493.2 1779.9 0.207
N 191
Note: Characteristics denoted with an asterisk use values from one of the baseline surveys only, all
other measures depict the average of both baselines (October 2012 and April 2013). P-values for
tests of equality between account and control group. *, **, and *** on p-values denote significant
differences at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All values are given in 1000 UGX.
Chapter 2 35
Table 2.7: Use of Cash Transfer - Account vs. Cash Group
Obs.
Cash
Treatment
Account
Treatment Difference p-value
Business Inventory/Equipment 92 212045.5 167916.7 44128.8∗ 0.0935
Inv./Equip. for New Business 92 18181.8 15833.3 2348.5 0.865
Inv./Equip. for Add. Business 92 13636.4 14166.7 -530.3 0.966
Hired Labour for Business 92 4545.5 0 4545.5 0.299
Money Saved 92 9090.9 42708.3 -33617.4∗∗ 0.0353
Household Expenditures 92 9772.7 30000 -20227.3 0.107
Other 92 6818.2 10208.3 -3390.2 0.736
N 92
Note: All values depict average shares of the 300,000 UGX transfer. P-values for tests
of equality of means between account and cash treatment group. *, **, and *** on the
difference denote significant differences at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 2.8: Use of Cash Transfer - Men vs. Women
Obs. Women Men Difference p-value
Business Inventory/Equipment 92 221714.3 168947.4 52766.9∗ 0.0506
Inv./Equip. for New Business 92 5714.3 23859.6 -18145.4 0.200
Inv./Equip. for Add. Business 92 0 22456.1 -22456.1∗ 0.0769
Hired Labour for Business 92 0 3508.8 -3508.8 0.436
Money Saved 92 28571.4 25438.6 3132.8 0.851
Household Expenditures 92 20571.4 20175.4 396.0 0.976
Other 92 0 13859.6 -13859.6 0.178
N 92
Note: All values depict average shares of the 300,000 UGX transfer. P-values for tests
of equality of means between males and females. *, **, and *** on the difference
denote significant differences at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Impact of Cash Transfer on Capital Stock
Capital Stock Log Capital Stock
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 598.652 702.046 554.273 0.191 0.032 0.316
(544.166) (611.179) (714.803) (0.224) (0.249) (0.264)
Cash Treatment 100.036 =40.238 109.371 =0.134 =0.207 =0.109
(543.069) (400.226) (741.714) (0.179) (0.158) (0.245)
Observations 851 547 609 851 547 609
Control Mean 1944.87 1845.17 2011.23 6.53 6.57 6.49
Equality of Treatments 0.41 0.22 0.57 0.14 0.32 0.09
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time. P-values for equality of treatments are stated in the last row.
Table 2.10: Impact of Cash Transfer on Monthly Profits
Monthly Profits Log Monthly Profits
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 86.320 333.783 7.376 0.010 =0.055 0.067
(269.217) (425.634) (411.767) (0.149) (0.183) (0.216)
Cash Treatment 21.524 =80.637 0.167 =0.096 =0.153 =0.115
(331.120) (544.961) (433.246) (0.166) (0.193) (0.239)
Observations 828 534 590 765 501 545
Control Mean 810.91 960.45 888.66 5.98 6.08 5.97
Equality of Treatments 0.80 0.26 0.99 0.52 0.62 0.42
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time. P-values for equality of treatments are stated in the last row.
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Table 2.11: Impact of Cash Transfer on Inventories
Inventories Log Inventories
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 1719.317 3152.738 740.353 0.210 0.480∗∗ =0.043
(1749.614) (2019.263) (2728.343) (0.207) (0.214) (0.288)
Cash Treatment =3662.463 1073.090 =7585.315 =0.226 0.219 =0.647∗∗
(3773.704) (2050.764) (6763.685) (0.237) (0.222) (0.320)
Observations 710 477 500 678 457 476
Control Mean 5945.82 6089.42 6825.35 6.91 6.97 7.02
Equality of Treatments 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.05 0.17 0.07
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time. P-values for equality of treatments are stated in the last row.
Table 2.12: Impact of Cash Transfer on Total Sales
Total Sales Log Total Sales
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 3631.872∗ 3033.344∗ 4323.376 0.231 0.233 0.264
(2127.288) (1709.910) (3359.568) (0.155) (0.178) (0.206)
Cash Treatment =311.076 =1462.372 =268.358 =0.106 =0.147 =0.182
(2003.229) (1574.047) (2991.575) (0.168) (0.177) (0.227)
Observations 833 537 594 832 537 593
Control Mean 5418.41 5695.97 5591.17 7.58 7.65 7.51
Equality of Treatments 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.03 0.07
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time. P-values for equality of treatments are stated in the last row.
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Table 2.13: Impact of Cash Transfer on Total Savings
Total Savings Log Total Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 560.642 610.106 780.552∗ =0.151 =0.079 =0.065
(361.279) (510.892) (469.501) (0.195) (0.220) (0.259)
Cash Treatment 213.846 27.267 555.349 =0.205 =0.157 =0.193
(568.771) (576.763) (981.067) (0.229) (0.263) (0.303)
Observations 701 391 453 601 350 379
Control Mean 1284.40 1444.30 1208.23 6.29 6.39 6.21
Equality of Treatments 0.52 0.30 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.66
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time. P-values for equality of treatments are stated in the last row.
Table 2.14: Impact of Cash Transfer on Total Business Savings
Total Business Savings Log Total Business Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 22.332 =145.770 197.369 =0.154 =0.738∗∗ 0.567
(186.403) (252.088) (245.671) (0.265) (0.317) (0.387)
Cash Treatment =66.704 =49.126 =86.773 0.049 =0.266 0.459
(210.077) (223.917) (303.922) (0.231) (0.283) (0.358)
Observations 809 521 574 352 252 247
Control Mean 879.00 1015.66 932.70 6.22 6.31 6.19
Equality of Treatments 0.69 0.67 0.36 0.34 0.07 0.69
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time. P-values for equality of treatments are stated in the last row.
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Table 2.15: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Bus. Savings - Capital Stock
Capital Stock Log Capital Stock
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 204.657 511.005 =213.727 0.058 =0.034 0.094
(588.765) (581.939) (887.747) (0.233) (0.261) (0.288)
Business Savings =0.041 =0.019 =0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.078) (0.042) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Bus. Savings =0.655∗ =0.624∗∗ =1.075 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000
(0.351) (0.241) (0.708) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment =1122.331∗∗=1116.225∗ =1376.441∗ =0.261 =0.381∗∗ =0.285
(542.010) (576.173) (786.021) (0.181) (0.179) (0.252)
Cash × Bus. Savings =1.189∗∗ =1.598∗∗ =1.415∗ =0.000 =0.000∗∗ =0.000
(0.497) (0.735) (0.748) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant =1208.789 =686.218 =1075.216 1.494∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗ 1.476∗∗∗
(859.809) (562.709) (860.904) (0.451) (0.324) (0.429)
Observations 768 493 549 768 493 549
R squared 0.43 0.70 0.41 0.64 0.76 0.67
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.16: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Bus. Savings - Profits
Monthly Profits Log Monthly Profits
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 164.388 568.626 51.000 0.012 =0.010 0.103
(299.347) (472.636) (541.253) (0.151) (0.192) (0.239)
Business Savings 0.010 =0.084 =0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.070) (0.074) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Bus. Savings 0.175 0.356∗∗ 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.183) (0.168) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment 342.421 =322.328 428.214 0.097 =0.151 0.135
(494.438) (788.657) (661.508) (0.224) (0.282) (0.311)
Cash × Bus. Savings 0.782 =0.418 1.115∗ 0.000 =0.000 0.001∗
(0.507) (0.610) (0.665) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1175.002∗∗∗ 391.654 1165.088∗∗∗ 3.089∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗ 2.504∗∗∗
(336.487) (392.749) (368.260) (0.413) (0.273) (0.464)
Observations 766 493 546 711 464 507
R squared 0.38 0.59 0.48 0.38 0.50 0.46
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Inventories and sales are measured
in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.17: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Bus. Savings - Inventories
Inventories Log Inventories
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 3802.823∗ 4337.515∗∗ =71.291 0.283 0.516∗∗ 0.011
(1996.165) (1805.668) (3792.388) (0.219) (0.220) (0.432)
Business Savings 1.389 1.145 1.112 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.892) (0.908) (0.827) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Bus. Savings 4.463∗∗∗ 6.350∗∗∗ =3.469 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.409) (1.558) (4.580) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Cash Treatment 809.360 1581.202 =3752.149 =0.258 0.338 =1.012∗
(1949.254) (2849.444) (3280.006) (0.281) (0.241) (0.529)
Cash × Bus. Savings 3.346 4.306 =4.228 =0.000 0.000 =0.001
(2.253) (3.631) (4.263) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant 3460.884 2323.190 3314.202 1.656∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗
(3048.690) (2006.749) (3806.025) (0.462) (0.312) (0.521)
Observations 646 432 454 618 415 433
R squared 0.54 0.71 0.56 0.68 0.77 0.67
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the in-
teraction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan Schilling,
deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims
the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.18: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Bus. Savings - Sales
Monthly Sales Log Monthly Sales
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 3432.281∗ 3642.305∗∗ =325.061 0.287∗ 0.310∗ 0.283
(1781.555) (1647.568) (4224.477) (0.147) (0.183) (0.277)
Business Savings 0.800∗∗ 0.133 0.651∗ 0.000 =0.000 0.000
(0.380) (0.246) (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Bus. Savings 2.474 4.499∗∗ =7.080 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(2.402) (1.786) (10.508) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment 5861.896∗∗ =749.374 8171.299∗∗ 0.283 =0.044 0.408
(2575.368) (1904.364) (3312.646) (0.214) (0.221) (0.309)
Cash × Bus. Savings 13.130∗∗∗ 2.684 17.739∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗
(3.707) (2.314) (4.300) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 11873.43∗∗ 4381.01∗∗∗ 12743.10∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗ 2.204∗∗∗ 2.435∗∗∗
(4643.515) (1539.676) (5844.409) (0.456) (0.342) (0.483)
Observations 761 490 542 760 490 541
R squared 0.35 0.53 0.40 0.55 0.64 0.59
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the in-
teraction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan Schilling,
deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims
the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.19: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Any Savings - Capital Stock
Capital Stock Log Capital Stock
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 337.741 361.081 363.771 0.088 =0.111 0.256
(513.104) (586.663) (667.675) (0.212) (0.269) (0.247)
Any Savings =0.029 =0.011 =0.029 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000
(0.022) (0.010) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Any Sav. =0.343∗∗∗ =0.388∗∗ =0.313∗ =0.000∗ =0.000 =0.000
(0.123) (0.167) (0.174) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment 78.722 =53.897 103.659 =0.135 =0.235 =0.115
(545.666) (393.083) (749.913) (0.176) (0.152) (0.243)
Cash × Any Sav. =0.148 =0.069 =0.173 =0.000 =0.000∗∗ =0.000
(0.100) (0.054) (0.123) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 851 547 609 851 547 609
R squared 0.34 0.62 0.34 0.63 0.78 0.65
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan
Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX.
The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.20: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Any Savings - Profits
Monthly Profits Log Monthly Profits
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 38.408 147.355 38.617 0.006 =0.120 0.121
(286.164) (425.012) (421.225) (0.163) (0.188) (0.239)
Any Savings 0.009 =0.013 =0.000 0.000 =0.000 =0.000
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Any Sav. =0.043 =0.233∗∗ 0.058 0.000 =0.000 0.000
(0.057) (0.101) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment =4.333 =199.185 =5.426 =0.095 =0.236 =0.079
(331.440) (545.656) (432.228) (0.169) (0.198) (0.243)
Cash × Any Sav. =0.023 =0.172 0.005 =0.000 =0.000∗ 0.000
(0.056) (0.133) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1387.317∗∗∗ 727.019 1418.396∗∗∗ 2.932∗∗∗ 1.542∗∗∗ 2.456∗∗∗
(407.283) (449.616) (440.035) (0.356) (0.247) (0.403)
Observations 828 534 590 765 501 545
R squared 0.39 0.60 0.49 0.42 0.54 0.48
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Savings are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated
by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the
top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.21: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Any Savings - Inventories
Inventories Log Inventories
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 2431.981 6108.474∗∗∗=607.463 0.275 0.605∗∗∗ =0.003
(3064.108) (1901.590) (5281.838) (0.214) (0.210) (0.309)
Any Savings =0.216 =0.878 =0.323 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000
(0.371) (0.586) (0.400) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Any Sav. 1.573 3.998∗∗∗ =0.658 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(1.947) (0.587) (3.538) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment =1838.197 1327.950 =4205.552∗ =0.186 0.221 =0.573∗
(2148.135) (1683.438) (2504.456) (0.236) (0.216) (0.316)
Cash × Any Sav. =2.742∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ =4.371∗∗∗ =0.000 0.000 =0.000
(1.271) (0.521) (1.238) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 5747.518∗ 2473.916 5378.743 1.817∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗
(3353.684) (2083.185) (4106.241) (0.478) (0.326) (0.534)
Observations 710 477 500 678 457 476
R squared 0.82 0.93 0.85 0.68 0.76 0.68
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan
Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX.
The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table 2.22: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Any Savings - Sales
Monthly Sales Log Monthly Sales
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 7018.26∗∗∗ 4683.18∗∗ 9222.736∗ 0.320∗ 0.267 0.408∗
(2667.66) (1976.11) (4774.735) (0.163) (0.177) (0.238)
Any Savings =0.24 =0.50 =0.276 0.000 =0.000 0.000
(0.43) (0.48) (0.446) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Account × Any Sav. 4.92∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗ 6.749∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗
(1.43) (1.25) (2.671) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Treatment =391.97 =2304.81 218.470 =0.117 =0.231 =0.169
(1914.99) (1518.18) (2925.596) (0.167) (0.163) (0.228)
Cash × Any Sav. =0.22 =0.60 0.055 0.000 =0.000∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.34) (0.66) (0.223) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 6257.46∗ 2567.65∗ 7103.374∗ 3.155∗∗∗ 1.877∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗
(3302.56) (1448.09) (4232.830) (0.433) (0.298) (0.466)
Observations 833 537 594 832 537 593
R squared 0.46 0.65 0.48 0.57 0.66 0.59
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed ef-
fects, the interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline co-
variates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales
are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in
profits over time.
Table 2.23: Impact of Cash Transfer on Monthly Profits - Lee Bounds
Upper Bound Monthly Profits Lower Bound Monthly Profits
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 175.121 501.472 97.429 99.281 330.732 98.008
(278.821) (422.613) (473.651) (281.267) (414.395) (366.780)
Cash Treatment 154.690 32.051 150.803 =98.475 =160.841 =117.035
(373.235) (618.689) (490.752) (378.255) (562.787) (514.367)
Observations 771 512 556 789 523 563
Control Mean 810.91 960.45 888.66 810.91 960.45 888.66
Equality of Treatments 0.95 0.29 0.92 0.45 0.21 0.56
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time and applies Lee bounds to the dependent variables. P-values for equality of treatments
are stated in the last row.
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Table 2.24: Impact of Cash Transfer on Capital Stock - Lee Bounds
Upper Bound Capital Stock Lower Bound Capital Stock
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 917.003 1018.432 901.300 =654.877∗ =446.921 =736.595
(619.260) (732.553) (824.380) (338.036) (327.737) (481.101)
Cash Treatment 301.553 100.256 309.358 =607.105∗ =422.078 =776.088
(594.782) (458.044) (779.782) (340.162) (319.045) (503.283)
Observations 792 517 580 797 526 576
Control Mean 1944.87 1845.17 2011.23 1944.87 1845.17 2011.23
Equality of Treatments 0.40 0.22 0.53 0.84 0.92 0.90
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time and applies Lee bounds to the dependent variables. P-values for equality of treatments
are stated in the last row.
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Table 2.25: Impact of Cash Transfer on Total Savings - Lee Bounds
Upper Bound Total Savings Lower Bound Total Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 861.329∗ 753.580 1223.713∗ =262.286 =144.569 =82.907
(446.368) (564.780) (623.221) (267.466) (409.482) (346.998)
Cash Treatment 772.815 283.018 1456.116 =596.940 =315.167 =737.882
(696.516) (564.762) (1376.355) (407.948) (575.064) (573.008)
Observations 636 377 402 653 372 424
Control Mean 1284.40 1444.30 1208.23 1284.40 1444.30 1208.23
Equality of Treatments 0.88 0.39 0.83 0.39 0.72 0.22
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects and
other baseline covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Profits and capital
stocks are measured in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All val-
ues are given in 1000 UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits
over time and applies Lee bounds to the dependent variables.. P-values for equality of treatments
are stated in the last row.
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4.1 Introduction
For households, taking out debt is a valuable tool to smooth consumption and often
a necessary precursor of private investments. However, as consumer indebtedness is
significantly increasing worldwide, there is widespread concern about when it turns
detrimental. Specifically, when households become over-indebted, household well-being
and consumption are threatened. Furthermore, household over-indebtedness poses a
serious threat to the stability of the financial system as a whole; for example, as expe-
rienced during the U.S. financial crisis in 2007-08.
Emerging market economies are especially at risk of low growth and even finan-
cial crises when the level of household debt is high, as their institutions and financial
regulations are weaker and income inequality is higher (IMF, 2017). Therefore, under-
standing the factors and reacting to the consequences of over-indebtedness are crucial
for improving living conditions while also ensuring a stable development of emerging
economies. The determinants of over-indebtedness are, however, not well understood.
Building on the classical “permanent income hypothesis,” this paper studies one po-
tential driver of over-indebtedness: upward biased income expectations.
Thailand is, on the one hand, exemplary for an emerging market but, on the other,
outstanding when it comes to household finances: Financial inclusion is comparatively
high, with four out of five persons participating in the formal financial system. How-
ever, simultaneously, outstanding household debt has increased to over 78.03% of the
country’s GDP. This constitutes an increase of almost 37 percentage points since the
beginning of the 2000s (Mbaye et al., 2018) and makes it the emerging market with
the highest household debt to GDP ratio in the world (see Figure 4.1). Given these
numbers, it is hardly surprising that both local policy makers and international institu-
tions agree that (over-)indebtedness is a growing problem in Thailand (Tambunlertchai,
2015).
We investigate the potential effect of biased expectations on over-indebtedness using
extensive survey data on the financial situation and financial behavior of one of the most
vulnerable populations in Thailand: Rural households in the North-East. In our regres-
sion analysis, we control for various household characteristics and shocks that house-
holds faced, which reduces reverse causality concerns. A crucial part of our survey was
to collect objective and subjective data on potential symptoms of over-indebtedness.
This allows us to construct different debt indicators.2 A major contribution to the lit-
2 It is still a highly debated topic how to measure over-indebtedness and there is no clear-cut answer
on the right method of elicitation.
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erature is that we relate these different debt indicators to sophisticated measures of
subjective income expectation biases. We employ two alternatives to capture upward
biased expectations, one quantitative and one qualitative measure. Further, we carried
out a lab-in-the-field experiment to explore the causal effect of biased expectations on
overborrowing.
Our survey results show that there is a strong and robust relationship between
upward biased expectations and indebtedness as well as over-indebtedness. The re-
sults vary with respect to different debt and expectations indicators. Objective debt
measures are relatively more affected by the quantitative expectation bias measure
while subjective debt measures are rather affected by the qualitative bias measure,
which describes financial distress and not so much indebtedness. The results are robust
to various specifications and become more precise if we exclude parts of the sample
that may had difficulties understanding the questions on eliciting future income ex-
pectations. Another main outcome is that higher perceived certainty about the income
expectation is positively related to over-indebtedness. Rural households are exposed to
a highly uncertain environment, hence, being too certain actually harms them. In the
supplemental experiment, we exogenously vary income expectations via two treatments
that vary the level of self-confidence of the respondents. We find that overconfidence
is related to more spending and overborrowing in our experimental setting. However,
most probably due to “noise,” our treatments themselves have no impact on overbor-
rowing, which is why we cannot claim a causal relationship of biased expectations on
overborrowing. These results are not driven by presumably confounding factors that
the treatments could have affected and are relatively robust. Rather, we find evidence
for “sticky” overconfident beliefs, which also points to a high level of perceived certainty
in our sample.
Households’ borrowing behavior around the world is still puzzling in various as-
pects and often hard to reconcile with standard neoclassical and behavioral models.
Zinman (2015) argues that one main reason for many unresolved puzzles is the fact
that household debt is vastly under-researched within the field of household finance
(which itself is under-researched in financial economics). Admittedly, a vibrant liter-
ature on measuring over-indebtedness is emerging (for example D’Alessio and Iezzi,
2013; Keese, 2012; Schicks, 2013). In contrast, the determinants of over-indebtedness
are still mostly unidentified. Our paper contributes to closing this gap by focusing on
biased expectations as one likely cause of over-indebtedness.
Specifically, our study touches on three strands of literature: First, the literature
on household over-indebtedness in emerging economies, second, research on the behav-
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ioral biases in financial decision-making and debt illiteracy, and, third, the literature
on eliciting and using subjective expectations data. There are at least two reasons
why the effect of biased expectations on over-indebtedness should be explicitly studied
in an emerging market setting and why findings from “WEIRD”3 populations might
not translate to those rural populations. First, financial literacy is substantially lower,
which implies lower debt literacy and, thus might hamper expectation formation on
financial matters. For example, Lusardi and Tufano (2015) find that debt illiteracy is
related to higher debt burdens and the inability to evaluate the own debt position.
Burke and Manz (2014) experimentally show that economic illiteracy increases finan-
cial forecast errors. Second, our study sample faces higher uncertainty regarding their
future incomes in two ways: through the generally high level of macroeconomic volatil-
ity in emerging markets and through individual shocks common for poor, small-scale
agricultural households (see Loayza et al., 2007; Klasen and Waibel, 2015). A more
volatile economic environment requires more individual belief formation, which makes
biased expectation formation more likely (see for example Johnson and Fowler, 2011)
and at the same time more dangerous.
Our work is most closely related to Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) and Grohmann
et al. (2019). The former establish a correlation between Finnish households’ overbor-
rowing and extreme positive forecast errors on the future financial situation. They show
that households exhibiting high positive forecast errors are more likely to overborrow
than households exhibiting smaller errors. They elicit households’ forecast errors re-
garding their financial situation in general not regarding their future income, which
gives rise to issues of reverse causality. Grohmann et al. (2019) conduct a very similar
experiment to ours in Germany and underpin their results with data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). They find a causal link between overconfidence and
overborrowing in the lab within a student sample and a relation between return expec-
tations and household debt in the panel sample. In contrast to Hyytinen and Putkuri
(2018), they explicitly ask about income expectations. As our study differs from these
two, it contributes to the literature by (i) analyzing the research question in a setting
where expectation formation is generally more difficult and over-indebtedness bears
more severe consequences; and (ii) eliciting income expectations and over-indebtedness
more precisely.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 presents the survey data we use and
explains how our variables of interest are constructed. In section 4.3, the estimation
3 Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic
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strategy is outlined and survey results are presented. Section 4.4 describes the experi-
ment and its results, while Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
This section introduces the data elicited during the survey and explains how the main
variables of interest are derived, i.e. biased income expectations. We develop two al-
ternative indicators each approximating possible biased perceptions about the future
development of household income.
Then, we turn to explain the debt measures used in the analysis. As such, the
concept and measurement of over-indebtedness is debated, with no consensus on a
single indicator that measures it precisely. This would indeed be very hard to achieve
given the multifaceted ways indebtedness can occur. Hence, we provide an overview on
the distinct debt measures used as dependent variables and argue that they portray
households’ financial situations accurately in our sample.
4.2.1 The Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel
The survey was conducted in Thailand in November 2017 and is an add-on project
of the Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel (TVSEP).4 The TVSEP has been
conducting yearly panel surveys in rural Thailand and Vietnam on a regular basis
since 2007, with so far recurrent surveys in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2016, and 2017.
The TVSEP survey captures the living conditions of households in rural areas that
are largely engaged in agricultural businesses. It focuses on factors affecting households’
vulnerability to poverty. Among others, the survey includes socio-economic character-
istics of every household member, sections on household consumption and savings, crop
farming, livestock rearing, and, in particular, questions on exposure to shocks and an-
ticipated risks. Furthermore, each wave captures additional topics of current research
interest. About 4000 rural households in 440 villages across six provinces in Thailand
and Vietnam are interviewed for the survey. The sample is set to represent the rural
population in these two countries while households living in urban areas are deliber-
ately excluded. To obtain a representative sample, a three-stage cluster sampling is
used. The procedure is described in Hardeweg et al. (2013).
Our study is conducted in only one of the TVSEP provinces in Thailand, Ubon
Ratchathani, which borders Cambodia and Laos (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Our sample
4 See https://www.tvsep.de/overview-tvsep.html
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consists of about 750 households in 97 villages. For the majority of our analysis, we
concentrate on our own survey, adding data from the 2016 and 2017 general TVSEP
survey.
[Figures 4.2 and 4.3 about here]
With our study, we want to gain new insights into over-indebtedness within a vulner-
able population. Therefore, our survey includes extensive question batteries on over-
indebtedness (see Sub-Section 4.2.3), savings, financial literacy, borrowing behavior in
general, optimism, and income expectations (see Sub-Section 4.2.2). In addition, we col-
lect data on health, subjective well-being, personality traits, and risk preferences. We
use established items to assess these data. For example, personality traits are measured
using the short version of the Big Five Inventory “BFI-S” (John and Srivastava, 1999;
Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). In order to test how financial knowledge affects households’
debt situation, we develop a broad financial literacy score, which not only encompasses
numeracy but also questions on financial behavior and attitude. The score is similar
in style to that developed by the OECD (OECD, 2018). Furthermore, we construct a
score for risk preference out of two questions: The first one asks whether the person
is in general fully prepared to take risks and the second question specifically asks for
risk-taking behavior in financial decision-making (i.e. investing and borrowing). Self-
control is assessed using the well-established scale by Tangney et al. (2004).5 Adjusted
to the low numeracy within the sample, we add a phrase to each numerical value on
questions involving scales.
4.2.2 Income Expectation Biases
In order to obtain an income expectation bias measure, we must elicit income expec-
tations in the first place. Expectations play a central role in the economic theory of
household decision-making, for example, determining saving, borrowing, consumption
(Friedman, 1957), and occupation choices (Becker, 1964). Manifold research has tried
to predict this choice behavior based on expectations, yet these are challenging to
empirically elicit correctly.
5 As more than 80% of our respondents are partly or fully responsible for household finances, we
assume their individual characteristics to possibly affect the household’s debt situation more than
those of any other household member.
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Eliciting Income Expectations
Expectations from Former Income Realizations The traditional way of elicitation
- referred to as revealed preference analysis - assumes that individuals have rational
expectations (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Manski, 2004). Furthermore, both the re-
searcher and the respondent would have to have the same information set (Guiso et al.,
2002). Given these strong assumptions, we decide for two alternative elicitation meth-
ods, which are explained in what follows.
Qualitative Expectations Questions The first way is to elicit expectations via qual-
itative questions, e.g. using Likert scales for questions on future expected events. We
use such a measure in our analysis to confirm the results of Hyytinen and Putkuri
(2018), who use Likert scales to construct their forecast error in predicting future in-
come. Again, this approach suffers from two main drawbacks: First, answers might not
be comparable across respondents and, second, response options are too coarse and
leave room for responses different from what is proposed.
Subjective Income Expectations The second way suggested by Dominitz and Man-
ski (1997) is to elicit probabilistic expectations. This approach is particularly useful for
calculating individual cumulative distribution functions and moments of the relevant
variable (Attanasio, 2009). As we elicit expectations within a rural sample in an emerg-
ing economy, we re-phrase our percent change questions in a way similar to “how sure
are you” and use visual aids to make the concept of probability more comprehensible.6
Thereby, we address the concerns of Attanasio (2009) and Delavande et al. (2011), who
state that the concept of probability might be hard to convey in contexts where people
have low levels of education.7
To check whether respondents adhere to the basic laws of probability, we first ask
them how sure they are that it will rain tomorrow and how sure they are that it will
rain within the next two weeks. They can indicate their answer by putting between zero
and ten of the marbles that we gave them beforehand into a cup, with zero marbles
meaning they are absolutely sure it will not rain and ten marbles meaning they are
absolutely sure it will rain. There are 182 out of 748 respondents (24.33 %) who do not
6 Studies dealing with these kind of expectation elicitations include, among others, Attanasio and
Augsburg (2016), which studies income processes in India, McKenzie et al. (2013), which investi-
gates income expectations of Tongans if they were to migrate to New Zealand, and Attanasio and
Kaufmann (2014), which elicit income expectations among high school students in Mexico.
7 The average respondent in our sample only attended school for six years.
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answer based on what the laws of probability would tell us. This is a substantial share
of respondents, most likely caused by the low educational level in our sample. In the
subsequent analysis, we run our regression both with and without these individuals.
After this “warm-up” exercise, we ask respondents how certain they are that their
monthly household income in the next twelve months will be in a pre-defined range.
We use income quartiles from the 2013 TVSEP wave to pre-determine the four bins to
which respondents allocate their ten marbles. The four bins range between 0 - 3,300
Thai Baht (THB), 3,300 - 8,100 THB, 8,100 - 16,590 THB, and 16,590 - 921,000 THB.8
Respondents distribute their ten marbles based on how certain they are that their future
monthly income will lie in each specific bin.9 We assume that respondents do not give
random answers just for the sake of finishing the interview, but provide reasonable
estimates for their expected future monthly income. Hence, with this information, we
are able to calculate the individual cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
expected monthly income as we interpret the number of marbles distributed between
the cups as points on their individual CDFs.
We then fit a subjective income distribution following Attanasio and Augsburg
(2016) and assume a piecewise (i.e. per cup) uniform probability distribution. This
enables us to calculate a specific expected mean and median income, as well as the
standard deviation, for each household.
[Table 4.1 about here]
Respondents allocate the number of marbles to the cups as a function of their
underlying subjective probability to earn income in the specific income range. The
average distribution of marbles per cup, i.e. the average implied probabilities to earn
income in the respective income quartile is shown in Table 4.1. Additionally, Figure 4.4
presents the probability density function of expected income in our sample. The average
respondent’s expected income distribution is skewed to the right; that is, on average,
respondents believe it is more probable that their average monthly future income is in
the lower cups.
[Figure 4.4 about here]
8 The range of the last bin is very broad. Compared to the maximum monthly income respondents
state, we find that only two respondents expect an income as high as 921,000 THB. All other
maximum income guesses range between 0 - 300,000 THB. In order to avoid artificially high expected
median incomes, we restrict the range of the last bin in our calculation of expected median income
to a maximum of 300,000 THB.
9 The enumerator places four cups in front of them, each labelled with a different income range and
makes sure that all marbles are allocated at the end of the exercise.
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We must ensure that the elicited expected income is not at odds with actual realized
income. As measure for income, we use the actual realized income in 2016 and an income
measure averaging the perceived income in a very bad and a very good month. Corre-
lations between these measures are always statistically significant and range between
0.27 and 0.33, which is encouragingly high given that the correlation between actual
income in 2016 and 2017 is only 0.48. As Attanasio (2009) proposes, we check how the
subjective expected median income covaries with respondents’ observed characteristics
in our sample, particularly with the household composition, educational achievement,
and realized income. Beyond the already stated influence of income, household total
education affects the elicited median income significantly and positively. A little am-
biguous, however, is the effect of the household composition on elicited income: While
a higher number of elders in the household is associated with a decrease in income
(albeit not significant), more workers in the household also seem to decrease elicited
household income (results available upon request).10
Defining the Bias
We develop two kinds of expectation biases, one based on the subjectively elicited ex-
pected income and the other using qualitative income expectation measures as Souleles
(2004) and Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) apply them.
We define respondents whose expected median income (Inci,t+1) is larger than their
actual income (Inci,t) to be upward biased:
Biased (= 1) if Inci,t+1 − Inci,t > 0 (4.1)
While we cannot formally test rationality of expectations with our subjective expected
income data,11 we assume that the difference between expected income in 2018 and
realized income in 2017 is partly due to respondents being overconfident of what they
will earn in the future. This assumption is based on studies finding that expectations
about various future outcomes may tend toward being positively biased (see for example
Zinman, 2015).
10 Reflecting on this last result, we assume that households with more working members are, in general,
poorer and have less stable incomes. There is a tendency in Thailand to abolish multi-generational
households in favor of small family homes, which is however only possible if income is high enough
and stable.
11 For example, because we lack data about realized income in 2018, the year after we asked for
expected income, and we do not know (yet) about shocks households endured during that time.
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The second expectation bias is derived following Souleles (2004) and Hyytinen and
Putkuri (2018). We make use of the available panel data and combine categorical
answers to the question on “How do you think your average monthly income will
develop in the next twelve months?” (Ei,t−1) asked in 2016 (one year prior to our
survey) with responses to the statement “the household is better off than last year”
asked in 2017 (Ai,t).
12 As in Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018), the difference between these
two questions is coined financial forecast error:
Financial Forecast Error = Ei,t−1 − Ai,t (4.2)
A positive forecast error occurs if the expected household situation is better than the
realized one and a negative if the opposite is true. The forecast error we use in the
main analysis is derived at the household level, meaning that the respondent may
not be the same for all three data points. Therefore, we re-run the analysis for a
sub-sample with only identical respondents, which does not change the results. We
assume that the household’s qualitative assessment regarding its own development
stays similar for a time period of two years and, thus, is able to explain indebtedness
in 2017. There are two reasons encouraging this view: We are able to control for a
rich set of socio-economic variables that capture household formation and, as incomes
are rather stationary, expectations may change slowly, too. Our two bias measures
differ in nature. While the forecast error is based on a qualitative assessment about the
household’s financial situation, the expected income bias is derived from respondents’
income elicitation exercise and the actual household income. Last, we also account for
perceived income uncertainty in our analysis. In addition to asking respondents how
they think that their income will develop over the next 12 months, we ask how certain
they are that this income development will truly become reality. Being too certain about
expectations can be a form of biased expectations called “over-precision” (Moore and
Healy, 2008). In addition, we calculate the inter-quartile range of elicited subjective
future income to account for uncertainty.
12 Answer options range on a scale from 1-5. For the question asked in 2016, one means “decrease
a lot” and five “increase a lot.” The question asked in 2017 ranges from one being “much worse
off” to five “much better off.” A valid criticism regarding the measure asked in 2017 is that it does
not explicitly refer to the financial situation of the household. However, we informally ask how
respondents understand the question and the majority of them think about household development
in economic terms.
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4.2.3 (Over-)Indebtedness Indicators
We distinguish between households that are indebted and those that are over-indebted.
These measures mainly differ in that the former contain continuous variables and the
latter comprise dummy variables, turning one if the specific debt measure passes a
certain pre-defined threshold. As already indicated, there is not a consensus regarding
a single set of indicators measuring (over-)indebtedness precisely.13 In general, all mea-
sures share economic, social, temporal and psychological dimensions (D’Alessio and
Iezzi, 2013): The amount of debt exceeds income over a medium- to long-term time
horizon and the household is not able to fulfill its debt commitments without increas-
ing its income or lowering its standard of living, which might lead to stress and worry.
So-called objective debt measures relate to the household’s debt service capacity, sub-
jective measures rather emphasize the psychological consequences of being indebted.
Objective Debt Measures The main indicator we use for this part of the analysis
is an aggregated and standardized index measuring objective debt. It consists of the
following components: The debt service to income ratio (DSR), the remaining debt to
income ratio, and whether the household defaulted or paid late on a loan in the last
twelve months. Each component is well established in the literature (see, for example
D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013). Among them, the DSR is especially widely recognized as
standard measure to capture indebtedness. We explain how the index and its compo-
nents are derived in Appendix D.
Subjective Debt Measures While objective debt indicators may provide numer-
ically accurate debt measures, these are criticized for various reasons, such as failing to
account either for the reasons why households borrow or for the household’s undisclosed
ability to pay back debt. Therefore, we also include subjective “respondent driven” debt
measures in our analysis. As before, we derive a standardized index aggregating differ-
ent components of subjective debt. The components include an assessment of whether
the household feels it has too much debt, whether it has difficulties paying them off,
and the so-called “sacrifice index”.14 The index and its components are explained in
detail in Appendix D. Schicks (2013) prefers to use subjective debt measures over ob-
jective ones in her work analyzing over-indebtedness from a customer-protection point
of view in microfinance. D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) also rely heavily on a subjective
13 Among others, D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) provide a summary on different indebtedness indicators,
their usage, and possible drawbacks.
14 We closely follow Schicks (2013) in constructing the sacrifice index.
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debt measure to study over-indebtedness in Italy. However, in line with Keese (2012)
and Lusardi and Tufano (2015), we argue that these measures describe a situation of
financial distress rather than over-indebtedness such that these measures should not
be used without considering objective debt indicators as well.
Over-Indebtedness Measures Again, we construct an overall standardized index
that aggregates various measures of over-indebtedness. We include the following compo-
nents in the index: a debt service to income ratio greater than 0.4 and households with
more than four loans. The threshold we set for the DSR is based on considerations from
the literature where a range between 0.3 and 0.5 is used to indicate over-indebtedness
(Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017; D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013). The detailed construction
of the index is explained in Appendix D. All indices we derive point to accumulating
more debt the higher the household scores.
4.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
The following subsection provides descriptive statistics about the financial situation in
Thailand and in our sample population. Since we use a restricted sample for the analysis
in Section 4.3, the descriptives are provided for the same group. In the analysis, we
exclude outliers by the following means: First, we trim the 1 percent highest and lowest
monthly household incomes in 2016 and 2017. Second, we exclude households whose
income is negative and who have a debt service to income ratio either smaller than
zero or greater than four. These restrictions all downward bias our results because we
cut extremely high debt service ratios as well as those households who have negative
debt service ratios and whose incomes are already negative. For the latter case, we trim
them as we do not know whether a negative income itself means that these households
are in financial distress.
Our average respondent is 57 years old, female, the spouse of the household head,
and has 5.7 years of education. While 57.27% of our respondents are the sole finan-
cial decision makers in their households, 28.05% share this task with someone else.
Hence, while capturing some respondent specific characteristics, we are still confident
that these individual traits determine the household’s state of indebtedness because
the majority of respondents is in charge of making financial decisions. However, as a
robustness check, we re-run the analysis without respondents who are not at all in
charge of financial decision-making within the household.
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In Thailand, over 80% of the population has a bank account and over 60% use
them for digital payments. The gaps in financial inclusion between women and men as
well as between the rural and urban population have declined and are relatively small
(Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2018). Financial inclusion in our sample is similar: 78.34% of
our sample households have an account with a formal banking institution.
Simultaneously, the rural credit market in Thailand has evolved extensively , pro-
viding manifold loan options for consumers. This is mainly due to heavily subsidized
government programs. The Thai credit market is dominated by government-financed
institutions (Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017). The most important ones are the Bank
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) and the Village and Urban
Community Fund (VF) program,15 with the former reaching approximately 95% of all
farm households (Terada and Vandenberg, 2014). In our sample, the majority (73.4%)
of households have a loan that is either still owed or has been paid back within the last
12 months. Those households have on average 2.4 loans. Figure 4.5 exhibits a graphic
overview of the loan situation. Households borrow from formal and informal sources
alike. In fact, loan sources are diverse, with the two most important credit sources
being the BAAC and the VF. Nevertheless, households also borrow from agricultural
cooperatives, business partners, relatives, and friends. Households take out loans for
various reasons. Most loans are primarily used for buying agricultural related goods like
fertilizer or pesticides (23.96%), for buying consumption goods (22.39%), and for agri-
cultural investments e.g. farm land or agricultural machines (16.58%). Loans are also
used for paying back another loan (9.87%), buying durable household goods (6.72%),
and education (3.15%).
[Figure 4.5 about here]
A descriptive overview of our main variables of interest is provided in Table 4.2.
The first part represents the two bias measures explained in Sub-Section 4.2.2. The
expected income bias indicates that, on average, respondents are rather underconfi-
dent with regard to their future income. A total of 75% of the respondents expect
their future income to be lower than what they earned in the year of the survey. The
financial forecast error suggest that no respondent is extremely biased in any of the
two directions, since it ranges between minus three and three. Generally, expectations
between future household well-being and ex post reflection on past household develop-
15 The aim of the VF is to improve financial access in rural areas in Thailand. It is one of the largest
microfinance programs in the world (Kislat and Menkhoff, 2013)
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ment match well in our sample: The median respondent does not make any forecast
error (i.e. the difference is zero).
The second part of Table 4.2 depicts our previously derived objective and subjective
debt measures (see Sub-Section 4.2.3). The average DSR lies at 0.23. Hence, on average
households are in debt, but below a critical threshold, i.e. not over-indebted. About
18% of the households have a DSR which is higher than 0.4 and are therefore considered
as over-indebted, while 14% of our sample households have more than four loans.
[Table 4.2 about here]
Furthermore, Table 4.3 presents correlations between all our debt indicators. Nat-
urally, the objective and subjective indices are significantly correlated with their re-
spective sub-indicators. However, our objective and subjective measures also correlate
significantly with each other. This is encouraging, since it rebuts criticism with respect
to objective debt measures neglecting important dimensions of indebtedness.
[Table 4.3 about here]
Another important variable for our study is financial literacy. Our financial literacy
index (described in Sub-Section 4.2.1) indicates a relatively low level of financial liter-
acy. On average, respondents answered four out of seven knowledge questions correctly,
reached five out of nine possible points concerning financial behavior, and three out
of seven possible points with regard to financial attitude. This is in line with findings
from the OECD/INFE study for Thailand from 2016 (OECD, 2016).
Figure 4.6 provides a graphic overview of the results on our measure for perceived
income certainty: 55.56% of respondents are at least somewhat certain about their
income development and 28.44% are very certain. The survey took place during the
harvest season, so that respondents might have an idea about the harvest outcome and
therefore perceive their expected future income as rather certain.
[Figure 4.6 about here]
4.3 Survey Results
This research examines the link between upward biased income expectations and (over-
)indebtedness. In the following, we relate the derived bias measures to the debt indica-
tors. We run simple OLS regressions estimating correlations between the variables in
question. In addition, we present experimental results in Section 4.4.
66
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The regressions we run take the following form (standard errors are clustered at the
village level):
DebtMeasurei = β0 + β1Biasi +X
′
iβ2 + i (4.3)
The dependent variable Debt Measurei represents the debt measures we apply to
mirror the financial situation of the household as clearly as possible. It contains: the
objective debt index,16 the subjective debt index,17 the debt service to income ratio,
the sacrifice index, and an over-indebtedness index.18
The main variable of interest is Biasi. It represents the bias measures we derived:
First, it is a dummy turning one, if the subjective expected median income in the next
twelve months is greater than the realized income in the survey period and, second,
the forecast error focusing on the household’s financial situation.
The vector Xi controls for household and respondent specific characteristics that
are likely to determine indebtedness of the household. Precisely, these are the number of
shocks the household had to cope with in the year prior to the general TVSEP survey in
2017 (time period 5/16-4/17), occupation dummies for farming, self-employment, and
wage employment, monthly household income in 2016 and 2017, the number of children
between 0-6 years, 7-10 years, and 11-16 years old, the number of elders and of working
members in the household, total household education (sum of all educational levels of its
members), age and age squared of the respondent, and respondent’s financial literacy
score. In alternative specifications, we add as control variables (where possible) the
lagged value of the dependent variable to control for the existing stock of debt (similar
to Hyytinen and Putkuri, 2018).
4.3.2 Main Results
To begin, we simply relate the respective bias measures to each debt indicator. In
a second step, we add the aforementioned control variables to our regression as the
debt indicators depend on other respondent and household specific characteristics as
well. We are interested in comparing our two main debt biased expectation indicators
16 Standardized average of debt service to income ratio, remaining debt to income ratio, a dummy
regarding whether the household paid late or defaulted on a loan
17 Standardized average of the sacrifice index, answers to questions on debt position and whether the
household has difficulties paying off debt
18 Standardized average of a dummy turning one if the debt service to income ratio is greater than
0.4 and a dummy turning one if the household has more than four loans.
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with each other, namely the bias derived from the expected median income and the
financial forecast error. Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 provide results on the expected income
bias measure and Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 show regression outputs for the financial
forecast error. The first column in each table represents the standardized and averaged
index whereas the subsequent columns depict results for the single non-standardized
components of the indices.
[Tables 4.4 - 4.9 about here]
We find a strong statistically significant relation between both bias indicators and the
objective debt measure. The objective debt index19 increases by 0.35 - 0.41 standard
deviation units if respondents exhibit very high positive income expectations based
on their expected future median income (columns (1) and (2), Table 4.4). The debt
service to income ratio and the remaining debt ratio mainly drive this effect. The DSR
increases by 14.9 - 20.5 percentage points (columns (3) and (4)) and the remaining
debt ratio by 16.2 - 19.7 percentage points (columns (5) and (6)) for households with
biased income expectations. These are substantial increases given that the mean DSR
is 0.23 and the fact that we already exclude households with a DSR greater than four.
Furthermore, the probability that a household paid late or defaulted on a loan increases
by 5.7% - 7% if a household’s expected future median income is greater than the current
income.
The direction of the relationship between objective debt and biased expectations
remains similar with respect to the financial forecast error. Point estimates, however,
tend to be lower compared to the bias dummy coefficients. If the financial forecast
error increases by one unit,20 the objective debt index increases by 0.11 - 0.14 standard
deviation units (columns (1) and (2), Table 4.7). This effect is mainly related to the
influence of the remaining debt to income ratio, which increases by 9.8 - 11 percentage
points for households with a higher financial forecast error (columns (3) and (4)). The
other two index components are not influenced by the forecast error if other important
debt determinants are controlled for.
Concerning the control variables, income, and the type of occupation significantly
affect a household’s debt situation for both biased expectations specifications. Fur-
thermore, age and age squared are both highly significant determinants of (over-
)indebtedness; thus suggesting a hump-shaped pattern in line with life-cycle-income-
19 This is the standardized average of the debt service to income ratio, the remaining debt to income
ratio, and whether the household defaulted or paid late on a loan.
20 This means households are more optimistic regarding their future income development than what
was actually realized and recalled later on
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smoothing. Objective debt, however, remains largely unaffected by the household com-
position and education.
We find interesting results for subjective indebtedness. While there are no significant
relations between biased median income expectations and subjectively perceived debt,
the financial forecast error strongly and significantly affects the subjective debt index.
If the financial forecast error increases by one unit, 0.10 - 0.16 standard deviation units
are added to this score (columns (1) and (2), Table 4.8). Mainly, this is due to the
positive effect the financial forecast error has on the “debt position” component of the
index. Households with a higher error tend to state more frequently that they “have
too much debt right now” (columns (3) and (4)). We conclude that the nature of the
financial forecast error being more “subjectively” elicited than the calculated biased
expectations dummy per se, might be reflected in more pronounced results regarding
subjectively “felt” debt. Subjective debt may, thus, be actually rather a concept of
perceived financial distress affected by not only the household’s true debt situation but
also by respondent characteristics.
This becomes clearer when analyzing the control variables. Unlike the regressions
on objective debt, personality characteristics such as risk aversion and self-control
significantly affect subjective debt measures: More risk loving respondents and those
with lower self-control are more likely to subjectively be indebted. Delving deeper
into the relationship between respondent characteristics, we run further regressions on
subjective debt and include the Big Five measures21 as additional control variables
(results are available on request). They almost exclusively determine subjective debt
measures and less over-indebtedness or objective debt. If a respondent scores high on
openness and neuroticism, her subjective debt index and the underlying components
are affected positively, i.e. debt rises.22 Furthermore, scoring higher on financial literacy
and acquiring more education is related to less subjective debt. Income sources do not
play a role in determining this kind of debt, but the number of shocks experienced
by the household in the last year affects subjective debt positively. This may suggest
that experiencing a shock may have psychological consequences on household members
exceeding those on income.
Lastly, greater financial forecast errors are strongly related to all over-indebtedness
measures (see Table 4.9). The over-indebtedness index increases by 0.10 - 0.13 standard
deviation units, when the financial forecast error increases by one unit. Both index
21 The Big Five comprise the following personality traits: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and neuroticism. More details on their construction are found in Appendix D.
22 Openness is the only trait of the Big Five that determines debt in almost all specifications. It is
possible that individuals with a high level of openness are also over-confident persons.
69
components are similarly responsible for this estimate: Households that make more
optimistic income forecasts are, by 3.2% - 3.7%, more likely to have a DSR greater
than 0.4 and are, by 3.5% - 4.5%, more likely to hold more than four loans (columns
(3) - (6), Table 4.9). Results for the bias dummy measure are not as consistent: We
fail to see a relation between the bias and the over-indebtedness index. The expected
median income bias solely and positively affects the probability to have a DSR greater
than 40% (columns (3) and (4), Table 4.6).
In an additional exercise, we add an income certainty measure as a control variable
to our main specifications in order to investigate whether the certainty about future
household income development affects (over-)indebtedness status.23 Tables 4.10, 4.11,
and 4.12 present results.
[Tables 4.10 - 4.12 about here]
There is no clear effect of certainty about future income on objective or subjective
indebtedness measures, except for that being more certain about the income develop-
ment is weakly related to an increased debt service to income ratio (columns (3) and
(4), Table 4.10) and a higher “debt position” (columns (3) and (4), Table 4.11).
Yet, we find strong effects of certainty for all over-indebtedness measures across both
bias specifications: If a respondent is very certain about the development of future
household income, this is linked to an augmented over-indebtedness index, a higher
probability to have a DSR greater than 0.4 and an increased probability of holding
more than four loans (Table 4.12). Moreover, the effect of certainty increases while the
effect of the specified bias variables decreases to a point where the expected median
income bias no longer affects significantly the over-indebtedness index. Thus, certainty
- representing a form of overconfidence, namely over-precision - is likely to constitute
a part of the expectation biases we derived.24
Hence, we conclude, (i) that there is a significant and robust relationship between
biased income expectations and (over-)indebtedness; (ii) We are also reassured that
subjective and objective debt indicators measure different dimensions of indebtedness.
While the “hard” objective debt measures are affected by both expectation biases,
23 Details on how the certainty measure is constructed are found in Appendix D.
24 As another variable controlling for certainty, we add the interquartile range of the elicited income
distribution to the regressions using the bias dummy as main variable of interest. While this certainty
measure does not affect over-indebtedness, it affects the subjective debt measures in a similar way
as over-precision: Higher uncertainty expressed through a higher interquartile range affects the
subjective debt and the sacrifice index significantly and negatively. Hence, uncertainty is related to
lower debt and less financial distress. The coefficient itself remains close to zero, however. Results
are available upon request.
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the more subjective measures are affected relatively more by the financial forecast
error. This indicates that these debt measures rather show respondent’s perceived fi-
nancial distress no matter the actual numerical debt level, and (iii) Certainty about
the household’s future income development is a likely driver of biased expectations and
it primarily affects over-indebtedness.
4.3.3 Robustness
Excluding Possibly Confounding Observations. Before eliciting the subjective ex-
pected income of respondents, we ask two questions testing their understanding of
probability. We here examine whether our main results hold and re-run the analysis for
only those respondents that correctly answer the probability probing questions. Results
are presented in Tables D.1, D.2, and D.3 in the Appendix. The effects for this sub-
sample stay highly significant and almost all coefficients increase in size emphasizing
the link between biased expectations and (over-)indebtedness.
In order to verify that respondents have an actual understanding of their house-
hold’s finances, we only include those individuals who are in charge of making household
financial decisions either by themselves or together with someone else (results are avail-
able upon request). Overall, the results stay virtually unchanged with regards to the
significance of our coefficients of interest. Point estimates are slightly higher for the
expected median income bias.
Different Bounds for Biased Expectations. We are aware of the fact that for some
households a non-zero difference between expected and actual income is rationally
justified. Thus, we calculate both wider and narrower measures for the expected me-
dian income bias to make sure we actually capture biased expectations. We define
the threshold from which a household is said to exhibit biased income expectations
narrower by including only the upper 20% of households that have a large positive
difference between expected and actually realized income and we define the threshold
wider by including the upper 30% of households from this “bias” distribution. The
results are similar in size and significance to the expected median income bias we use
in the main part of the analysis (see Tables D.4, D.5, and D.6 in the Appendix). Thus,
we are reassured that our effects are not due to arbitrarily setting the threshold of
having biased expectations at zero.
Adding the Lag of the Dependent Variable. In line with Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018),
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we control for the stock of already accumulated debt by including the lagged dependent
variable in the regression with the debt service to income ratio as endogenous variable.
This way, we can detect how debt evolves holding the accumulated level of debt constant
(see Table D.7 in the Appendix). As expected, the past level of the DSR has a large
impact on the present level. Nevertheless, the bias dummy remains significant. The
financial forecast error, however, still does not relate to the DSR, much like our main
results above.
Interacting the Bias with Personality Traits. We do not claim to show a causal effect
because we acknowledge that the relation between (over-)indebtedness and biased in-
come expectations may also work in the reverse. For example, if people are indebted,
they might have a great bias regarding future expected income as they plan to work
harder in the future to pay down their debt. We expect such people to exhibit a
high level of conscientiousness, the personality marker describing achievement oriented
(McClelland et al., 1953), hard-working, effective, and dutiful characters (Barrick and
Mount, 1991). Hence, we interact our bias variables with this character trait, expecting
to find significant effects for conscientious people. Results for the aggregated indices as
dependent variables are shown in Table D.8. The interaction is not significant for any
debt measure, no matter which bias we interact conscientiousness with. This counter-
acts the assumption that the achieving respondents with biased expectations drive the
relationship between biased expectations and debt status. Hence, personality traits do
not seem to support the claim that more indebted people have a higher income bias,
because they strive to work more in the future.
4.4 The Experiment
The preceding section shows that biased expectations and (over-)indebtedness are
strongly related to each other, even when controlling for important socio-economic char-
acteristics and shocks. However, methodologically, the implemented regression analysis
only represents correlations. In what follows, we try to prove that biased expectations
are one potential cause why persons in our sample spend more than they can actually
pay for.
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4.4.1 Experimental Design
As final part of the survey, we play a “market game” in which respondents can buy
different kinds of goods for a discounted price with money they earn in the experiment.
They can buy packs of coffee, chips, dried mango, or detergent for 10 THB (ca. 25 euro
cents) each instead of the 20 THB list price.25 Each participant receives an endowment
of 40 THB. Additional money can be earned by answering questions in a trivia game.
The amount earned depends on how many questions the participant answers correctly
in comparison to the other participants. We rank them from 1-10, where rank ten
corresponds to answering the most questions correctly and rank one to answering the
least number of questions correctly.26 Participants ranked 1-4 do not earn anything
additionally to their endowment, those ranked 5-6 earn 10 THB, those ranked 7-8 20
THB and those ranked 9-10 earn 40 THB additionally. Thus, participants can earn up
to 80 THB and can buy at most eight goods.
We make expectations a crucial factor in the game by requiring participants to
decide how much and what to buy before they take the pay-off relevant quiz, i.e. be-
fore they know their final payoff. We divide participants in two treatment groups; one
group faces a “hard” quiz and the other one an “easy” trivia quiz. To convey the dif-
ficulty of each quiz and to exogenously vary expectations about relative performance,
participants do a test quiz with seven questions upfront where difficulty again depends
on treatment. Based on the test quiz participants infer how good they will be in the
pay-off relevant main quiz and form expectations about the performance of the others
and, thereby, their relative rank. They are ranked within each treatment group and
they are told that everybody they are ranked against took the exact the same quiz.
With this design, we can exploit the so-called hard-easy gap analogous to Dargnies
et al. (2016) and very similar to Grohmann et al. (2019). Much research finds that peo-
25 At least for the bag of chips, it is common knowledge that they usually cost 20 THB as, for a long
time, they had the price printed on their front. To further convince participants that the products
are truly discounted, we attached “20 THB” price tags to each product.
26 In the field, participants from the first villages were ranked against participants from our pilot
villages and our interviewers who also took the quizzes. For later villages, we replaced our interviewer
data with data from the previous villages and told participants that they are ranked against ten
persons who live in a village similar to theirs. For the final analysis, we use all the observations to
create a ranking. In each treatment, we have two accumulation points in the number of correctly
answered questions that are next to each other and around the mean. We set these two points as
rank five and six. Each one point deviation in correctly answered question then constitutes a one
point deviation in rank (e.g. if rank five means nine questions answered correctly, rank four means
eight questions answered correctly). Since there are more questions than possible ranks, we have
some bunching of correctly answered questions around rank one and rank ten, the boundaries of
the ranking.
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ple tend to overplace themselves in easy tasks and to underplace themselves in hard
tasks (for example Merkle and Weber, 2011; Hartwig and Dunlosky, 2014; Benoit et al.,
2015). Over-(under-)placing is a form of over-(under-)confidence in which individuals
over-(under-)estimate their relative performance in comparison to others. Thus, by as-
signing participants to two different treatments, we exogenously vary their expectations
through varying self-confidence (see Figure 4.7).27 We subsequently measure confidence
as difference between expected rank and actual rank:
confidence = rankexp − rankact (4.4)
Theoretically, upward biased expectations can arise for two reasons; either an individual
is overly optimistic or overly confident. We follow Heger and Papageorge (2018) in
defining overoptimism as the tendency to overestimate the probability of preferred
outcomes and overconfidence as the tendency to overestimate one’s own performance.
For our experiment, we decide to concentrate on overconfidence because numerous
studies show that overconfidence is related to important life and financial decisions.28
[Figure 4.7 about here]
Except for the difference in difficulty, the procedure is the same for every partici-
pant: If participants agree to play the game, the interviewer prepares the set-up and
starts reading out the instructions. The instructions include comprehension questions
to test whether participants understand how their rank is determined and how much
they can earn. If participants do not answer these questions correctly, the interviewer
does not continue with the instructions.29 After they have finished the instructions,
the participants start to answer the test quiz, which has seven trivia questions. They
have five minutes to answer all the questions. For each question, four possible answers
are given. When the time is up or participants have finished answering, they receive
a decision sheet. On the decision sheet, they first have to write down the rank and
the earnings they expect to reach in the following main quiz. Then, they have to indi-
cate their buying decision based on their expected earnings. Afterwards, participants
27 The exogenous variation is one of the reasons why we do not include this measure for self-confidence
in our survey regressions as an alternative measure for expectation bias. Another reason is that self-
confidence is domain dependent, which can also later be seen comparing the on average observed
under-confidence in financial literacy and the overconfidence we find here.
28 For example, Camerer and Lovallo (1999), who experimentally test the effect of overconfidence on
entrepreneurial decision-making (this relationship is a well-researched field of study), conclude that
excess entry in a market game is strongly related to overconfidence and not to overoptimism.
29 Still, there are participants who had serious difficulties in understanding the game such that we
exclude them from the main analysis
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continue with the main quiz where they have to answer 15 questions in ten minutes.
Following the quiz, there are three debriefing questions including a question on the ex-
pected rank after the second quiz has actually been taken (such that we can check for
belief updating). Finally, the interviewer calculates the rank and earnings, then hands
over the products and money, if applicable.
In most cases, participants could read, write, and answer the quizzes on their own.
Sometimes, especially older people needed assistance in reading and writing, which was
provided by the interviewer. The supplemental material for the experiment is available
upon request.
Rational Decisions
If participants want to buy more than they can afford, including their endowment,
their consumption has to be restricted. They receive at most as many goods as they
can buy with their earnings and nothing beyond that amount. Participants are aware
of that fact.
We implicitly assume that expectations influence buying decisions. If this does not
hold, the aforementioned design feature seriously distorts our results as follows. If it
was the case that “rational” participants strictly prefer goods over money because, for
example, they are cheaper than list price and can be stockpiled, expectations would
become meaningless for the consumption decision. Indicating to buy eight goods is
weakly dominating any other number of goods for this kind of participants, since they
clearly prefer goods over money independent of the budget.30
Eventually about 4% of our participants decided to buy eight goods even though
they expect to earn less. An additional 3% wanted to buy more than they expected to
earn but less than eight goods. In our main analysis, these observations are excluded
because i) we already know that expectations do not impact consumption in this set-
ting for them and ii) they could artificially inflate our results. We present additional
analyses on this sub-sample in the Appendix Section “The Rationals” (D.12) and dis-
cuss whether they truly acted in a rational way or rather had difficulties understanding
the game.
For the other 93%, we still assume that in general respondents prefer a bundle out of
products and cash. The exact composition depends on individual preferences but also
30 If the participant expects less than 80 THB, there is a potential loss in indicating to buy less than
eight goods because the prediction might be under-confident. However, given our setting, there is
no loss if she indicates to buy eight goods but actual earnings are lower than 80 THB.
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expected earnings. Thus, being overconfident (or underconfident) creates a distortion
in utility. Following these reflections, we derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: On average, individuals in the easy treatment will buy more than in-
dividuals in the hard treatment.
Hypothesis 2: A great level of overconfidence will lead to excessive spending.
Hypothesis 1 is implied by the finding on the hard-easy gap. Hypothesis 2 follows
from the fact that we define respondents to be overconfident if their expected rank is
higher than their actual rank, which implies that they earn less than expected. Since
we cannot allow respondents to pay from personal money if experimental money is
insufficient, restricting consumption in some cases is necessary. Therefore, they cannot
accumulate debt. Nevertheless, this is what would actually happen in real life and,
therefore, we opted for this experimental design to estimate the effect of overconfidence
on (over-)indebtedness.
4.4.2 Experimental Results
Overall, 604 respondents participated in the game. Since participation is self-selected,
participants and non-participants are compared in Table D.9 in the Appendix. As can
be seen, participants and non-participants significantly differ in some variables.31 In
all these variables, the difference is in the expected direction: female, older, less occu-
pied, less educated, financial illiterate and less numerate and more financial risk averse
respondents are less likely to participate in the game. Several of these variables are
significantly correlated with each other. Running a simple regression on the likelihood
to participate, we find that some of these variables are insignificant and that the time
of day is one of the strongest predictors of game participation (see D.10). Since the
time of day at which we visited households for the interviews is mostly exogenous,32
self-selection into the game is less pronounced than initially expected.
Out of the 604, seven observations are excluded because either treatments for them
are mixed up, personal information is missing, or a third person helped them answer the
questions. We exclude 44 observations that are also excluded from the survey regression
31 A complete list of all variables and their explanation is provided in the Appendix.
32 We interviewed households according to a schedule we designed together with our interview team
manager, which tried to minimize travel distances for each interview team. Hence, this schedule was
exogenous to individual household characteristics, except for the village that the household resides
in. However, a few houses were empty the first time we visited them and we had to reschedule
another date with the household itself.
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analysis because they are outliers in income or the debt service to income ratio (see
Section 4.2.4).33 Additionally, 84 observations are excluded because it can be inferred
from the data that comprehension was insufficient34 or because they want to buy more
than they expect to earn in total (see previous Sub-Section on these special cases).
Those 84 cases differ only in their number of children between 7-10 years.
In Table 4.13 characteristics of the remaining 471 participants are compared across
treatments. The significantly unequal number of participants per treatment is due to
fact that we slightly over-sampled the easy treatment. Results from previous studies
suggest that the effect of easy tasks on self-confidence is generally stronger than the
effect of hard tasks (see for example Dargnies et al., 2016). The characteristics depicted
here might be important for the general level of self-confidence and the willingness to
buy products. Given the sample size and the number of variables analyzed, random-
izing participants into the treatments worked well; the two groups only significantly
differ with regard to their health status, their monthly household income, and their
(objective) over-indebtedness index. Controlling for these variables leaves our results
virtually unchanged.
[Table 4.13 about here]
Shift in Beliefs
On average, participants answered 9.07 out of 15 trivia questions correctly in the easy
treatment and 5.09 out of 15 in the hard treatment. Thus, it can be assumed that
for our sample the easy treatment is truly “easier” than the hard treatment. The
average expected rank in the hard treatment is 6.89 whereas the average expected
rank in the easy treatment is 7.22. In Figure 4.8 the cumulative distribution functions
of the expected ranks for both treatments are plotted. It seems that there is only
a small shift in beliefs, since the distributions are still almost overlapping.35 Indeed,
if we compare the distributions of the “second” expectations that are elicited after
respondents actually took the main quiz, we find a much larger shift (see Appendix
Figure D.1). Thus, either our test quizzes are not as hard or easy as the main quizzes
and, therefore, the shift in first beliefs is smaller or participants have such strong beliefs
33 The results are robust to this exclusion.
34 For example, one participant writes that he expects to earn 30 Baht from the game, which is,
however, not an possible option. Another one wants to buy 35 products although the maximum
affordable number is eight.
35 We focus on the expected rank in our analysis but everything holds analogously for expected earn-
ings.
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that they only gradually update their beliefs. Still, the distributions of first beliefs
are significantly different from each other (Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sided p=0.056;
Wilcoxon rank-sum two-sided p=0.041). The t-test for mean expectations is significant
at the 5% level (one-sided) as well (see Figure 4.11).
[Figure 4.8 about here]
The difference in self-confidence is larger than the difference in expected rank (see
Figure 4.9). This might be driven by our ranking procedure or by the fact that the
easy quiz is not a perfect shift of the hard quiz with respect to the number of questions
answered correctly. In any case, this suggests that our manipulation via the treatments
to shift the level of beliefs and thereby self-confidence worked.
[Figures 4.9 and 4.10 about here]
As seen in Figure 4.10, across both treatments the mean and median respondents
are slightly overconfident (even in the hard treatment). The whole distribution is a
little bit skewed to the left but still resembles a normal distribution. Over 14% of
the sample have perfectly accurate beliefs and have a self-confidence of “0.” Small
deviations from 0 could be considered accurate as well because they could present a
form of Bayesian updating.36 Still, a substantial fraction of participants seems to be
tremendously overconfident.
Buying Decision
We find a significant positive correlation between expected rank (earnings) and the
amount of goods participants want to buy. However, there is no significant relation
between the treatment itself and mean desired consumption as presented in Figure
4.12.
[Figures 4.11 and 4.12 about here]
If we run regressions where we can control for the variables that are unbalanced
across treatments, the picture stays the same: the treatment is positively related to the
expected rank, the expected rank is positively related to the desired amount of goods,
but the treatment is not related to the amount of goods (see Table 4.14).
[Table 4.14 about here]
36 On this discussion see Merkle and Weber (2011).
78
A similar pattern emerges if we look explicitly at spending behavior (see Table 4.15).
We distinguish overborrowing, meaning buying more than actual earnings including
endowment can pay for, from overspending, meaning buying more than actual game
earnings can pay for, but the spending can still be paid with the endowment. The
expected rank as well as confidence have a significant effect on both variables, but
treatment does not.37
[Table 4.15 about here]
A supplementary result we find worth mentioning is that having higher objective
and subjective burdens as well as being over-indebted in “real life” is actually related
to spending behavior in our experiment (see Table 4.16). Likewise, our regressions
results from Section 4.3.2 on over-indebtedness become more precise if we only look at
the persons who overspend in the game. Thus, those respondents who have problems
controlling their spending in real life are also those who spend less carefully in the game.
We see this as evidence that our experiment, although highly artificial, still captures
aspects of real life behavior.
[Table 4.16 about here]
Summarized, our treatments shifted expectations in hypothesized directions; expec-
tations are positively related to spending behavior, but the treatment has no impact on
the latter. Therefore, we cannot claim that there is a causal link between expectations
and overborrowing with our experiment.
4.4.3 Confounding Factors
The previous findings are exceptionally robust to various restrictions. For example, they
are not driven by participants who are very old or have mild comprehension difficulties
(we already excluded those with large difficulties in the main analysis). It is also not the
case that the treatments only affect expected ranks but not expected earnings.38 This
suggest that there are confounding factors or “noise” interfering with our treatments.
We run further analyses to rule out that the treatments affected factors other than
expectations:
37 The level of significance is higher not lower when we exclude possibly “rational” participants who
want to buy more than they expect to earn in total.
38 This could happen if there is a piecewise treatment effect (shifting expectations only within the same
earnings category) because earnings are only piecewise increasing in ranks and not equidistant.
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Frustration and Gratification. One of the most likely confounds could be that partic-
ipants in the hard treatment feel frustrated because of the difficult questions and want
to treat themselves with “shopping.” In contrast, some others might be proud of mas-
tering such a hard quiz and also want to reward themselves. Both motives should lead
to the result that especially participants with extreme expectations behave differently
across treatments. Participants who are frustrated should rank themselves rather low
whereas participants that are proud should rank themselves rather high. Subsequently,
the buying behavior of participants with the same expected rank across treatments
should be significantly different for the lowest and highest ranks. However, the only
(marginally) significant difference we can detect is for the five participants who ex-
pected to reach rank two: here, participants in the hard treatment want to buy more
than participants in the easy treatment. Excluding these observations does not change
our results. For all other ranks participants in both treatments exhibit the same spend-
ing pattern. This finding is not in favor of frustration and gratification being possible
confounding factors.
Temptation. Another possibility is that participants in the hard treatment are more
susceptible to temptation goods. They have to exercise more cognitive effort, which
decreases their self-control, so-called “ego depletion” (see, for example, Hagger et al.,
2010). Running separate regressions on each product, we find a significantly different
treatment effect only for dried mango. Still, self-control (measured with the scale from
Tangney et al., 2004) and BMI do not have significant effects on buying mango, which
opposes the ego depletion interpretation. We also do not find evidence that frustrated
(more depleted) participants are more likely to buy mango. Furthermore, detergent is
the most popular product and the share of detergent in all goods desired is not different
across treatments, whereas mango is the least popular. Detergent is the one product
we would expect to be least related to self-control issues. Summarized, we do not find
convincing evidence that persons in the hard treatment are more likely to give in to
temptation.
Based on the tests above, we argue that we can rule out the most probable confounding
factors interfering with the treatments. We believe that the reason we do not find a
treatment effect on spending and borrowing is that the induced shift in beliefs was not
strong enough to eventually be reflected in spending. We can only speculate why the
well-established hard-easy gap is so small in our setting. Consulting our interviewers
and the data, we have no reason to believe that participants did not perceive the test
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quizzes as either hard or easy when they should. Several other studies find larger shifts
in beliefs although participants had less exposure to manipulation.39 The rural Thai
population may have more persistent beliefs than Western populations, which makes
changing these beliefs more difficult. Given the tremendous level of overconfidence we
find, this circumstance might not be beneficial for our participants. It relates to our
regression result that being too certain about the future income is related to over-
indebtedness. “Sticky,” biased expectations bear implications for policy making. They
must be taken into account when measures to reduce household over-indebtedness are
designed.
4.5 Conclusion
Over-indebtedness can pose a serious threat to households’ welfare and the financial
stability of a country, especially in emerging markets. However, the determinants of the
worldwide high level of over-indebtedness are, so far, not well understood. Theoretically,
as modelled in the permanent income hypothesis, higher income expectations should
lead to a higher level of borrowing.
In this study, we analyze the effect of biased income expectations on over-indebtedness
by using data from an extensive household survey and a lab-in-the-field experiment.
Little financial knowledge and high income uncertainty demand for explicit research
in emerging countries and not to rely on results for Western populations. Our sample
belongs to a panel survey of relatively poor and rural households in Thailand. Indeed,
we can confirm a low level of financial literacy in several dimensions and find sub-
stantial uncertainty in income expectations for our sample. While over-indebtedness is
increasingly recognized as a growing problem in Thailand, our study sheds light on its
potential drivers.
In our regression analysis, we find a strong and robust positive relationship between
biased expectations and (over-)indebtedness controlling for various household charac-
teristics and shocks. This finding holds for two alternative measures for biased income
expectations and various measures for objective and subjective debt measures. Subjec-
tive debt measures are, however, much more related to the qualitative bias measure.
This measure is likely to be influenced more heavily by judgments on the household’s
financial situation and by the respondent’s personality traits. Last, certainty about the
future household income development positively affects household over-indebtedness
39 For example, Grohmann et al. (2019) only use four questions they frame as “example questions”
and find larger treatment effects on expectations.
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and is likely to be a driver of biased expectations themselves. The results are robust to
various specifications.
We attempt to establish a causal relationship between biased expectations and
overborrowing in our experiment by exogenously varying self-confidence via the so
called hard-easy gap. Thereby, we change expectations about the future payout in the
game. Our results show that also in the experiment, overconfidence is related to more
spending and overborrowing but we cannot claim causality. The most probable reason
why our treatments do not affect spending behavior are too “sticky” beliefs. This also
suggests that rural households are too certain about their income expectations.
Two caveats of our study warrant mentioning: First, all our results are correlations
and do not show causality. Still, by accounting for shocks households experienced, we
can reduce the concern that over-indebtedness drives biased expectations or that both
are spuriously correlated to each other. Second, because we will never know the true
income generating process, we cannot know with certainty whether the expectations of
our respondents are truly biased.
Nevertheless, we find reassuring evidence that too high expectations can lead to
household over-indebtedness, thus pushing households into severe poverty. One of the
potential channels why overconfident expectations affect over-indebtedness is being too
certain about own expectations in the highly uncertain environment that rural house-
holds in emerging markets are living in. Given the supplemental evidence for sticky
beliefs from our experiment, changing beliefs or their certainty seems to be challeng-
ing. More appropriate policy measures would reduce vulnerability and uncertainty with
the expansion of assistance and insurance schemes, especially for households engaged
in agriculture, but also by training to improve information processing in general.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 4.1: Household Debt to GDP Ratio, Selected Emerging Markets
Figure 4.2: Study Site, Ubon Ratchathani
Thailand
Figure 4.3: Sampled Subdistricts
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Table 4.1: Probabilities Assigned to Sections of the Income Distribution
Observations Minimum Maximum Median Mean S.D.
0-3300 THB 737 0 100 20 32.18 35.1
3301-8100 THB 737 0 100 30 30.71 29.27
8101-16590 737 0 100 20 24.03 28.38
16591-300000 737 0 100 0 13.08 24.08
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Figure 4.5: Number of Loans
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Figure 4.6: Income Certainty
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - Main Variables
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Expectation Bias Indices
Expected Income Bias (=1) 0.24 0.43 0 1 686
Financial Forecast Error 0.17 0.95 =3 3 674
Debt Variables
Objective Debt Index 0.00 1.00 =1 5 688
Debt Service Ratio 2017 0.23 0.48 0 4 688
Remain. Debt/Income Ratio 0.34 0.70 =1 10 665
Paid Late/Defaulted on Loan 0.15 0.36 0 1 685
Over-Indebtness Index =0.00 1.00 =1 3 688
DSR > 0.4 (=1) 0.18 0.39 0 1 688
Holds > 4 Loans (=1) 0.14 0.35 0 1 688
Subjective Debt Index =0.00 1.00 =2 3 688
Sacrifice Index =0.08 1.19 =2 4 688
Debt Position =0.02 0.87 =2 1 688
Diff. Paying Debt 1.37 0.60 1 3 686
Note: The debt index variables are standardized. The components of the indices are
given in non-standardized real terms.
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Table 4.4: Income Expectation Bias Dummy - Objective Debt Indicators
Obj. Debt Index DSR 2017 Rem. Debt/Income Paid Late/Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bias Dummy 0.410∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.107) (0.110) (0.055) (0.057) (0.072) (0.077) (0.032) (0.032)
Monthly Inc. 2017 =0.000∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.051∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Age Squared =0.001∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Shocks 0.072∗ 0.013 0.040∗∗ 0.024
(0.040) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
FL-Score =0.001 0.012∗ 0.009 =0.009∗
(0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005)
Risk Aversion 0.030 0.012 0.005 0.009
(0.020) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008)
Self-Control 0.006 0.001 =0.001 0.003∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Main Inc. Farming =0.327∗ =0.142 0.116 =0.106∗
(0.168) (0.091) (0.093) (0.057)
Main Inc. Employed =0.378∗∗ =0.228∗∗∗ =0.015 =0.057
(0.169) (0.082) (0.088) (0.062)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. =0.242 =0.217∗∗ 0.191 =0.029
(0.208) (0.090) (0.179) (0.077)
Main Inc. Remitt. =0.395∗∗ =0.195∗∗ =0.003 =0.092
(0.162) (0.083) (0.092) (0.060)
Children (0-6 yrs) =0.044 =0.021 =0.102∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.051) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022)
Children (7-10 yrs) 0.038 0.014 0.033 0.003
(0.077) (0.034) (0.044) (0.031)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.070 0.002 0.023 0.028
(0.066) (0.030) (0.034) (0.027)
No. of Elders 0.062 0.008 0.019 0.027
(0.053) (0.030) (0.040) (0.020)
No. of Working Mem. 0.012 0.010 0.002 =0.001
(0.043) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015)
Total HH Education 0.002 0.002 =0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant =0.098∗∗ =1.011∗ 0.185∗∗∗=0.114 0.294∗∗∗ =0.304 0.141∗∗∗ =0.066
(0.047) (0.584) (0.021) (0.273) (0.035) (0.385) (0.017) (0.227)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 678 686 678 663 655 683 675
Adj. R-squared 0.030 0.082 0.032 0.079 0.013 0.051 0.003 0.025
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 4.5: Income Expectation Bias Dummy - Subjective Debt Indicators
Subj. Debt Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bias Dummy 0.061 0.100 0.072 0.119 0.013 0.023 0.054 0.078
(0.093) (0.093) (0.083) (0.085) (0.053) (0.054) (0.104) (0.104)
Monthly Inc. 2017 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.045∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020)
Age Squared =0.001∗∗∗ =0.001∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Shocks 0.102∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.020 0.136∗∗
(0.042) (0.033) (0.024) (0.054)
FL-Score =0.034∗∗ 0.006 =0.020∗∗ =0.066∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.016)
Risk Aversion 0.050∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.013
(0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.024)
Self-Control 0.010∗∗ 0.004 0.005∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Main Inc. Farming =0.187 =0.096 0.009 =0.397∗∗
(0.147) (0.127) (0.087) (0.191)
Main Inc. Employed =0.033 =0.029 0.054 =0.158
(0.160) (0.138) (0.094) (0.203)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. =0.016 =0.000 0.053 =0.149
(0.168) (0.136) (0.103) (0.219)
Main Inc. Remitt. =0.209 =0.157 =0.066 =0.241
(0.151) (0.127) (0.090) (0.188)
Children (0-6 yrs) =0.045 =0.084 0.013 =0.033
(0.064) (0.053) (0.039) (0.077)
Children (7-10 yrs) =0.067 0.071 =0.064 =0.166∗
(0.075) (0.068) (0.044) (0.094)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.070 0.045 =0.005 0.141
(0.071) (0.054) (0.045) (0.092)
No. of Elders 0.003 0.027 0.014 =0.052
(0.050) (0.046) (0.032) (0.061)
No. of Working Mem. 0.122∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.014 0.159∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.039) (0.028) (0.056)
Total HH Education =0.010∗∗ =0.007 =0.002 =0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Constant =0.016 =1.349∗∗ =0.043 =1.993∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗=0.100∗ =0.537
(0.050) (0.563) (0.043) (0.468) (0.031) (0.350) (0.060) (0.669)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 678 686 678 684 676 686 678
Adj. R-squared -0.001 0.086 -0.000 0.089 -0.001 0.040 -0.001 0.084
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 4.6: Income Expectation Bias Dummy - Over-Indebtedness Indicators
Over-indebtness Index DSR > 0.4 (=1) Holds > 4 Loans (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bias Dummy 0.188∗∗ 0.133 0.131∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ =0.007 =0.005
(0.090) (0.094) (0.037) (0.037) (0.028) (0.030)
Monthly Inc. 2017 =0.000 =0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.033∗∗ 0.006 0.014∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.004)
Age Squared =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000 =0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Shocks 0.038 0.001 0.022
(0.045) (0.018) (0.014)
FL-Score 0.020 0.008 0.005
(0.015) (0.006) (0.005)
Risk Aversion 0.047∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
Self-Control =0.003 =0.002 =0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Main Inc. Farming =0.090 =0.066 0.006
(0.142) (0.062) (0.047)
Main Inc. Employed =0.266∗ =0.114∗ =0.055
(0.147) (0.060) (0.050)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. =0.261 =0.100 =0.064
(0.173) (0.076) (0.059)
Main Inc. Remitt. =0.236 =0.073 =0.074
(0.165) (0.067) (0.053)
Children (0-6 yrs) =0.056 =0.014 =0.021
(0.063) (0.025) (0.022)
Children (7-10 yrs) 0.059 0.013 0.023
(0.085) (0.034) (0.029)
Children (11-16 yrs) =0.033 =0.018 =0.003
(0.061) (0.028) (0.022)
No. of Elders =0.056 0.002 =0.035∗
(0.062) (0.023) (0.020)
No. of Working Mem. 0.052 0.019 0.014
(0.038) (0.016) (0.014)
Total HH Education =0.000 =0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant =0.044 =0.901∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.088 0.145∗∗∗ =0.304∗
(0.057) (0.542) (0.019) (0.250) (0.020) (0.175)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 678 686 678 686 678
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.046 0.020 0.053 -0.001 0.040
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 4.7: Fin. Forecast Error - Objective Debt Indicators
Obj. Debt Index DSR 2017 Rem. Debt/Income Paid Late/Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.143∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.031 0.110∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.023
(0.045) (0.045) (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.039) (0.018) (0.018)
Monthly Inc. 2017 =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.051∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.019) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Age Squared =0.001∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗ =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Shocks 0.056 0.008 0.026 0.021
(0.045) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020)
FL-Score 0.003 0.015∗∗ 0.013 =0.009
(0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Risk Aversion 0.028 0.012 0.004 0.007
(0.020) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008)
Self-Control 0.007 0.001 =0.001 0.003∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Main Inc. Farming =0.380∗∗ =0.166∗ 0.094 =0.115∗
(0.172) (0.091) (0.093) (0.058)
Main Inc. Employed =0.475∗∗∗ =0.264∗∗∗ =0.050 =0.081
(0.170) (0.080) (0.085) (0.064)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. =0.312 =0.239∗∗∗ 0.165 =0.049
(0.207) (0.088) (0.181) (0.078)
Main Inc. Remitt. =0.442∗∗∗ =0.219∗∗∗ =0.030 =0.098
(0.162) (0.083) (0.095) (0.061)
Children (0-6 yrs) =0.038 =0.017 =0.100∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.051) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023)
Children (7-10 yrs) 0.026 0.012 0.038 =0.004
(0.081) (0.034) (0.047) (0.032)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.051 0.000 0.017 0.019
(0.066) (0.031) (0.035) (0.027)
No. of Elders 0.047 =0.001 0.009 0.027
(0.052) (0.029) (0.039) (0.019)
No. of Working Mem. =0.022 =0.002 =0.016 =0.008
(0.046) (0.022) (0.027) (0.016)
Total HH Education 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant =0.023 =0.852 0.230∗∗∗=0.071 0.326∗∗∗ =0.298 0.148∗∗∗ =0.008
(0.040) (0.609) (0.020) (0.260) (0.029) (0.392) (0.015) (0.242)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 674 667 674 667 652 645 671 664
Adj. R-squared 0.017 0.073 0.005 0.071 0.020 0.061 0.005 0.021
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 4.8: Fin. Forecast Error - Subjective Debt Indicators
Subj. Debt Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.158∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.042 0.139∗∗∗ 0.091∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.048) (0.046)
Monthly Inc. 2017 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000 =0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.020 0.043∗∗
(0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.022)
Age Squared =0.001∗∗∗ =0.001∗∗∗ =0.000∗∗ =0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Shocks 0.084∗ 0.065∗ 0.014 0.122∗∗
(0.043) (0.034) (0.024) (0.055)
FL-Score =0.033∗∗ 0.008 =0.022∗∗ =0.061∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.017)
Risk Aversion 0.047∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.010
(0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.024)
Self-Control 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Main Inc. Farming =0.183 =0.104 0.015 =0.387∗∗
(0.141) (0.122) (0.085) (0.185)
Main Inc. Employed =0.036 =0.036 0.054 =0.156
(0.157) (0.133) (0.094) (0.199)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. =0.021 =0.017 0.046 =0.127
(0.162) (0.130) (0.100) (0.216)
Main Inc. Remitt. =0.199 =0.168 =0.057 =0.218
(0.143) (0.119) (0.087) (0.183)
Children (0-6 yrs) =0.041 =0.082 0.015 =0.028
(0.067) (0.055) (0.042) (0.078)
Children (7-10 yrs) =0.074 0.070 =0.072 =0.169∗
(0.077) (0.071) (0.045) (0.095)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.064 0.045 =0.007 0.129
(0.070) (0.054) (0.043) (0.091)
No. of Elders =0.003 0.016 0.014 =0.055
(0.050) (0.046) (0.031) (0.061)
No. of Working Mem. 0.098∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.006 0.139∗∗
(0.041) (0.038) (0.028) (0.055)
Total HH Education =0.008∗ =0.004 =0.001 =0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Constant =0.019 =1.170∗ =0.041 =1.784∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗=0.102∗ =0.520
(0.043) (0.630) (0.037) (0.516) (0.027) (0.389) (0.053) (0.720)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 674 667 674 667 672 665 674 667
Adj. R-squared 0.021 0.093 0.022 0.094 0.006 0.043 0.011 0.090
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 4.9: Fin. Forecast Error - Over-Indebtedness Indicators
Over-indebtness Index DSR > 0.4 (=1) Holds > 4 Loans (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.133∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Monthly Inc. 2017 =0.000∗ =0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.033∗∗ 0.008 0.012∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.007) (0.004)
Age Squared =0.000∗∗∗ =0.000∗ =0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Shocks 0.020 =0.004 0.016
(0.050) (0.020) (0.015)
FL-Score 0.023 0.010 0.005
(0.015) (0.006) (0.005)
Risk Aversion 0.046∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
Self-Control =0.003 =0.002 =0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Main Inc. Farming =0.103 =0.077 0.009
(0.141) (0.063) (0.045)
Main Inc. Employed =0.288∗∗ =0.133∗∗ =0.051
(0.140) (0.059) (0.050)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. =0.271 =0.112 =0.060
(0.171) (0.075) (0.060)
Main Inc. Remitt. =0.250 =0.085 =0.071
(0.163) (0.067) (0.052)
Children (0-6 yrs) =0.048 =0.009 =0.020
(0.064) (0.025) (0.022)
Children (7-10 yrs) 0.058 0.015 0.021
(0.086) (0.034) (0.029)
Children (11-16 yrs) =0.031 =0.019 =0.001
(0.062) (0.029) (0.022)
No. of Elders =0.063 =0.005 =0.033
(0.062) (0.023) (0.021)
No. of Working Mem. 0.031 0.010 0.009
(0.040) (0.016) (0.014)
Total HH Education 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant =0.021 =0.858 0.176∗∗∗ 0.064 0.135∗∗∗ =0.257
(0.049) (0.540) (0.017) (0.236) (0.017) (0.175)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 674 667 674 667 674 667
Adj. R-squared 0.014 0.053 0.007 0.053 0.013 0.046
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 4.10: Certainty Measure - Objective Debt Indicators
Obj. Debt Index DSR 2017 Rem. Debt/Income Paid Late/Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bias Dummy 0.352∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.113) (0.059) (0.080) (0.032)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.118∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.025
(0.045) (0.019) (0.039) (0.018)
Overprecision 0.034 0.030 0.057∗ 0.057∗ =0.007 =0.011 =0.014 =0.015
(0.065) (0.066) (0.032) (0.033) (0.047) (0.046) (0.023) (0.023)
Constant =0.891 =0.761 =0.216 =0.199 =0.226 =0.266 0.049 0.115
(0.669) (0.695) (0.332) (0.314) (0.506) (0.504) (0.244) (0.257)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 665 655 665 655 642 633 662 652
Adj. R-squared 0.079 0.071 0.084 0.076 0.049 0.060 0.023 0.021
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses.
Table 4.11: Certainty Measure - Subjective Debt Indicators
Subj. Debt Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bias Dummy 0.077 0.114 0.004 0.057
(0.094) (0.086) (0.053) (0.106)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.109∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.042 0.091∗
(0.045) (0.039) (0.028) (0.047)
Overprecision =0.004 =0.006 0.092∗ 0.092∗ =0.054 =0.055 =0.031 =0.036
(0.068) (0.069) (0.054) (0.053) (0.041) (0.042) (0.084) (0.085)
Constant =1.330∗∗ =1.229∗ =2.357∗∗∗=2.204∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗∗=0.367 =0.429
(0.611) (0.673) (0.534) (0.576) (0.378) (0.417) (0.751) (0.794)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 665 655 665 655 663 653 665 655
Adj. R-squared 0.084 0.093 0.092 0.099 0.042 0.046 0.080 0.087
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 4.12: Certainty Measure - Over-Indebtedness Indicators
Over-indebtness Index DSR > 0.4 (=1) Holds > 4 Loans (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bias Dummy 0.128 0.092∗∗ =0.007
(0.096) (0.038) (0.030)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.113∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.038) (0.015) (0.014)
Overprecision 0.178∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant =1.284∗∗ =1.303∗∗ 0.026 =0.021 =0.474∗∗ =0.443∗∗
(0.573) (0.571) (0.266) (0.248) (0.188) (0.188)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 665 655 665 655 665 655
Adj. R-squared 0.060 0.068 0.060 0.060 0.054 0.059
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4.7: Experimental Flow
Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Hard Treatment Easy Treatment Difference
Sex 1.64 1.60 1.67 −0.07
Age 56.16 55.23 56.93 −1.70
Relation to HH Head 1.70 1.69 1.71 −0.02
Marital Status 2.13 2.09 2.16 −0.07
Main Occupation 4.79 4.29 5.20 −0.90
Years of Schooling 5.92 6.08 5.79 0.28
Children (0-6 years) 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.08
Children (7-10 years) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.01
Numeracy 2.14 2.09 2.19 −0.10
Health Status 1.38 1.32 1.43 −0.11∗∗
BMI 23.58 23.25 23.86 −0.61
Fin. Decision Maker 1.57 1.55 1.59 −0.03
Self Control 20.94 21.19 20.75 0.44
Risk Taking 4.02 3.96 4.07 −0.12
Fin. Risk Taking 4.06 3.99 4.12 −0.13
FL-Score 5.66 5.55 5.75 −0.20
Monthly Inc. 2017 18653.06 20802.79 16893.44 3909.35∗∗
Obj. Debt Index −0.01 −0.07 0.05 −0.12
Subj. Debt Index −0.02 −0.00 −0.03 0.03
Over-Indebtedness Index 0.03 −0.06 0.11 −0.17∗
Morning 0.53 0.51 0.54 −0.03
Midday 0.27 0.26 0.28 −0.02
Read Alone 1.44 1.44 1.44 −0.00
Difficulties in Game 1.14 1.15 1.13 0.01
Observations 471 212 259 471
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Table 4.14: Consumption Decision
Exp. Rank No. Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.371∗∗ =0.143 =0.200
(0.175) (0.173) (0.171)
Exp. Rank 0.147∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; A higher expected rank corresponds to a higher
expected performance. Controls: Health Status, Monthly HH income and Over-Indebtedness In-
dex.
Table 4.15: Overborrowing and Overspending
Overconfidence Overborrowing Overspending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.216∗∗∗ 0.009 =0.008 =0.035
(0.282) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045)
Overconfidence 0.014∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; Controls: Health Status, Monthly HH income and
Over-Indebtedness Index.
Table 4.16: Overborrowing in the Game and in Real Life
No. Goods Overborrowing Overspending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Obj. Debt Index 0.055 0.001 0.039∗
(0.076) (0.009) (0.022)
Subj. Debt Index 0.137∗ =0.010 0.054∗∗
(0.080) (0.008) (0.022)
Over-Indebtedness Index 0.081 0.008 0.046∗∗
(0.079) (0.010) (0.020)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Controls: Treatment and all variables listed in Table 4.13.
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Appendix A - Appendix for
Chapter 2
Table A.1: Actual Treatment for Baseline and Follow-up Waves
Oct.12 Apr.13 Oct.13 Oct.14 Oct.15 Oct.16 Oct.17 Total
Account
Treatment 47 48 48 46 43 38 34 304
Cash
Treatment 48 48 47 45 38 36 35 297
Control Group 92 92 88 71 63 58 49 513
N 187 188 183 162 144 132 118 1,114
Source: Own calculations
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Table A.2: Analysis of Attrition - Baseline Balance
Obs. Not Surveyed Surveyed Difference p-value
Central Division 349 0.41 0.48 =0.078 0.160
Kawempe Division 349 0.19 0.063 0.120∗∗∗ 0.0003
Makindye Division 349 0.078 0.063 0.015 0.600
Nakawa Division 349 0.19 0.23 =0.039 0.395
Rubaga Division 349 0.14 0.16 =0.022 0.581
Manufacturing 349 0.25 0.53 =0.280∗∗∗ 0.0000
Trade 349 0.58 0.29 0.280∗∗∗ 0.0000
Services 349 0.094 0.12 =0.024 0.491
Age 346 33.8 35.3 =1.520∗ 0.0983
Male 349 0.53 0.65 =0.120∗∗ 0.0265
Married* 176 0.64 0.69 =0.047 0.527
No primary education 349 0.047 0.12 =0.071∗∗ 0.0273
Completed primary school 349 0.23 0.31 =0.078 0.121
Completed O-level 349 0.28 0.21 0.069 0.148
Completed A-Level 349 0.16 0.20 =0.043 0.320
Completed University 349 0.25 0.11 0.140∗∗∗ 0.0004
Speaks English fluently 342 0.77 0.66 0.110∗∗ 0.0272
Household Size 349 2.89 2.93 =0.037 0.895
Assetindex 174 0.089 0.054 0.035∗∗∗ 0.0016
Total Savings 175 2580.5 1851.0 729.5 0.418
1=Credit Constrained* 203 0.77 0.84 =0.066 0.246
1=Impatient 346 0.77 0.89 =0.120∗∗∗ 0.0039
1=Present Biased* 175 0.55 0.63 =0.084 0.279
Firm Age* 171 5.03 7.94 =2.900∗∗∗ 0.0034
1=Formal Business* 173 0.30 0.20 0.095 0.158
Start-up Capital 344 6752.5 1502.1 5250.500∗∗∗ 0.0000
Own-Account Worker 349 0.35 0.39 =0.038 0.486
Owner Labor Hours 335 310.8 316.3 =5.500 0.510
Employee Labor Hours 349 293.0 292.9 0.120 0.998
Business Savings 329 1879.1 658.2 1220.900∗∗∗ 0.0020
Sales 343 10429.2 5499.3 4929.900∗∗∗ 0.0057
Costs 349 9890.7 4434.8 5455.900∗∗∗ 0.0013
Profits 342 1885.9 890.1 995.800∗∗ 0.0184
N 349
Note: Characteristics denoted with an asterisk use values from one of the baseline surveys only, all
other measures depict the average of both baselines (October 2012 and April 2013). P-values for
tests of equality between account and control group. *, **, and *** on p-values denote significant
differences at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All values are given in 1000 UGX.
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Heterogeneity Analysis - Interaction with Gender
Descriptive baseline results reveal that male and female led businesses differ signif-
icantly from each other in various ways: Male-led businesses are older on average (7.9
vs. 5.8 years) and less credit constrained (46% vs. 67%). Accumulated capital stock
is much higher (2,308,000 UGX vs. 1,309,000 UGX), their firms sell more (8,711,000
UGX vs. 3,659,000 UGX) and yield higher profits (1,383,000 UGX vs. 785,000 UGX).40
Moreover, the finding that cash transfers and loans are used differently by gender is
established in the related literature (e.g. de Mel et al., 2009a; Fafchamps et al., 2014;
Fiala, 2018).
We present results from interacting the treatment variables with gender in Tables
A.3 to A.8. The tables provide estimates with respect to capital stock, monthly profits,
inventories, sales, and (business) savings in both levels and logs. As in our main equa-
tion, all regressions control for the baseline value of the respective outcome variable,
dummies for the division and the industry the business operates in, business owner’s
level of education and age, the amount of available baseline start-up capital and house-
hold wealth, the number of employees, and age of the firm. We further interact gender
with the respective wave.
Similar to our main regression results, there is no robust and significant hetero-
geneous treatment effect on capital stock across both treatment groups (Table A.3).
Results in levels for monthly profits and inventories suggest a positive treatment ef-
fect for men compared to women in the account group. However, this effect vanishes
when looking at the log-regressions which might be due to these specifications accom-
modating extreme values better (Tables A.4 and A.5). Sales for female and male led
businesses are not significantly differently affected by the cash transfer, but, neverthe-
less, coefficients for the interactions consistently display positive (though insignificant)
treatment results for men in both treatment arms (Table A.6).
Last, there is no conclusive finding regarding heterogeneous treatment effects when
we examine the interactions with respect to savings and business savings as outcome
variables (see Tables A.7 and A.8.) Hence, we are cautious in interpreting our inter-
action results as they are often only marginally significant or change coefficient signs
depending on whether the regression is presented in levels or logs. In conclusion, the
transfer does not seem to affect women and men differently.
40 The difference for firm profits is significant at the 10% level, for firm age it is significant at the 5%
level, all other differences mentioned are significant at the 1% level (results from two-sided t-tests).
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Table A.3: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Gender - Capital Stock
Capital Stock Log Capital Stock
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 61.979 =34.925 271.608 0.124 =0.116 0.280
(513.261) (364.063) (582.112) (0.277) (0.249) (0.351)
1=Male 356.830 225.537 319.914 0.072 0.054 0.059
(357.734) (212.406) (346.471) (0.106) (0.066) (0.098)
Account × Male=1 906.240 1174.523 532.109 0.110 0.241 0.061
(939.226) (980.642) (1249.163) (0.415) (0.443) (0.495)
Cash Treatment 368.757 =156.395 739.707 =0.211 =0.357∗ =0.186
(418.771) (297.030) (686.337) (0.243) (0.205) (0.366)
Cash × Male=1 =407.953 243.511 =949.991 0.133 0.278 0.120
(989.359) (742.145) (1343.279) (0.374) (0.311) (0.514)
Constant =964.611 =583.546 =990.540 1.419∗∗∗ 0.608∗ 1.386∗∗∗
(1161.354) (695.166) (1125.603) (0.530) (0.328) (0.530)
Observations 851 547 609 851 547 609
R squared 0.34 0.62 0.34 0.63 0.78 0.65
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.4: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Gender - Profits
Monthly Profits Log Monthly Profits
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment =338.989 =253.219 =722.436∗∗ 0.097 =0.243 0.203
(212.073) (274.538) (312.146) (0.249) (0.263) (0.400)
1=Male 500.478 276.556 413.441 =0.236 =0.170 =0.252∗
(438.963) (321.891) (368.826) (0.163) (0.146) (0.148)
Account × Male=1 676.393∗ 932.117 1128.918∗ =0.095 0.299 =0.139
(361.248) (605.779) (584.544) (0.301) (0.355) (0.455)
Cash Treatment =232.465 =390.397 =415.411 0.078 =0.045 0.064
(244.256) (432.128) (296.259) (0.277) (0.288) (0.432)
Cash × Male=1 410.763 481.865 647.544 =0.254 =0.193 =0.230
(542.157) (933.240) (683.047) (0.349) (0.391) (0.511)
Constant 1120.680∗∗∗ 665.788 1237.754∗∗∗ 2.912∗∗∗ 1.707∗∗∗ 2.429∗∗∗
(336.399) (434.913) (347.598) (0.385) (0.275) (0.420)
Observations 828 534 590 765 501 545
R squared 0.40 0.60 0.49 0.42 0.53 0.50
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.5: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Gender - Inventories
Inventories Log Inventories
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment =1942.023 =1666.602 =2281.373 0.330 0.357 0.322
(1185.128) (1773.342) (1811.518) (0.297) (0.275) (0.502)
1=Male 1105.785 =595.793 =565.548 =0.282 =0.186 =0.417∗∗
(1977.169) (1966.200) (2006.453) (0.205) (0.185) (0.202)
Account × Male=1 6121.514∗∗ 7831.638∗∗ 5049.989 =0.197 0.215 =0.598
(2993.999) (3303.041) (4513.140) (0.394) (0.422) (0.595)
Cash Treatment =986.131 =809.807 =1376.420 =0.051 0.134 =0.296
(1398.802) (1630.414) (2650.048) (0.292) (0.251) (0.483)
Cash × Male=1 =4578.801 3269.615 =9536.247 =0.306 0.157 =0.582
(6362.427) (3819.721) (10526.771) (0.444) (0.418) (0.626)
Constant 4550.782 3260.877 5649.567 2.055∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 1.987∗∗∗
(3775.907) (2628.610) (4759.889) (0.500) (0.359) (0.548)
Observations 710 477 500 678 457 476
R squared 0.61 0.91 0.63 0.67 0.76 0.67
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.6: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Gender - Sales
Monthly Sales Log Monthly Sales
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 894.952 257.015 1060.239 =0.037 =0.107 =0.050
(1826.096) (2108.367) (1905.872) (0.271) (0.310) (0.353)
1=Male =1756.575 =1592.309 =1863.007 =0.137 =0.093 =0.156
(1698.508) (1537.470) (1728.719) (0.168) (0.146) (0.159)
Account × Male=1 4174.302 4255.613 4854.764 0.413 0.537 0.473
(3747.444) (3160.647) (5501.406) (0.327) (0.365) (0.440)
Cash Treatment =2243.320 =2388.795 =3886.890 =0.370 =0.417 =0.528
(1796.234) (1843.752) (2440.640) (0.271) (0.285) (0.363)
Cash × Male=1 2967.963 1174.215 5549.573 0.408 0.429 0.527
(3131.661) (3099.070) (4496.421) (0.362) (0.367) (0.484)
Constant 8730.259∗ 4466.280∗∗∗ 9810.598 3.179∗∗∗ 2.103∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗
(4547.850) (1536.389) (6037.445) (0.428) (0.310) (0.465)
Observations 833 537 594 832 537 593
R squared 0.36 0.58 0.37 0.56 0.65 0.58
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.7: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Gender - Any Savings
Total Savings Log Total Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 25.688 131.150 233.088 0.398 0.512 0.364
(380.848) (563.602) (398.362) (0.306) (0.338) (0.463)
1=Male 640.337 862.277∗∗ 237.845 0.163 0.207 0.108
(560.990) (377.203) (561.494) (0.205) (0.175) (0.188)
Account × Male=1 871.195 823.032 860.717 =0.832∗∗ =0.943∗∗ =0.626
(614.731) (926.334) (694.333) (0.376) (0.427) (0.548)
Cash Treatment =320.986 =749.257 33.021 0.057 0.284 =0.208
(516.087) (789.967) (612.328) (0.378) (0.415) (0.553)
Cash × Male=1 853.255 1385.683 801.145 =0.413 =0.761 0.033
(1008.115) (1236.958) (1524.206) (0.483) (0.575) (0.672)
Constant 879.968 =992.997 2214.295 3.456∗∗∗ 2.678∗∗∗ 2.959∗∗∗
(1391.253) (988.990) (2125.340) (0.627) (0.621) (0.688)
Observations 701 391 453 601 350 379
R squared 0.19 0.61 0.21 0.33 0.43 0.41
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.8: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. Gender - Business Savings
Total Business Savings Log Total Business Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment =38.779 =365.060 262.183 =0.027 =0.900∗ 1.155∗
(300.642) (433.208) (300.656) (0.479) (0.528) (0.614)
1=Male =43.694 47.778 =114.242 =0.274 =0.267 =0.219
(533.982) (525.432) (531.894) (0.307) (0.293) (0.315)
Account × Male=1 91.214 341.284 =108.999 =0.223 0.299 =0.944
(378.165) (526.391) (437.282) (0.596) (0.671) (0.801)
Cash Treatment 58.900 =174.322 264.698 0.121 =0.207 0.917∗∗
(275.619) (420.511) (280.116) (0.301) (0.398) (0.397)
Cash × Male=1 =213.143 214.286 =562.105 =0.180 =0.051 =0.787
(406.250) (508.664) (533.386) (0.463) (0.551) (0.655)
Constant =686.858 =652.270 =595.967 3.022∗∗∗ 2.634∗∗∗ 2.449∗∗∗
(580.507) (494.878) (730.093) (0.687) (0.611) (0.772)
Observations 809 521 574 352 252 247
R squared 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.50 0.59 0.61
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured in
Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Heterogeneity Analysis - Interaction with Education
We turn to providing results of interacting the treatment with a dummy for high
education at baseline which changes to one if the respondent has finished her A-Levels
or graduated from university. We expect the interaction effect between the treatment
groups and the education dummy to be positive as higher educated business owners
might use the cash transfer for more productive purposes.
While the interaction effects are mostly positive for capital stock as dependent
variable, they are insignificant such that we cannot draw the conclusion that the effect
of the cash transfer is higher depending on the kind of education achieved (see Table
A.9). We also fail to find significant interaction results when we examine monthly profits
and inventories (see Tables A.10 and A.11). However, entrepreneurs with high education
significantly sell and save more in the long term (valid for both treatment groups, see
Tables A.12 and A.13). For business savings, entrepreneurs with high education in both
treatment arms save more than entrepreneurs with less education (see Table A.14).
Table A.9: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. High Education - Capital Stock
Capital Stock Log Capital Stock
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 513.720 271.720 650.563 0.101 =0.030 0.195
(624.634) (469.853) (927.761) (0.269) (0.287) (0.323)
High Education =10.639 =143.694 45.113 0.142 0.131 0.057
(550.907) (318.847) (573.403) (0.250) (0.159) (0.233)
Account × High Edu. 178.462 1384.438 =657.706 0.310 0.185 0.470
(1380.140) (1525.475) (1903.341) (0.479) (0.550) (0.588)
Cash Treatment =37.739 =74.591 =140.783 =0.158 =0.257 =0.119
(562.344) (364.212) (816.592) (0.197) (0.180) (0.272)
Cash × High Edu. 290.325 5.989 496.430 0.046 0.119 0.016
(1086.072) (881.400) (1655.306) (0.412) (0.347) (0.571)
Constant =509.149 =282.019 =535.842 1.458∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗ 1.407∗∗∗
(943.702) (540.352) (951.891) (0.455) (0.296) (0.455)
Observations 851 547 609 851 547 609
R squared 0.34 0.62 0.34 0.63 0.78 0.65
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Monthly Profits and capital stocks are measured
in Ugandan Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000
UGX. The sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.10: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. High Education - Profits
Monthly Profits Log Monthly Profits
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 36.499 470.939 =150.101 =0.079 =0.108 =0.104
(360.256) (600.318) (530.303) (0.171) (0.227) (0.240)
High Education =940.263∗∗ =368.881 =990.196∗∗ =0.358 =0.218 =0.466∗∗
(391.585) (445.672) (387.364) (0.222) (0.170) (0.231)
Account × High Edu. 225.671 =387.536 683.178 0.341 0.191 0.722
(417.969) (672.751) (624.588) (0.364) (0.370) (0.596)
Cash Treatment =97.898 =248.120 =169.526 =0.195 =0.247 =0.283
(488.518) (821.715) (628.149) (0.219) (0.267) (0.304)
Cash × High Edu. 298.279 465.562 398.457 0.291 0.296 0.491
(535.621) (868.419) (682.380) (0.316) (0.346) (0.471)
Constant 1690.195∗∗∗ 998.987∗∗ 1620.207∗∗∗ 2.948∗∗∗ 1.741∗∗∗ 2.411∗∗∗
(504.686) (466.218) (513.751) (0.362) (0.260) (0.389)
Observations 828 534 590 765 501 545
R squared 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.52 0.49
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Savings are measured in Ugandan Schilling, de-
flated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The sample
trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.11: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. High Education - Inventories
Inventories Log Inventories
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 9.495 2774.057 =1920.759 0.189 0.581∗∗ =0.159
(1372.384) (2092.205) (1512.933) (0.255) (0.257) (0.340)
High Education 3322.639 =1378.868 4452.888 0.219 0.318 0.060
(3017.272) (3503.472) (3042.438) (0.309) (0.269) (0.312)
Account × High Edu. 7295.349 563.339 13399.708 0.044 =0.444 0.486
(5644.509) (4461.758) (9814.827) (0.472) (0.435) (0.711)
Cash Treatment 584.145 940.362 209.583 =0.108 0.264 =0.519
(1372.753) (2547.820) (1652.516) (0.310) (0.285) (0.418)
Cash × High Edu. =12194.112 =249.281 =20858.772 =0.386 =0.261 =0.327
(10068.021) (4419.509) (17886.996) (0.478) (0.408) (0.660)
Constant 6926.850∗∗ 3578.404 6739.636∗ 1.983∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗
(3125.603) (2280.937) (3716.267) (0.465) (0.344) (0.515)
Observations 710 477 500 678 457 476
R squared 0.62 0.91 0.64 0.67 0.76 0.67
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan
Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The
sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.12: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. High Education - Sales
Monthly Sales Log Monthly Sales
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 943.914 3355.034∗ =741.184 0.060 0.182 =0.026
(1461.558) (1864.941) (1776.596) (0.172) (0.217) (0.207)
High Education =2347.081 =1965.091 =2296.543 =0.262 =0.201 =0.312
(2610.269) (2485.565) (2438.712) (0.248) (0.210) (0.231)
Account × High Edu. 10853.459 =1189.821 22414.238∗ 0.653 0.176 1.202∗
(7396.598) (3850.140) (13112.586) (0.403) (0.377) (0.612)
Cash Treatment 112.566 =1113.627 =18.340 =0.284 =0.203 =0.464∗
(2566.639) (1867.326) (3852.421) (0.217) (0.239) (0.279)
Cash × High Edu. =601.121 =1577.557 1584.889 0.566 0.160 0.941∗
(3702.240) (3539.972) (5327.710) (0.342) (0.330) (0.485)
Constant 7527.556∗ 4019.458∗∗ 7321.404 3.101∗∗∗ 2.133∗∗∗ 2.443∗∗∗
(3889.621) (1718.206) (4479.959) (0.440) (0.335) (0.448)
Observations 833 537 594 832 537 593
R squared 0.37 0.59 0.40 0.56 0.65 0.58
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan
Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The
sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.13: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. High Education - Any Savings
Total Savings Log Total Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment 392.953 768.477 232.601 =0.204 =0.033 =0.322
(422.558) (654.033) (468.405) (0.232) (0.281) (0.277)
High Education 412.437 780.387 =240.147 0.681∗∗ 0.433 0.606∗
(944.470) (748.201) (1145.279) (0.335) (0.293) (0.326)
Account × High Edu. 596.428 =645.079 2101.340∗ 0.175 =0.184 0.920
(881.838) (1106.987) (1264.611) (0.428) (0.419) (0.615)
Cash Treatment =456.559 =514.525 =528.602 =0.406 =0.116 =0.767∗∗
(520.574) (777.737) (736.408) (0.249) (0.272) (0.342)
Cash × High Edu. 1915.239 1481.028 3235.007 0.598 =0.130 1.737∗∗∗
(1283.957) (1177.993) (2215.030) (0.502) (0.605) (0.661)
Constant 918.782 =668.469 1802.234 3.454∗∗∗ 2.848∗∗∗ 2.687∗∗∗
(1211.217) (1062.247) (1738.579) (0.629) (0.632) (0.665)
Observations 701 391 453 601 350 379
R squared 0.19 0.61 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.42
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan
Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The
sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Table A.14: Het. Treatment Effects w.r.t. High Education - Business Savings
Business Savings Log Business Savings
Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term Pooled
Short
Term
Long
Term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Account Treatment =15.750 =262.153 154.585 =0.357 =1.224∗∗∗ 0.447
(197.784) (263.215) (239.965) (0.347) (0.400) (0.529)
High Education 568.009 464.514 556.123 0.506 0.616 0.245
(659.229) (696.653) (689.490) (0.395) (0.373) (0.405)
Account × High Edu. 108.023 340.996 150.880 0.657 1.344∗∗ 0.413
(529.883) (631.182) (718.921) (0.561) (0.646) (0.837)
Cash Treatment =207.005 =329.555 =181.912 =0.077 =0.673∗ 0.401
(167.431) (223.666) (208.583) (0.295) (0.383) (0.447)
Cash × High Edu. 325.180 745.238 176.333 0.366 0.940∗ 0.240
(515.373) (558.092) (766.699) (0.519) (0.562) (0.805)
Constant =777.876 =811.229∗∗ =690.136 2.610∗∗∗ 2.135∗∗∗ 2.222∗∗∗
(474.052) (394.794) (554.818) (0.647) (0.583) (0.712)
Observations 809 521 574 352 252 247
R squared 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.49 0.59 0.60
Note: Regressions control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, wave fixed effects, the
interaction between wave and the heterogeneity measure, and other baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Inventories and sales are measured in Ugandan
Schilling, deflated by the CPI to reflect 2011 price levels. All values are given in 1000 UGX. The
sample trims the top and bottom 5 percent of changes in profits over time.
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Appendices B and C - Appendices
for Chapter 3
Appendix B
Table B.1: Financial Literacy Questions and Response Options
Concepts
No. of
QuestionsQuestion(s) Answer Options
Risk
Diversification 1 Suppose you have some money. Is it safer to
put your money into one business or invest-
ment, or to put your money into multiple
businesses or investments?
a) one business or in-
vestment; b) multi-
ple businesses or in-
vestments; c) don’t
know; d)refuse to an-
swer
Inflation 1 Suppose over the next 10 years the prices of
things you buy double. If your income also
doubles, will you be able to buy less than you
buy today, the same as you can buy today, or
more than you can buy today?
a) less; b) the same;
c) more; d) don’t
know; e) refuse
Interest 1 Suppose you need to borrow $100. Which is
the lower amount to pay back: $105 or $100
plus three percent?
a) 105 US dollars;
b) 100 US dollars
plus three percent; c)
don’t know; d) refuse
Interest
Compound-
ing
2 Suppose you put money in the bank for two
years and the bank agrees to add 15 percent
per year to your account. Will the bank add
more money to your account in the second
year than it did in the first year, or will it add
the same amount of money in both years?
a) more; b) the same;
c) don’t know; d)
refuse
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account
and the bank adds 10 percent per year to the
account. How much money would you have
in the account after five years if you did not
remove any money from the account?
a) more than 150
US dollars; b) ex-
actly 150 US dol-
lars; c) less than 150
US dollars; d) don’t
know; refused128
Financial Literacy Questions and Response Options - continued.
Concepts
No. of
QuestionsQuestion(s)
Answer
Options
Financial
Literacy 1 Proportion of people that can answer ques-
tions on 3 out of 4 concepts correctly.
Financial
Literacy
Men, Women 1 Proportion of men/women that can answer
questions on 3 out of 4 questions correctly.
Notes: This table reports the four financial literacy concepts, the corresponding questions and the
answer options. These questions are used to generate the proportion of the population that is
regarded as financially literate in a country. If a person can answer questions on three out of four
questions correctly, this person can be regarded as financially literate.
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Table B.4: List of Countries in OLS and IV Regressions
Country
OLS
Sample
IV
Sample Country
OLS
Sample
IV
Sample Country
OLS
Sample
IV
Sample
Afghanistan x Greece x x Pakistan x
Albania x x Guatemala x x Panama x x
Algeria x x Guinea x Peru x x
Angola x Honduras x x Philippines x x
Argentina x x Hungary x x Poland x x
Armenia x x India x Portugal x x
Australia x x Indonesia x x Romania x
Austria x x Iraq x Russian Feder-
ation
x x
Azerbaijan x x Ireland x x Saudi Arabia x x
Bangladesh x x Israel x x Senegal x
Belgium x x Italy x x Serbia x
Belize x Jamaica x Slovak Repub-
lic
x x
Benin x Japan x x Slovenia x x
Bhutan x Jordan x x South Africa x x
Bolivia x x Kazhakhstan x x Spain x x
Bosnia and
Herz.
x x Kenya x x Sri Lanka x
Botswana x x Korea, Rep. x x Sudan x
Brazil x x Kuwait x x Sweden x x
Bulgaria x x Kyrgyz Rep. x x Switzerland x x
Burundi x Latvia x x Tanzania x x
Cambodia x Lebanon x x Thailand x x
Cameroon x x Luxembourg x x Togo x x
Chad x x Macedonia,
FYR
x x Tunisia x x
Chile x x Madagascar x x Turkey x x
China x x Malawi x x Uganda x x
Colombia x x Malaysia x x Ukraine x x
Congo, Dem.
Rep.
x Mali x x United Arab
Emirates
x
Congo, Rep. x Malta x United States x x
Costa Rica x x Mauretania x x Uruquay x x
Cote d’Ivoire x Mauritius x x Venezuela, RB x x
Croatia x x Mexico x x Vietnam x
Cyprus x x Moldova x x West Bank
and Gaza
x
Czech
Republic
x x Mongolia x Yemen, Rep. x x
Denmark x x Montenegro x x Zambia x x
Dom.
Republic
x x Namibia x x
Ecuador x x Nepal x Total 119 93
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
x x Netherlands x x
El Salvador x x New Zealand x x
Estonia x x Nicaragua x x
Finland x x Niger x x
France x x Nigeria x x
Georgia x x
Germany x x
Ghana
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Table B.6: Basis for Imputations for Numeracy in Primary School
(1)
Numeracy in Primary School
Numeracy in Secondary School 0.749∗∗∗
(0.072)
Constant 2.162
(3.754)
R-squared 0.658
Observations 58
Note: This table shows the relationship that is the basis for our imputation of numeracy in pri-
mary school using numeracy in secondary schools. If numeracy in primary school is missing, but
numeracy in secondary school is available the following equation was used to generate an impu-
tation for numeracy in primary school. Numeracy in primary school= 2.162 + 0.749 numeracy in
secondary school.
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Table B.7: First Stage Regressions for IV Results
(1)
Financial Literacy
Math Education in Primary School 0.539∗∗∗
(0.173)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 9.982∗∗∗
(1.801)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =1.248∗∗∗
(0.204)
Secondary
Education =0.014
(0.085)
Tertiary
Education 0.043
(0.102)
Private Credit
to GDP =0.001
(0.028)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 =0.025
(0.031)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.796∗
(0.404)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.007
(0.041)
Constant 0.529
(19.763)
Observations 93
F-Test for First Stage Regression 15.24
F-Test for Weak Instruments 9.67
Note: This table reports the first stage regression of the
IV regressions shown in this paper with robust standard
errors in parentheses. The F-statistics reports the F-stat
for the first stage regression. The F-test for weak instru-
ments denotes passing the Stock-Yogo test at 15%. ***,
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table B.8: Financial Literacy and Access to Financial Services - OLS and IV Results
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy 0.471∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.650) (0.184) (0.493)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 16.412∗∗∗ 2.686 16.925∗∗∗ 6.230
(3.183) (7.839) (3.073) (5.576)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.701∗ 1.063 =0.754∗∗ 0.621
(0.390) (0.875) (0.365) (0.679)
Secondary
Education =0.046 =0.089 0.023 =0.011
(0.135) (0.170) (0.136) (0.161)
Tertiary
Education =0.201 =0.364∗∗ =0.106 =0.233
(0.152) (0.178) (0.177) (0.175)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.140∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.076∗
(0.031) (0.046) (0.045) (0.042)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.055 0.064 0.023 0.030
(0.043) (0.058) (0.047) (0.054)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.175 =1.078 =0.187 =1.162
(0.625) (0.971) (0.640) (0.772)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.097∗ =0.048 =0.102∗ =0.064
(0.055) (0.091) (0.061) (0.084)
Constant =67.524∗∗ =96.144∗∗ =85.607∗∗∗ =107.907∗∗∗
(28.475) (40.375) (27.491) (36.845)
R-squared 0.824 0.640 0.811 0.702
Observations 93 93 93 93
Note: The table reports OLS and IV regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Columns (1) and (2) show results for the proportion of people that have a bank account. Columns
(3) and (4) show results for the proportion that has a debit card as the outcome variable. Numer-
acy in primary schools acts as an instrument in these regressions. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.9: Financial Literacy and Use of Financial Services - OLS and IV Results
Saved at Formal Fin. Institution Used Debit Card in the Last Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy 0.537∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.387) (0.183) (0.478)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 7.020∗∗∗ 1.388 14.092∗∗∗ 5.520
(2.129) (4.509) (2.913) (4.814)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.838∗∗∗ =0.114 =0.776∗∗ 0.326
(0.303) (0.568) (0.356) (0.698)
Secondary
Education =0.024 =0.042 0.008 =0.019
(0.109) (0.120) (0.127) (0.142)
Tertiary
Education 0.008 =0.059 0.132 0.030
(0.134) (0.139) (0.170) (0.172)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.110∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.043 0.030
(0.046) (0.038) (0.043) (0.040)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.071∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.011 0.016
(0.036) (0.038) (0.055) (0.055)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.028 =0.486 0.171 =0.611
(0.538) (0.694) (0.626) (0.755)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.031 =0.011 =0.069 =0.038
(0.048) (0.056) (0.069) (0.086)
Constant =13.922 =25.666 =81.949∗∗ =99.822∗∗
(22.582) (25.695) (33.905) (41.527)
R-squared 0.745 0.675 0.771 0.698
Observations 93 93 93 93
Note: The table reports OLS and IV regression results with robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the proportion of people that have a bank
account. Columns (3) and (4) show results for the proportion that has a debit card as the
outcome variable. Numeracy in primary schools acts as an instrument in these regressions.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.10: First Stage Regression for Placebo IV
Results – Literacy as an Instrument
(1)
Financial Literacy
Literacy Education in Primary School 0.191
(0.235)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 9.866∗∗∗
(2.602)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =1.430∗∗∗
(0.247)
Secondary
Education =0.017
(0.100)
Tertiary
Education 0.083
(0.120)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.002
(0.027)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 =0.032
(0.032)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.708
(0.508)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.055
(0.044)
Constant 31.132
(22.951)
Observations 77
F-Test for First Stage Regression 11.02
F-Test for Weak Instruments 0.66
Note: This table reports the first stage regression of the
IV regressions using literacy instead of numeracy as an in-
strument with robust standard errors in parentheses. The
F-statistics reports the F-stat for the first stage regression.
The F-test for weak instruments denotes not passing the
Stock-Yogo test. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.11: First Stage Regression for Placebo IV Results – Literacy as an
Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 1.667 1.913 0.896 2.635
(2.198) (2.404) (1.091) (2.803)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 3.292 2.720 2.932 =4.387
(23.678) (25.505) (11.779) (29.556)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.835 1.064 =0.416 1.875
(3.218) (3.461) (1.571) (4.031)
Secondary
Education 0.004 0.055 0.081 0.018
(0.189) (0.218) (0.119) (0.244)
Tertiary
Education =0.240 =0.231 0.106 =0.015
(0.266) (0.292) (0.162) (0.334)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.122∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.036
(0.041) (0.047) (0.044) (0.051)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.121 0.088 0.106∗∗ 0.064
(0.091) (0.109) (0.049) (0.122)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =1.093 =1.240 =0.227 =1.141
(1.786) (1.892) (1.058) (2.217)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.038 =0.025 0.009 0.054
(0.175) (0.193) (0.090) (0.234)
Constant =88.998 =121.919 =25.625 =151.750
(85.466) (92.652) (42.570) (113.761)
R-squared 0.679 0.623 0.736 0.448
Observations 77 77 77 77
Note: The table reports IV regression results with robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The
imputed literacy rate in primary school is used as an instrument for financial literacy.
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Table B.12: Financial Literacy and Access to Finance - OLS Results,
Proportion of Banks that are State Owned
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.453∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.187) (0.097) (0.192)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 14.734∗∗∗ 15.055∗∗∗ 6.635∗∗∗ 12.642∗∗∗
(2.847) (2.660) (1.883) (2.850)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.891∗∗ =0.841∗∗ =0.729∗∗ =1.090∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.390) (0.289) (0.403)
Secondary
Education 0.206 0.181 0.069 0.128
(0.134) (0.136) (0.089) (0.125)
Tertiary
Education =0.083 =0.108 0.045 0.181
(0.163) (0.203) (0.154) (0.199)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.145∗∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.088∗ 0.068
(0.037) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.065∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.040 0.039∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.289 =0.155 0.276 0.184
(0.610) (0.536) (0.506) (0.611)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.066 =0.104 =0.015 =0.082
(0.050) (0.069) (0.051) (0.086)
(9.995) (9.411) (6.737) (9.744)
Constant =58.035∗ =72.440∗∗ =22.615 =53.790
(32.604) (34.607) (25.537) (43.954)
R-squared 0.829 0.826 0.740 0.784
Observations 86 86 86 86
Note: The table reports OLS regression results with robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.13: Financial Literacy and Access to Finance - OLS Results,
Proportion of State Owned Assets Below the Median Only
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy 0.425∗∗ 0.523∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.283) (0.141) (0.280)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 16.894∗∗ 17.622∗∗∗ 10.335∗∗∗ 14.960∗∗∗
(6.781) (5.504) (2.930) (3.510)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =1.130∗ =0.928 =0.960∗∗ =0.908∗
(0.629) (0.551) (0.408) (0.491)
Secondary
Education 0.199 0.082 0.189∗ =0.065
(0.233) (0.193) (0.112) (0.167)
Tertiary
Education =0.045 =0.233 0.119 =0.170
(0.291) (0.343) (0.174) (0.332)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.090∗∗ 0.036 0.042 0.043
(0.042) (0.054) (0.048) (0.055)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.047∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.011 0.019
(0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.201 =0.215 0.094 =0.719
(0.916) (0.718) (0.599) (0.661)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.075 =0.148 0.014 =0.167∗
(0.110) (0.107) (0.066) (0.097)
Constant =55.456 =74.366 =46.665 =60.373
(74.413) (55.763) (40.779) (47.842)
R-squared 0.849 0.840 0.849 0.831
Observations 45 45 45 45
Note: The table reports OLS regression results with robust standard errors in brackets.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The re-
gressions only include countries with the proportion of assets held at state owned banks
below the median.
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Table B.14: Financial Literacy and Access to Finance - IV Results,
Controlling for Government Expenditure and Total Education Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 1.899∗∗ 1.721∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗
(0.713) (0.575) (0.337) (0.502)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 0.426 2.364 =0.672 7.467
(8.734) (7.523) (3.722) (5.834)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.243 0.716 =1.102∗∗ 0.351
(0.955) (1.103) (0.532) (1.032)
Secondary
Education 0.063 =0.294 0.508∗∗∗ =0.497
(0.303) (0.444) (0.176) (0.426)
Tertiary
Education =0.303 =0.457 0.228 =0.299
(0.250) (0.369) (0.148) (0.364)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.155∗∗∗ 0.097∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.041
(0.051) (0.056) (0.031) (0.052)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.105 0.034 0.126∗∗∗ =0.064
(0.075) (0.087) (0.040) (0.083)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =1.892∗ =1.976∗∗ =1.385∗ =1.021
(1.010) (0.880) (0.688) (0.944)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.120 =0.212∗ =0.094 =0.200∗∗
(0.124) (0.109) (0.061) (0.098)
Gov. Consumption
Expenditure =0.728 0.095 =0.447 0.694
(1.013) (0.799) (0.433) (0.726)
Gov. Spending
On Education 0.180 =0.337 1.101∗∗ =0.743
(0.804) (0.899) (0.495) (0.872)
Constant =17.877 =45.824 23.609 =59.824
(63.478) (57.357) (26.374) (46.379)
R-squared 0.786 0.817 0.866 0.835
Observations 49 49 49 49
Note: The table reports IV regression results with robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Government consumption expenditure is government expenditure on consumption
as a percent of GDP, whereas government expenditure on education is percent of gov-
ernment expenditure on education as a percent to total government expenditure. ***,
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.15: First Stage Regression - Using
Numeracy of Individuals Born in 1960 as
Instrument
(1)
Financial Literacy
Numeracy in 1960 0.378∗∗
(0.169)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 8.560∗∗∗
(2.348)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =1.385∗∗∗
(0.297)
Secondary
Education 0.004
(0.125)
Tertiary
Education 0.065
(0.162)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.060
(0.042)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 =0.094
(0.057)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.836
(0.515)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.011
(0.064)
Constant 3.163
(33.197)
R-squared 0.720
Observations 47
F-test for First Stage 15.55
F-test for Weak Instruments 4.145
Note: The table reports the first stage of the IV
regression using historic numeracy as an instru-
ment. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.16: Financial Literacy and Access to Finance - IV Results, Using
1960s Numeracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 1.452 0.647 0.281 0.111
(0.918) (0.594) (0.508) (0.475)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 0.532 7.265 3.509 11.041∗∗
(8.603) (5.103) (4.052) (4.727)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.733 =0.777 =0.740 =1.865∗∗
(1.243) (0.794) (0.685) (0.738)
Secondary
Education 0.124 0.205 0.047 0.121
(0.240) (0.158) (0.149) (0.176)
Tertiary
Education =0.439 =0.361 0.011 0.097
(0.273) (0.216) (0.187) (0.285)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.117 0.200∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.103) (0.077) (0.078) (0.073)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.138 =0.032 =0.015 =0.167
(0.143) (0.080) (0.097) (0.120)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =1.291 =0.727 0.036 0.086
(1.277) (0.763) (0.599) (0.775)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.137 =0.223∗∗∗ =0.044 =0.256∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.076) (0.062) (0.091)
Constant =37.762 5.147 14.871 47.005
(61.571) (36.740) (34.478) (44.259)
R-squared 0.769 0.904 0.832 0.857
Observations 47 47 47 47
Note: The table reports IV regression results with robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Numeracy in 1960 with imputations from 1950 is used as an instrument ***, **
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix C
This appendix on robustness tests addresses four issues: It shows further evidence
for the causal relationship between financial literacy and financial inclusion (Section
C.1), it shows that our main findings also hold for various sub-groups within coun-
tries (Section C.2), that they are robust to various changes in variable definitions or
considerations (Section C.3), and that different estimation techniques confirm results
(Section C.4).
C.1 Within-Model Generated Instruments.
In addition to running conventional IV-regressions, we also apply the recent approach
developed by Lewbel (2012) to examine causality. We here explain its basic intuition.
Instead of relying on external instruments and needing the exclusion restriction to
hold, this method uses instruments that are generated from within the model. For this
to be possible, two conditions need to hold: First, the error term of the first stage of
the potentially endogenous variable (financial literacy in our case) on (a sub-set of)
the potentially exogenous regressors Z, has to be heteroscedastic, i.e. the error term
of the first stage regression is Cov(Z, 2) 6= 0. The second condition that needs to
hold for the Lewbel (2012) model is that the products of the idiosyncratic errors of
the first and second stage are uncorrelated with the subset of variables Z used in the
first stage regression, hence Cov(Z, , u) = 0. To check that the first condition holds
we run the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity on the first stage regression and
homoscedasticity is rejected at 1%. The second condition holds by assumption. If these
two conditions hold, instruments are then generated using (Z−Z)̂ where Z is the mean
of Z and ̂ is the estimated residuals in the first stage. Hence there is the same number
of instruments as exogenous variables are included in the first stage. The generated
instruments can be used by themselves or in combination with traditional instruments
that are taken from outside the model.
We do not run the regression with the same full set of control variables as in the other
regressions instead focus on a subset. We here only include those variables that can be
argued to be determined outside the model i.e. the proportion of the population that
has completed secondary school, the proportion of the population that has completed
tertiary education, the number of banks per 1000 km2, strength of legal rights and ease
of doing business.
Results of the Lewbel model examining the potential impact of financial literacy
on access to finance are shown in Table C.1, whereas the results regarding the use of
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financial services are shown in Table C.2. Both tables present regression results em-
ploying numeracy in primary school as an instrument, using the generated instruments
only and applying a combination of external and generated instruments.
The results confirm our earlier finding that financial literacy has a positive and
significant impact on all our measures of financial inclusion that we use in this paper.
Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficient, no matter whether we use just
the generated instrument or a combination of generated and traditional instrument,
confirm that the relationship between financial literacy and financial inclusion is causal.
Another advantage of the Lewbel model is that we can test for overidentification,
which is not possible in IV regressions with only one instrument. The Hansen-J-statistic
shows that overidentification is not a problem in our regression. The tables also pro-
vide the F-statistic of the first stage regression, which is consistently above 10 and so
confirms that the instruments are not weak.
C.2 The Effect of Financial Literacy for Various Sub-Groups
It is possible that financial literacy works differently for various groups across and
within countries. Thus, we perform three kinds of analyses to test whether the overall
results are robust and can be applied for policy purposes in various kinds of circum-
stances.
Interactions With Different Income Levels Across Countries. We expect
that the relationship between financial literacy and access to financial services will be
stronger for lower income countries. There are several reasons that make us form this
hypothesis. First, on an individual level as well as in our descriptive statistics we can
see that high income is correlated with high financial literacy. The marginal effect of
financial literacy in poor countries may hence be larger. Kaiser and Menkhoff (2017),
indeed, also find that financial literacy trainings are less effective when baseline levels of
financial literacy are high. At the same time, as we are here looking at simple financial
services, access and use of financial services is already fairly high in higher income
countries, there is therefore less “room for improvement”. For these reasons we expect
the marginal effect of financial literacy to be higher in low GDP per capita countries.
In order to test if a larger proportion of the population being financially literate has
heterogeneous effects depending on the income level of the population, we introduce
an interaction term between financial literacy and GDP per capita in the regressions
described above. Table C.3 shows results of OLS regressions that include the interaction
term. The outcome variables are the same as above. Columns (1) and (2) show results
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for access to finance, whereas columns (3) to (4) show the results for use of financial
services. The dependent variables in the table were centered and hence the interaction
term shows the effect of an increase in financial literacy at the mean GDP per capita.
To increase clarity and give the effect of a change in financial literacy at all levels of
GDP per capita we include figures that show the average marginal effect of financial
literacy at each level of GDP. These can be seen in Figure C.1 - there is one picture
for each outcome variable.
Table C.3 and Figure C.1 demonstrate that increasing the level of financial literacy
of the population would have the strongest effect on account ownership in countries
that have lower levels of GDP per capita, as hypothesized above. Increasing financial
literacy would have the largest marginal effect on account ownership at levels of GDP
per capita below the mean. The interaction term between financial literacy and log
GDP per capita is negative but not significant, indicating that the effect of financial
literacy on debit card ownership is similar at different levels of GDP.
Interestingly, the interaction between financial literacy and our measures of use of
financial services is positive rather than negative. Further, Figure C.1 clearly shows
that the average marginal effect of financial literacy is higher at higher levels of GDP.
This pattern can also be seen when looking at the proportion of people that has used
a debit card during the last year.
In this section we learn that increasing the level of financial literacy in the popu-
lation has heterogeneous effects for countries with different levels of GDP per capita.
Interestingly, the effect of increasing financial literacy on access to finance would have
the largest effect in countries with low levels of GDP per capita. The effect of increased
financial literacy on use of financial services, however, is larger at higher levels of GDP
per capita.
Interactions With Different Levels on Bank Branch Penetration. In a next
step we look at the interaction between financial literacy and physical access to financial
services by introducing an interaction term, analogous to the procedure in Section ??
and the one shown above. The results are shown in Table C.4. Graphical presentations
of the average marginal effects of financial literacy at different levels of bank branch
penetration (again centered at their means) are presented in Figure C.2.
The patterns that we see in these regressions are different from the patterns that
we find above. The interaction term between financial literacy and bank branch pene-
tration is insignificant and close to zero for all our measures of financial inclusion. This
shows that the average marginal effect of financial literacy is constant for all levels of
bank branch penetration. However, departing from the mean there is a positive yet de-
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creasing marginal effect of financial literacy on bank account ownership for lower bank
branch penetration. Also, the effect of financial literacy on the percentage of people
that saved during the last year is positive and increasing (Figure C.2). This makes
sense since financial literacy should be more effective where actual banking facilities
require people to apply good financial knowledge.
Different Income Groups Within Countries. We now analyze whether the link
between financial literacy and financial inclusion is stronger for certain groups of the
population than for other ones. To do this, we use data that show the proportion of
the poorest 40% and richest 60% of the country that can answer questions on three out
of four financial literacy concepts correctly. As the outcome variable we use respective
measures of financial inclusion, i.e. also of the poorest 40% and richest 60% of the pop-
ulation. We rerun the regressions above, but this time broken down by within country
income groups. Results are presented in Table C.5. They show that the coefficient on
the level of financial literacy of the richest 60% is larger than the coefficient on the
level of financial literacy of the poorest 40% of the population. This may indicate at
first sight that the link between financial literacy and financial inclusion is tentatively
stronger for the richer part of the population. However, when we test the difference
between the coefficients, there is no significant difference between the two regression
coefficients.
Excluding Islamic Countries. Countries in which the majority of the popula-
tion follows the Islamic religion, may have different levels of financial literacy. This
may especially apply to the questions on interest and interest compounding due to the
prohibition of interest in Islamic law. It is possible that these questions are answered
particularly badly in majority Muslim countries, but that people here have good finan-
cial literacy regarding other financial topics. This would introduce measurement error
into our regression. To check this, we ran our main models shown in Tables ?? and
?? again, excluding all countries where more than half of the population is Muslim.
Results are shown in Table C.6 and Table C.7. This shows no change to our main
model. All results remain significant and effect sizes are of a similar size.
C.3 Changes in Variable Definitions and Further Considerations
We here test whether the main results change when (i) looking at the effect of financial
literacy on inclusion with respect to borrowing or (ii) high frequency of account use,
(iii) adding political risk, ATM penetration and cost of bank account as further control
variables, (iv) omitting the share of people aged 15-64 and secondary education from
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the estimation, (v) using disaggregated financial literacy items as variables of interest,
and (vi) modifying the definition of income.
Financial Literacy and Borrowing. In this study we deliberately focus on the
relationship of financial literacy and financial inclusion on the asset side of the balance
sheet. As it is harder to determine the desired level of financial inclusion on the bor-
rowing side, we do not study this form of inclusion in the main text (Schicks, 2014).
However, we look at the relationship between inclusion w.r.t to borrowing and financial
literacy here, by running our regressions with the proportion of the population that
borrowed from a formal financial institution, the proportion that borrowed from an
informal financial institution and the proportion that has used a credit card within the
last year. Results for OLS and IV regressions are presented in Table C.8. The results
confirm the link between financial literacy and financial inclusion, also on the borrow-
ing side: There is no significant relationship between financial literacy and borrowing
at a formal financial institution. We find, however, a negative and significant relation-
ship between financial literacy and the proportion of people that borrowed from an
informal financial institution, indicating that there is a link between financial literacy
and financial inclusion on the borrowing side. Lastly, the link between financial literacy
and the proportion that used a credit card in the last year is positive and significant.
All the OLS results are confirmed by the IV regressions.
Financial Literacy and High Frequency of Account Use. Our measures of fi-
nancial access and use do not take into account the intensity to which certain financial
services are actually utilized. The variable “high frequency of account use” alleviates
this constraint by indicating the share of people that took money out of a formal bank
account three or more times in a typical month. OLS and IV regression results are
presented in Table C.9. Estimation results are positively related and significant at the
one percent level. The effect of a one percentage point higher share of adults being
financial literate translates into an about 0.59 percentage point higher share of peo-
ple using their account intensively. Interestingly, the coefficient for tertiary education
turns significant indicating that above and beyond financial literacy, adults with higher
education use their accounts more frequently.
Considering Other Control Variables. Although we already control for a number
of variables in our main regression, we here expand the number of control variables
and see if our results still hold. The results of the exercise are shown in Table C.10
for account ownership as the outcome variable. First, we introduce a political risk in-
dex into the regressions. This considerably reduces the sample size. The relationship
between financial literacy and account ownership remains significant. Next, we intro-
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duce ATMs per 1000 km2, as an additional measure of physical access to finance into
the regressions; again the coefficient on the relationship between financial literacy and
account ownership remains positive and significant.
Fees levied on holding and using financial products constitute barriers to accessing
finance. In fact, data from the Micro Findex data base (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper,
2012) show that 29% of respondents without a bank account state the high costs
hindering them to acquire one. Thus, we consider the annual cost of checking accounts
as additional control variable in our OLS regressions. As we did not get access to more
recent World Bank data, as a second-best approach we use data presented in Beck
et al. (2008) that are available for 68 countries and were collected in 2004. In order to
enlarge the sample size, we impute the cost data for 43 other countries by estimating
the annual fees of a checking account with the following explanatory variables: the
share of population above 15 years and financial institutional variables such as private
credit to GDP, bank return on assets, and bank return on equity.
Using this information as proxy for the cost of financial services and products, we
re-run the OLS regressions. The results are shown in Table C.10, column (3). Notably,
there is no great difference in the point estimate or significance level of financial literacy
compared to the regressions run without the cost data.
Column (4) shows results from regressions only with countries for which the original
bank account cost data by Beck et al. (2008) are available. The sample size shrinks in
these estimations and so the significant effect of financial literacy on the financial access
variables vanishes. Further, running the regressions without the cost variable but with
the decreased sample size still yields non-significant effects of financial literacy. Hence,
we conclude that the missing effects of financial literacy are due to the specific small
sample and are not related to the inclusion of a bank account cost covariate. We here
only show the results for the regressions explaining account ownership, but performed
this exercise with all outcome variables and found similar results. Financial literacy
remains significant, also when controlling for additional variables.
These checks make us confident to say that the cost of financial products should
not be neglected in such estimations, however, financial literacy, nevertheless, remains
to have a distinct effect on financial inclusion. Controlling additionally for dummies
that classify our sample according to the World Bank definition into low, lower middle,
upper middle and high income countries sheds light on whether financial literacy still
has a distinct effect on financial access and use despite varying income levels. OLS
regression results are depicted in Table C.11. The statistically significant coefficient
estimates of financial literacy range between 0.35 and 0.52 and are thus of comparable
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yet smaller size as the coefficients of our preferred OLS estimation (Tables ?? and ??).
Except for the savings specification, the coefficients of the country group dummies show
negative signs implying that access and use of financial services is more pronounced in
high income countries.
Disaggregating Financial Literacy. As already mentioned, the variable of inter-
est, financial literacy, depicts the share of a country’s population that is able to answer
3 out of 4 financial literacy topics correctly. Disaggregating this measure and inserting
the actual shares of correctly answered risk diversification, inflation, interest and inter-
est compounding questions as explanatory variables, and running the OLS regression
lets us disentangle which field of knowledge is most important in supporting financial
access and financial use. At the same time, these measures set a lower standard of
financial literacy than the rather harsh cut off of being able to answer questions on
at least three out of four concepts. Considering that multicollinearity could endan-
ger the results, we calculated the variance inflation factor for each of the explanatory
variables and find that it never exceeds 10. Based on this rule of thumb, we rule out
multicollinearity in our case.
We find that there is no clear pattern about knowledge on a single financial literacy
concept affecting financial access or use more than others. Rather, knowledge about in-
terest rates influences the share of people that have an account or a debit card positively,
whereas knowledge on inflation or interest compounding does not change the share of
people with financial access. The financial use variables are also affected differently by
the disaggregated financial literacy measures: Knowledge on interest compounding has
a highly significant effect on saving at a formal financial institution which hints to the
conclusion that more sophisticated financial products may require more sophisticated
financial knowledge. On the contrary, using a debit card is affected significantly and
positively by financial literacy on risk. Regression results are available upon request.
Omitting Control Variables. Even though the variance inflation factors of all
control variables lie far below the threshold of 10, we re-run our OLS estimations
omitting two variables to rule out biases possibly caused by high correlation between
the control variables: The share of population aged 15-64 and secondary education
(Tables C.12 and C.13). The results remain similar to the full specification in terms of
significance and size. Multicollinearity seems to be no problem for the analysis.
Adding Proxies for Culture. Culture may influence the degree to which peo-
ple access and use financial services. For this reason, we add three different types of
variables that proxy cultural institutions as control variables in our OLS regressions.
We control for (i) religion. We use data from the World Religion Dataset (Maoz and
152
Henderson, 2013) from the year 2010. The variables display percentage shares of the
population that adhere to the respective faiths. Results from this analysis are found
in Table C.14. Overall, the coefficient of financial literacy on all financial inclusion
measures remains positive and significant.
Second, we employ (ii) Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede et al., 2010) as
proxy for culture which includes power distance, the degree of individualism, masculin-
ity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence (Table C.15). These
dimensions of culture are measured on a scale from 0-100 with 100 displaying the
specific dimension exactly and zero portraying its counterpart. Due to a big drop in
observations, standard errors go up while coefficients remain largely stable compared to
earlier Table C.10 so that there is no significant relationship between financial literacy
and financial inclusion in these regressions. With regards to the cultural dimensions, a
more masculine, i.e. more competitive, society tends to be negatively correlated with
financial inclusion whereas a high degree of long-term orientation and individualism
positively affects access and use of financial services.
Lastly, Table C.16 shows results from regressions including dummy variables for (iii)
Scandinavian, French, and German legal origins (La Porta et al., 2008) as additional
control variables. British legal origin serves as reference category. The level of financial
literacy in a country continues to have a distinct significant and positive effect on all
measures of financial inclusion. Furthermore, countries with Scandinavian and German
legal origins have a higher positive effect on financial access and use as compared
to countries with British legal origin. However, as is often found in the literature,
countries with French legal origin do not perform as well compared to British legal
origin countries.
Applying Different Income Definitions. In our standard regression specification,
we use log GDP per capita in PPP constant 2011 international US-dollars as the
measure of income. As expected, repeating this exercise with other income definitions
such as log GNI per capita (as it is used by the World Bank for the derivations of its
country classifications) does not change the results significantly. Rather, the size of the
effect of financial literacy on the respective access and use measures is higher in these
OLS regressions. Results are available upon request.
C.4 Different Estimation Techniques
Fractional Response Regressions. All our dependent variables reflect propor-
tions of aggregated binary outcome questions. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose
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functional forms for regressions with such fractional variables that take into account
their specific discrete characteristics. Thus, in order to check for the validity of the
OLS results, we run probit regressions considering the fractional response nature of
the data. Table C.17 presents the marginal effects regarding the financial access and
use variables and shows that they are similar in magnitude to the OLS results dis-
cussed earlier. Countries with a higher level of financial literacy have higher access to
and higher use of financial products. Furthermore, higher financial depth affects access
to accounts, owning a debit card and saving at formal financial institutions positively
and significantly.
Quantile Regressions. We also employ quantile regression analysis since this es-
timation strategy is more robust to outliers and provides a richer characterization of
data so that the effect of a control variable along the distribution of the dependent
variable may be measured and not just its conditional mean. We run quantile regres-
sions at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile for our four outcome variables. Results are
presented in Table C.18. The impact of financial literacy on account ownership is high-
est for those countries at the median level of account ownership, however, an equality
of coefficients test cannot rule out that these differences are significantly different from
zero. Interestingly, the specifications with dependent variables describing the use of
finance, show that the effect of financial literacy is significant at all estimated quantiles
of the distribution albeit higher for the 75th percentile – again an equality of quan-
tile estimates test cannot rule out that they are statistically different from each other.
Thus, we conclude that the effect of financial literacy on our four outcome variables is
positive and significant at all levels of financial inclusion.
Interaction Analysis with Instrumental Variable. As a last robustness check,
we re-estimate all OLS regressions with interactions in an instrumental variable setting.
As above, numeracy among primary school children is used as instrument for financial
literacy. Results for our three interaction terms are presented in Tables C.19 to C.21
and Figures C.3 to C.5. These interaction terms show a similar pattern to the OLS
results above, with signs on the interaction term in the regression being mostly the
same. However, the results tend to be insignificant, most probably because of the
larger confidence interval caused by the lower number of observations.
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Table C.1: Financial literacy and Access to Finance: IV Results using Lewbel (2012)
Account Ownership Debit Card Ownership
Standard
IV
Lewbel
Generated
Instruments
Combined
Model
Standard
IV
Lewbel
Generated
Instruments
Combined
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Literacy 2.201∗∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗ 1.831∗∗∗ 1.750∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗
(0.823) (0.307) (0.270) (0.622) (0.302) (0.247)
Secondary
Education 0.011 0.073 0.062 0.115 0.120 0.122
(0.225) (0.161) (0.170) (0.191) 0.182 (0.180)
Tertiary
Education =0.433 =0.007 =0.077 =0.096 =0.064 =0.051
(=0.379) (0.196) (0.190) (0.302) (0.222) (0.200)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.1407∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.0862 0.086∗ 0.086∗
(0.064) (0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.051) 0.0508
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =2.146∗∗ =1.647∗∗ =1.741∗∗ =2.244∗∗∗ =2.20∗∗∗ =2.185∗∗∗
(0.915) (0.670) (0.677) (0.758) (0.698) (0.678)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.176 =0.238∗∗∗ =0.227∗∗∗ =0.189∗∗∗ =0.194∗∗∗ =0.197∗∗
(0.110) (0.074) (0.078) (0.094) (0.080) (0.082)
Constant 1.263 30.531 25.011 =6.92 =4.449 =3.425
(32.98) (20.712) (20.806) (28.7) (22.489) (22.266)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
Hansen J-Statistic 0 8.8 8.18 0 4.29 4.53
Hansen J-Statistic
p-value 0 0.066 0.147 0 0.368 0.476
F-Statistics of
First Stage 10.58 10.65 12.92 10.58 10.65 12.92
Note: The table reports the results of Lewbel model regression, of financial literacy on access to
finance. Columns (1) and (4) show results for standard IV regressions. Columns (2) and (5) show
results of regressions using generated instruments only, columns (3) and (6) show results regres-
sions using a combination of generated and external instruments.
155
Table C.2: Financial literacy and Use of Financial Services: IV Results using Lewbel
(2012)
Saved at Formal Fin. Institution Used Debit Card in Last Year
Standard
IV
Lewbel
Generated
Instruments
Combined
Model
Standard
IV
Lewbel
Generated
Instruments
Combined
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Literacy 1.329∗∗∗ 1.518∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗∗ 1.945∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.255) (0.202) (0.528) (0.365) (0.279)
Secondary
Education =0.096 =0.109 =0.107 0.089 0.065 0.075
(0.142) (0.140) (0.141) (0.150) (0.173) (0.162)
Tertiary
Education =0.022 =0.095 =0.084 0.160 0.012 0.071
(0.222) (0.167) (0.155) (0.231) (0.228) (0.184)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.098∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.051 0.052 0.052
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.053) (0.058) (0.056)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.863 =0.962 =0.947 =1.390∗∗ =1.590∗∗ =1.511∗∗
(0.663) (0.527) (0.590) (0.692) (0.725) (0.675)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.059 =0.047 =0.048 =0.124 =0.099 =0.109
(0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.085) (.084) (0.082)
Constant =14.012 =19.800 =18.900 =26.26 =37.97 =33.333
(18.632) (18.543) (16.820) (25.927) (22.900) (22.111)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
Hansen J-Statistic 0 7.58 8.53 0 1.55 2.68
Hansen J-Statistic
p-value 0 0.108 0.046 0 0.817 0.883
F-Statistics of
First Stage 10.58 10.65 12.98 10.58 10.65 12.98
Note: The table reports the results of Lewbel model regression, of financial literacy on use of fi-
nancial services. Columns (1) and (4) show results for standard IV regressions. Columns (2) and
(5) show results of regressions using generated instruments only, columns (3) and (6) show results
regressions using a combination of generated and external instruments.
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Table C.3: Financial Literacy, GDP, and Their Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.520∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.171) (0.084) (0.161)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 0.684∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.190∗ 0.634∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.178) (0.100) (0.169)
Financial Literacy×
Log GDP p.c. =0.015∗∗ =0.003 0.019∗∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.010 =0.134 =0.251 =0.281
(0.357) (0.277) (0.209) (0.292)
Secondary
Education 0.145 0.170∗ 0.031 0.107
(0.107) (0.097) (0.072) (0.083)
Tertiary
Education =0.189 =0.134 =0.106 0.014
(0.144) (0.181) (0.110) (0.169)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.149∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.037)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.057∗∗∗ 0.029 0.030∗∗ 0.023
(0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.025)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.003 =0.368 =0.283 =0.129
(0.546) (0.480) (0.380) (0.421)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.158∗∗∗ =0.168∗∗∗ =0.066∗ =0.135∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.035) (0.054)
Constant 55.114∗∗ 51.277∗∗ 35.807∗∗ 47.168∗∗
(24.191) (20.057) (15.263) (23.407)
R-squared 0.790 0.815 0.773 0.799
Observations 119 119 119 119
Note: The table shows the effect of financial literacy, log GDP per capita and their
interaction on different measures of financial inclusion, including access to and use of
financial services. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The interacted variables were
centered at their means which correspond to about 6041,35 PPP USD for GDP per
capita (re-converted to real values) and 36.4% for financial literacy. ***, ** and * de-
note significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.4: Financial Literacy, Bank Branch Penetration, and Their Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.506∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.157) (0.086) (0.158)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.079∗∗ 0.033 0.011 0.033
(0.033) (0.029) (0.027) (0.034)
Financial Literacy×
Bank Branches per 1000 km2 =0.003 0.000 0.003 =0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 13.392∗∗∗ 13.936∗∗∗ 6.061∗∗∗ 12.236∗∗∗
(2.834) (2.570) (1.479) (2.428)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.274 =0.480 =0.578∗∗ =0.725∗∗
(0.342) (0.303) (0.222) (0.302)
Secondary
Education 0.017 0.028 =0.052 =0.031
(0.106) (0.103) (0.067) (0.095)
Tertiary
Education =0.129 0.030 0.004 0.245∗
(0.140) (0.147) (0.114) (0.139)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.127∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.032) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.279 =0.000 0.177 0.327
(0.548) (0.512) (0.408) (0.502)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.098∗ =0.105∗ =0.034 =0.074
(0.050) (0.053) (0.040) (0.058)
Constant =51.204∗∗ =57.948∗∗ 0.236 =40.174
(25.194) (25.265) (18.639) (29.623)
R-squared 0.804 0.816 0.739 0.779
Observations 119 119 119 119
Note: The table shows the effect of financial literacy, bank branch penetration and their interac-
tion on different measures of financial inclusion, including access to and use of financial services.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The interacted variables were centered at their means
which correspond to 22.44 for bank branches per 1000 km2 and 36.4% for financial literacy.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.6: Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion - OLS, Excluding
Countries with More than 50% Muslims
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.510∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.185) (0.096) (0.185)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 12.497∗∗∗ 12.999∗∗∗ 6.549∗∗∗ 12.536∗∗∗
(3.192) (2.840) (1.686) (2.927)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.174 =0.428 =0.717∗∗ =0.627
(0.416) (0.350) (0.272) (0.388)
Secondary
Education 0.066 0.092 =0.080 0.050
(0.123) (0.131) (0.074) (0.129)
Tertiary
Education =0.117 =0.009 0.031 0.251
(0.145) (0.169) (0.128) (0.172)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.121∗∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.039
(0.030) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.043∗∗∗ 0.021 0.023 0.009
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.712 =1.016∗ =0.523 =0.480
(0.575) (0.524) (0.461) (0.567)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.094 =0.136∗∗ =0.047 =0.081
(0.058) (0.068) (0.050) (0.080)
Constant =63.942∗∗ =65.433∗ =8.209 =71.900∗
(31.905) (33.170) (25.617) (42.273)
R-squared 0.800 0.825 0.751 0.787
Observations 89 89 89 89
Note: The table reports OLS regression results with robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.7: Financial literacy and Financial Inclusion - IV, Excluding
Countries with More than 50% Muslims
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 1.533∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 1.763∗∗∗
(0.584) (0.479) (0.360) (0.446)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 3.936 2.919 2.488 3.772
(8.571) (7.164) (4.862) (6.170)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.931 1.237 =0.223 1.002
(0.944) (0.842) (0.641) (0.861)
Secondary
Education =0.063 =0.003 =0.089 0.041
(0.173) (0.201) (0.132) (0.207)
Tertiary
Education =0.349∗∗ =0.302 =0.036 0.019
(0.166) (0.200) (0.156) (0.221)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.130∗∗∗ 0.081∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.027
(0.041) (0.046) (0.042) (0.043)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.074 0.036 0.069∗ 0.000
(0.053) (0.060) (0.039) (0.060)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =1.856∗∗ =2.282∗∗∗ =1.063 =1.631∗
(0.910) (0.801) (0.719) (0.838)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.080 =0.112 =0.044 =0.045
(0.100) (0.116) (0.072) (0.131)
Constant =80.884 =108.683∗ =15.487 =127.806∗∗
(49.805) (55.257) (34.891) (61.354)
R-squared 0.747 0.735 0.739 0.711
Observations 72 72 72 72
Note: The table reports IV regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.8: Financial Literacy and Borrowing Decisions - OLS and IV Results
Borrowed from a
formal fin. institution
Borrowed from an
Informal Institution
Used Credit Card
in the Last Year
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Literacy 0.092 =0.085 =0.094∗∗ =0.597∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.141) (0.045) (0.234) (0.111) (0.331)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 0.360 1.872 0.650 5.654∗∗ 7.655∗∗∗ 3.102
(0.972) (1.830) (1.093) (2.764) (1.688) (3.981)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.179 =0.177 0.008 =0.666∗∗ =0.593∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.131) (0.234) (0.100) (0.318) (0.177) (0.480)
Secondary
Education 0.032 0.069 =0.051 =0.023 =0.031 =0.023
(0.047) (0.048) (0.044) (0.078) (0.056) (0.091)
Tertiary
Education 0.022 0.086 0.011 0.071 0.240∗∗ 0.123
(0.050) (0.059) (0.038) (0.065) (0.100) (0.141)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.003 =0.003 =0.007 =0.001 0.059∗ 0.039
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.032) (0.034)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 =0.009 =0.001 =0.011∗ =0.027 0.037∗ 0.076
(0.006) (0.020) (0.006) (0.019) (0.019) (0.049)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.273 0.195 =0.047 0.301 0.405 =0.168
(0.270) (0.279) (0.185) (0.319) (0.323) (0.577)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.039∗∗ =0.052∗∗ 0.014 =0.011 =0.017 0.008
(0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043)
Constant =5.791 8.101 3.033 15.769 =35.636∗ =53.646∗∗
(10.457) (11.924) (9.766) (15.829) (18.617) (24.342)
R-squared 0.436 0.377 0.182 -0.942 0.708 0.605
Observations 119 93 119 93 119 93
Note: The table reports OLS regression in columns (1), (3) and (5), and IV regression
results in columns (2), (4) and (6) with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Borrowed at for-
mal financial institution is the proportion of people that currently borrow at a formal
financial institution, borrowed at informal financial institution described those that bor-
rowed from an informal financial institution, credit card used during the last year is the
proportion of people that used their credit card during the last year.
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Table C.9: Financial Literacy and High
Frequency of Use - OLS and IV Results
High Frequency of Account Use
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Financial Literacy 0.588∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.445)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 8.835∗∗∗ 2.071
(1.805) (4.641)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =1.119∗∗∗ =0.240
(0.252) (0.643)
Secondary
Education =0.058 =0.023
(0.073) (0.123)
Tertiary
Education 0.314∗∗∗ 0.151
(0.113) (0.157)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.105∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.032) (0.036)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.021 0.038
(0.015) (0.050)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.285 =0.703
(0.463) (0.738)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.079∗ =0.052
(0.043) (0.069)
Constant =15.432 =37.482
(22.296) (33.796)
R-squared 0.816 0.732
Observations 119 93
Note: The table reports OLS regression in column (1),
and IV regression results in column (2) with robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
High frequency of account use denotes the percentage
of the population (older than 15 years) that have taken
money out of a formal bank account at a bank or other
formal financial institution at least three times in a typ-
ical month, including cash withdrawals, electronic pay-
ments or purchases, checks, or any other type of pay-
ment debit, either by account owner or other parties.
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Table C.10: Financial Literacy and Account Ownership -
Additional Control Variables
Account Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy 0.567∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.389
(0.172) (0.175) (0.189) (0.239)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 11.705∗∗∗ 12.112∗∗∗ 18.758∗∗∗ 24.048∗∗∗
(3.708) (3.789) (3.474) (3.726)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.106 =0.090 =0.135 =0.195
(0.377) (0.384) (0.437) (0.542)
Secondary
Education 0.017 0.016 =0.036 =0.008
(0.139) (0.138) (0.159) (0.181)
Tertiary
Education =0.131 =0.149 =0.230 =0.302
(0.169) (0.172) (0.189) (0.295)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.055)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.289 0.493 0.675 0.805
(0.682) (0.703) (0.711) (0.990)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.064 =0.048 =0.017 0.072
(0.065) (0.067) (0.069) (0.090)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.050∗∗∗ 0.024 0.021 0.025
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025)
Political Risk 0.229 0.213 0.050 0.117
(0.270) (0.268) (0.279) (0.378)
ATMs per 1000 km2 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Cost Checking
Account (Imputed) 0.943∗
(0.479)
Cost Checking
Account (original) 1.371∗∗
(0.563)
Constant =85.412∗∗∗=92.331∗∗∗=139.172∗∗∗=196.886∗∗∗
(32.134) (32.846) (38.231) (49.643)
R-squared 0.789 0.787 0.776 0.783
Observations 103 101 88 57
Note: The table reports OLS regression results with robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.11: Financial Literacy and Financial Services - OLS Results
Including Country Group Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.411∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.153) (0.100) (0.147)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 6.846 7.264∗∗ 7.840∗∗∗ 6.197∗∗
(4.758) (3.176) (2.904) (2.644)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.055 =0.196 =0.618∗∗∗ =0.370
(0.317) (0.271) (0.220) (0.253)
Secondary
Education 0.021 0.049 =0.062 =0.006
(0.112) (0.098) (0.077) (0.081)
Tertiary
Education =0.130 0.013 =0.022 0.169
(0.149) (0.148) (0.115) (0.137)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.122∗∗∗ 0.079 0.112∗∗ 0.027
(0.031) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.412 0.100 0.113 0.414
(0.538) (0.456) (0.413) (0.399)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.093∗∗ =0.096∗∗ =0.038 =0.072∗
(0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.042)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.054∗∗∗ 0.026 0.032∗ 0.018
(0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Low Income Country =20.595 =21.964∗∗ 3.387 =21.268∗∗
(13.810) (9.184) (9.160) (9.681)
Lower Middle
Income Country =19.580∗∗ =23.710∗∗∗ 3.949 =24.098∗∗∗
(8.677) (6.075) (6.238) (6.671)
Upper Middle
Income Country =11.375∗∗ =16.777∗∗∗ =0.811 =20.828∗∗∗
(4.857) (4.611) (4.075) (5.014)
Constant =10.981 =14.810 =32.491 =8.987
(48.494) (30.251) (30.116) (30.689)
R-squared 0.818 0.845 0.742 0.826
Observations 119 119 119 119
Note: The table reports OLS regression results. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. The omitted country group variable is high income country. ***, ** and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.12: Financial Literacy and Access to Financial
Services - OLS Results - Without Population And/Or
Education Variables
Account Ownership Debit Card Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy 0.535∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.135) (0.138) (0.153)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 11.533∗∗∗ 13.295∗∗∗ 12.499∗∗∗ 14.845∗∗∗
(2.285) (2.788) (2.192) (2.674)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.141 =0.362
(0.347) (0.311)
Secondary
Education 0.045 0.027
(0.099) (0.103)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.334 0.289 0.055 =0.015
(0.543) (0.538) (0.532) (0.513)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.079 =0.078 =0.079 =0.089∗
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.057∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.030∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant =77.990∗∗∗=79.807∗∗∗=99.678∗∗∗ =91.438∗∗∗
(24.572) (27.092) (24.437) (26.288)
R-squared 0.800 0.784 0.811 0.798
Observations 120 120 120 120
Note: The table reports OLS regression results. Robust standard er-
rors are shown in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) show results with
the proportion of the population that have a bank account as the out-
come variable. Columns (3) and (4) show results with the proportion
that has a debit card as the outcome variable. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.13: Financial Literacy and Use of Financial Services
- OLS Results - Without Population And/Or Education
Variables
Saved at formal
fin. institution Debit Card Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy 0.652∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.084) (0.150) (0.157)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 4.278∗∗∗ 6.157∗∗∗ 11.183∗∗∗ 13.585∗∗∗
(1.368) (1.516) (2.302) (2.531)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.575∗∗∗ =0.572∗
(0.213) (0.320)
Secondary
Education =0.053 =0.066
(0.066) (0.102)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.113∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.045 0.052
(0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.183 0.137 0.404 0.320
(0.430) (0.415) (0.543) (0.521)
Ease of Doing
Business Index 0.005 =0.022 =0.048 =0.065
(0.037) (0.036) (0.054) (0.055)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.033∗ 0.032∗ 0.033∗ 0.028
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Constant =47.266∗∗∗=23.646 =104.878∗∗∗ =86.662∗∗∗
(16.310) (18.314) (26.050) (30.726)
R-squared 0.720 0.731 0.764 0.755
Observations 120 120 120 120
Note: The table reports OLS regression results. Robust standard er-
rors are shown in parentheses. The outcome variables are the pro-
portion of people that saved at a formal financial institution and the
proportion of people that used their debit card during the last year.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, re-
spectively.
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Table C.14: Fin. Literacy and Fin. Inclusion Incl. Religiosity - OLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.364∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.138) (0.083) (0.112)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 14.211∗∗∗ 14.326∗∗∗ 5.009∗∗∗ 9.896∗∗∗
(2.482) (2.212) (1.547) (2.074)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.378 =0.511∗ =0.523∗∗ =0.585∗∗
(0.342) (0.278) (0.219) (0.257)
Secondary
Education 0.106 0.089 0.087 0.002
(0.102) (0.104) (0.068) (0.101)
Tertiary
Education =0.014 0.174 0.245∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.137) (0.083) (0.125)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.105∗∗∗ 0.062 0.087∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.033) (0.041) (0.030) (0.036)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.222 =0.361 0.027 0.080
(0.557) (0.519) (0.395) (0.546)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.042 =0.059 =0.012 =0.032
(0.048) (0.050) (0.031) (0.056)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Christianity (prot.) 8.591 10.697 16.591∗∗∗ 7.553
(10.252) (8.488) (5.744) (9.124)
Christianity (other) 4.608 =1.242 =14.656∗∗∗ =12.242∗
(7.269) (6.123) (3.958) (6.667)
Judaism 6.551 =59.908∗∗∗ 9.820∗ =69.786∗∗∗
(7.135) (5.759) (5.259) (5.025)
Islam (Sunni) =4.810 =3.045 =2.666 =7.097
(5.051) (4.569) (3.232) (4.372)
Islam (Shi’a) =34.167∗∗∗ =27.957∗∗∗ =12.842∗∗ =21.271∗∗
(8.163) (9.093) (5.188) (9.210)
Islam (Other) =11.189 =28.893 =3.205 =2.523
(35.004) (39.566) (49.855) (44.700)
Buddhism 13.780 1.445 12.148∗∗ =14.145∗∗
(11.516) (8.419) (5.566) (6.395)
Hinduism 26.042∗∗∗ 11.507∗ 15.349∗∗∗ 5.002
(7.234) (6.167) (4.911) (5.308)
Non-Religious 29.992∗∗ 30.184∗∗ 15.506 29.684∗
(13.362) (15.208) (9.702) (15.399)
Other Religions =1.979 5.264 8.600 =19.735∗∗∗
(11.043) (7.667) (7.950) (5.873)
Constant =77.603∗∗∗ =84.495∗∗∗ =18.750 =55.657∗∗
(26.730) (24.908) (17.365) (26.314)
R-squared 0.845 0.868 0.837 0.862
Observations 117 117 117 117
Note: The table reports OLS regression results. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Religion
variables depict percentage shares of the population adhering to the respective faith.
Catholic Christianity is the left-out category due to concerns of multicollinearity.
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Table C.15: Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion Incl. Hofstede’s
Cultural Dimensions – OLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.375 0.376 0.358 0.392
(0.285) (0.266) (0.218) (0.357)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 17.286∗∗ 18.404∗∗ 8.488∗ 15.841∗∗
(7.485) (6.828) (4.551) (7.627)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 0.670 =0.305 =0.535 =0.213
(0.603) (0.635) (0.609) (0.716)
Secondary
Education 0.114 0.188 0.072 0.296
(0.217) (0.186) (0.141) (0.219)
Tertiary
Education =0.097 =0.238 0.149 0.148
(0.266) (0.259) (0.179) (0.277)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.172∗∗∗ 0.083∗ 0.110∗∗ =0.031
(0.040) (0.048) (0.044) (0.065)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.720 =0.242 =0.298 0.000
(0.667) (0.689) (0.694) (0.844)
Ease of Doing
Business Index 0.006 =0.007 =0.021 0.039
(0.104) (0.116) (0.061) (0.143)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.015 0.012 0.033∗ 0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.025)
Power Distance 0.117 =0.017 =0.069 =0.105
(0.117) (0.097) (0.099) (0.144)
Individualism 0.225 0.207 =0.105 0.315∗∗
(0.144) (0.132) (0.097) (0.153)
Masculinity =0.091 =0.182∗∗ 0.079 =0.265∗∗
(0.081) (0.080) (0.058) (0.099)
Uncertainty
Avoidance 0.043 =0.021 =0.294∗∗∗ =0.101
(0.091) (0.099) (0.083) (0.135)
Long Term Orientation 0.067 0.240∗ 0.171∗ 0.178
(0.110) (0.124) (0.093) (0.171)
Indulgence =0.149 0.051 0.104 0.083
(0.106) (0.124) (0.070) (0.147)
Constant =186.289∗∗ =142.398∗ =33.998 =133.964∗
(73.181) (72.088) (34.062) (74.996)
R-squared 0.869 0.879 0.874 0.856
Observations 52 52 52 52
Note: The table reports OLS regression results. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. The five dimensions rank countries from 0-100 with 100 fulfilling the spe-
cific dimension exactly and 0 displaying the respective counterpart. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.16: Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion Incl. Legal Origin –
OLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.407∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.159) (0.093) (0.163)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 13.474∗∗∗ 13.821∗∗∗ 6.356∗∗∗ 11.992∗∗∗
(2.709) (2.461) (1.563) (2.329)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.284 =0.498∗ =0.577∗∗∗ =0.684∗∗
(0.314) (0.292) (0.189) (0.318)
Secondary
Education 0.017 0.035 =0.051 =0.023
(0.107) (0.096) (0.066) (0.090)
Tertiary
Education =0.139 0.091 0.037 0.300∗∗
(0.151) (0.149) (0.102) (0.139)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.114∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.043
(0.033) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.095 =0.174 =0.104 0.326
(0.486) (0.471) (0.374) (0.499)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.089∗ =0.070 =0.023 =0.043
(0.051) (0.052) (0.037) (0.057)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.076∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018)
Scandinavian Legal
Origin =5.831 13.743∗ 8.914∗ 22.670∗∗∗
(5.798) (7.115) (5.063) (8.325)
French Legal
Origin =11.741∗∗∗ =2.332 =8.222∗∗∗ 1.957
(3.334) (2.987) (2.060) (2.878)
German Legal
Origin 2.216 11.528∗∗ =1.417 10.155∗
(4.239) (4.453) (3.394) (5.169)
Constant =59.477∗∗ =74.951∗∗∗ =12.301 =69.413∗∗
(25.634) (25.039) (18.404) (30.602)
R-squared 0.836 0.837 0.775 0.797
Observations 118 118 118 118
Note: The table reports OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. British legal origin is the reference category for the different legal origin dummy
variables. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.17: Fractional Response Probit Regressions - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.537∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.138) (0.073) (0.120)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 0.124∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.024)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.529∗ =0.307 =0.398∗∗ =0.340
(0.290) (0.262) (0.202) (0.242)
Secondary
Education 0.032 0.076 =0.044 0.048
(0.089) (0.090) (0.073) (0.085)
Tertiary
Education =0.063 =0.055 =0.078 0.047
(0.125) (0.126) (0.096) (0.110)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.165∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.026)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.001 =0.001∗ =0.000 =0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 119 119 119 119
Note: The table reports fractional probit regression results. Robust standard errors are
shown in parentheses. The outcome variables are the proportion of people over the age
of 15 that have a bank account or own a debit card, proportion of people that saved at
a formal financial institution and the proportion of people that used their debit card
during the last year. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table C.18: Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion - Quantile Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
25th Quantile
Financial Literacy 0.396∗∗ 0.592∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 0.540∗∗
(0.197) (0.250) (0.157) (0.221)
Constant =66.842 =100.718∗∗∗ =3.422 =61.575∗
(41.387) (37.853) (28.231) (36.143)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes
50th Quantile
Financial Literacy 0.456∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.192) (0.127) (0.171)
Constant =54.805 =88.692∗∗∗ =28.256 =19.421
(37.330) (32.082) (27.131) (35.303)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes
75th Quantile
Financial Literacy 0.272 0.649∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.178) (0.152) (0.193)
Constant =66.284∗ =57.808 =27.485 =44.462
(38.425) (37.506) (27.993) (41.268)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes
Observations 119 119 119 119
Model Deg. of Freedom 30 30 30 30
Degrees of Freedom 109 109 109 109
No. of Replications 500 500 500 500
q1=0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Raw Sum of Deviations (q1) 1137.25 994.79 528.35 763.57
Min Sum of Deviations(q1) 476.05 466.23 343.53 454.20
q2=0.5 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Raw Sum of Deviations (q2) 1577.54 1501.39 836.84 1297.54
Min Sum of Deviations(q2) 586.93 573.86 441.79 573.61
q3=0.75
Raw Sum of Deviations (q3) 1176.84 1261.57 812.80 1263.94
Min Sum of Deviations(q3) 472.81 445.88 345.09 447.01
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Table C.19: Financial Literacy, Financial Depth and Their Interaction (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.605∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.211) (0.127) (0.214)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.180∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.053
(0.045) (0.049) (0.040) (0.045)
Financial Literacy ×
Private Credit to GDP =0.008∗ =0.006 0.005 =0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 16.911∗∗∗ 17.253∗∗∗ 6.712∗∗∗ 14.216∗∗∗
(2.947) (3.015) (1.929) (2.870)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.982∗∗ =0.939∗∗ =0.664∗∗ =0.846∗∗
(0.419) (0.424) (0.327) (0.398)
Secondary
Education 0.013 0.061 =0.061 0.023
(0.135) (0.137) (0.112) (0.131)
Tertiary
Education =0.101 =0.040 =0.054 0.157
(0.151) (0.191) (0.132) (0.193)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index 0.460 0.001 =0.148 0.242
(0.633) (0.662) (0.458) (0.634)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.074 =0.087 =0.045 =0.063
(0.061) (0.064) (0.042) (0.069)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.038 0.011 0.082∗∗ 0.007
(0.041) (0.044) (0.036) (0.054)
Constant =34.784 =55.873∗ 7.249 =50.379
(29.625) (28.752) (19.436) (32.951)
R-squared 0.828 0.792 0.757 0.760
Observations 93 93 93 93
Note: The table shows the effect of financial literacy, private credit to GDP and their inter-
action on different measures of financial inclusion, including access to and use of financial
services. Numeracy levels among primary school children act as instrument for financial
literacy. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The interacted variables were centered at
their means which correspond to 57.31% of GDP for financial depth and 36.4% for finan-
cial literacy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.20: Financial Literacy, Bank Branch Penetration and Their Interaction
(IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.475∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.174) (0.105) (0.173)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.114 0.018 0.004 0.012
(0.096) (0.077) (0.083) (0.090)
Financial Literacy ×
Bank Branches per 1000 km2 =0.008 0.001 0.009 =0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 16.494∗∗∗ 16.919∗∗∗ 6.926∗∗∗ 14.094∗∗∗
(2.977) (2.908) (1.941) (2.764)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.793∗∗ =0.746∗∗ =0.733∗∗ =0.778∗∗
(0.394) (0.380) (0.311) (0.365)
Secondary
Education =0.030 0.021 =0.043 0.009
(0.137) (0.132) (0.107) (0.123)
Tertiary
Education =0.127 =0.112 =0.077 0.134
(0.188) (0.200) (0.166) (0.204)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.128∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.066 =0.166 0.302 0.165
(0.581) (0.639) (0.635) (0.710)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.088 =0.103∗ =0.041 =0.068
(0.054) (0.059) (0.052) (0.066)
Constant =44.095 =66.029∗∗ 1.506 =54.379∗
(27.741) (27.960) (22.021) (32.995)
R-squared 0.824 0.810 0.735 0.771
Observations 93 93 93 93
Note: The table shows the effect of financial literacy, bank branch penetration and their inter-
action on different measures of financial inclusion, including access to and use of financial ser-
vices. Numeracy levels among primary school children act as instrument for financial literacy.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The interacted variables were centered at their means
which correspond to 22.44 branches per 1000 km2 and 36.4% for financial literacy. ***, ** and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.21: Financial Literacy, GDP, and Their Interaction (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Account
Ownership
Debit Card
Ownership
Saved at Formal
Fin. Institution
Used Debit Card
in the Last Year
Financial Literacy 0.622∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.204) (0.111) (0.204)
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) 0.710∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.096 0.527∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.169) (0.119) (0.155)
Financial Literacy×
Log GDP p.c. (PPP) =0.020 =0.009 0.025∗∗ 0.020
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014)
Population Share
between 15 and 64 =0.192 =0.198 =0.388 =0.124
(0.419) (0.366) (0.273) (0.370)
Secondary
Education 0.087 0.149 0.048 0.125
(0.142) (0.135) (0.108) (0.119)
Tertiary
Education =0.134 =0.157 =0.105 =0.038
(0.171) (0.226) (0.130) (0.221)
Private Credit
to GDP 0.161∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.031) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038)
Strength of Legal
Rights Index =0.355 =0.668 =0.480 =0.446
(0.616) (0.585) (0.440) (0.508)
Ease of Doing
Business Index =0.156∗∗ =0.169∗∗∗ =0.075∗ =0.140∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.042) (0.063)
Bank Branches per
1000 km2 0.046 =0.005 0.051 =0.027
(0.045) (0.056) (0.034) (0.058)
Constant 71.212∗∗∗ 59.194∗∗ 43.504∗∗ 38.299
(26.285) (23.990) (17.621) (28.092)
R-squared 0.805 0.799 0.774 0.779
Observations 93 93 93 93
Note: The table shows the effect of instrumented financial literacy, log GDP per capita
and their interaction on different measures of financial inclusion, including access to
and use of financial services. Numeracy levels among primary school children act as in-
strument for financial literacy. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The interacted
variables were centered at their means which correspond to about 6041.35 PPP USD
for GDP per capita (re-converted to real values) and 36.4% for financial literacy. ***,
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure C.1: Average Marginal Effects of Financial Literacy on Four Measures of
Financial Inclusion at Different Levels of GDP per capita.
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Figure C.2: Average Marginal Effects of Financial Literacy on Four Measures of
Financial Inclusion at Different Levels of Bank Branches per 1000 km2.
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Figure C.3: Average Marginal Effects of Financial Literacy on Four Measures of
Financial Inclusion at Different Levels of Private Credit to GDP (IV).
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Figure C.4: Average Marginal Effects of Financial Literacy on Four Measures of
Financial Inclusion at Different Levels of Bank Branches per 1000 km2 (IV).
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Figure C.5: Average Marginal Effects of Financial Literacy on Four Measures of
Financial Inclusion at Different Levels of GDP per capita (IV).
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Appendix D - Appendix for
Chapter 4
Survey Appendix
Table D.1: Subsample: Income Expectation Bias Dummy - Objective Debt Indicators
Obj. Debt Index DSR 2017 Rem. Debt/Income Paid Late/Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bias Dummy 0.435∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.053 0.072∗
(0.120) (0.122) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071) (0.074) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant =0.122∗∗ =1.218∗ 0.179∗∗∗=0.269 0.278∗∗∗ =0.836∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.048) (0.706) (0.022) (0.321) (0.029) (0.357) (0.019) (0.272)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 532 525 532 525 513 506 529 522
Adj. R-squared 0.034 0.096 0.038 0.084 0.020 0.084 0.002 0.031
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
Table D.2: Subsample: Income Expectation Bias Dummy - Subjective Debt
Indicators
Subj. Debt Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bias Dummy 0.118 0.173 0.134 0.181∗ 0.025 0.049 0.108 0.151
(0.104) (0.113) (0.091) (0.102) (0.060) (0.063) (0.119) (0.121)
Constant =0.012 =1.168∗ =0.034 =1.942∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗=0.097 =0.293
(0.055) (0.701) (0.048) (0.562) (0.035) (0.436) (0.070) (0.795)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 532 525 532 525 530 523 532 525
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.077 0.002 0.074 -0.002 0.034 -0.000 0.090
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table D.3: Subsample: Income Expectation Bias Dummy - Over-Indebt. Indicators
Over-indebtness Index DSR > 0.4 (=1) Holds > 4 Loans (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bias Dummy 0.241∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ =0.002 0.000
(0.101) (0.109) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) (0.036)
Constant =0.074 =1.155∗ 0.134∗∗∗ =0.100 0.141∗∗∗ =0.286
(0.055) (0.673) (0.019) (0.266) (0.020) (0.231)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 532 525 532 525 532 525
Adj. R-squared 0.009 0.053 0.031 0.062 -0.002 0.037
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
Table D.4: Wider and Narrower Bias Measures - Objective Debt Indicators
Obj. Debt Index DSR 2017 Rem. Debt/Income Paid Late/Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Narrower Bias (20%) 0.433∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.123) (0.064) (0.083) (0.035)
Wider Bias (30%) 0.357∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.094) (0.050) (0.078) (0.028)
Constant =1.018∗ =1.101∗ =0.120 =0.137 =0.296 =0.397 =0.067 =0.085
(0.570) (0.593) (0.266) (0.279) (0.382) (0.353) (0.225) (0.229)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 678 678 678 678 655 655 675 675
Adj. R-squared 0.089 0.084 0.086 0.077 0.052 0.059 0.026 0.025
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
Table D.5: Wider and Narrower Bias Measures - Subjective Debt Indicators
Subj. Debt Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Narrower Bias (20%) 0.138 0.176∗ 0.055 0.029
(0.103) (0.092) (0.061) (0.111)
Wider Bias (30%) 0.054 0.095 0.022 =0.020
(0.082) (0.074) (0.047) (0.100)
Constant =1.363∗∗ =1.326∗∗ =2.018∗∗∗=1.998∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ =0.494 =0.453
(0.562) (0.564) (0.475) (0.472) (0.349) (0.350) (0.668) (0.673)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 678 678 678 678 676 676 678 678
Adj. R-squared 0.087 0.085 0.092 0.088 0.041 0.040 0.083 0.083
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table D.6: Wider and Narrower Bias Measures - Over-Indebtedness Indicators
Over-indebtness Index DSR > 0.4 (=1) Holds > 4 Loans (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Narrower Bias (20%) 0.218∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.101) (0.041) (0.032)
Wider Bias (30%) 0.158∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ =0.004
(0.080) (0.033) (0.027)
Constant =0.943∗ =0.961∗ 0.070 0.048 =0.312∗ =0.304∗
(0.537) (0.549) (0.245) (0.253) (0.176) (0.177)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 678 678 678 678 678 678
Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.048 0.062 0.058 0.040 0.040
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
Table D.7: All Biases - Incl. Lagged Dependent Variable
DSR 2017 DSR 2017
(1) (2)
Bias Dummy 0.141∗∗
(0.059)
Debt Service Ratio 2016 0.401∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.147)
Fin. Forecast Error 0.027
(0.020)
Constant =0.037 0.070
(0.241) (0.228)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 663 665
Adj. R-squared 0.159 0.148
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table D.8: All Biases - Interaction with Conscientiousness
Obj. Debt Index Subj. Debt Index Over-Indebtedness Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conscientiousness 0.009 0.007 0.033 0.003 =0.003 =0.001
(0.040) (0.037) (0.055) (0.053) (0.036) (0.034)
Bias Dummy 0.194 0.628 =0.120
(0.502) (0.445) (0.547)
Bias Dummy × Conscient. 0.028 =0.092 0.044
(0.087) (0.077) (0.093)
Fin. Forecast Error =0.308 =0.163 =0.078
(0.229) (0.334) (0.229)
Fin. FE × Conscient. 0.073∗ 0.047 0.032
(0.040) (0.056) (0.039)
Constant =1.055∗ =0.865 =1.551∗∗ =1.167∗ =0.875 =0.840
(0.596) (0.608) (0.617) (0.656) (0.541) (0.559)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 678 667 678 667 678 667
Adj. R-squared 0.080 0.075 0.085 0.092 0.044 0.051
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors
in parentheses.
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Experiment Appendix
Table D.9: Descriptive Statistics by Participation in Game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Participating Non-Participating Difference
Sex 1.66 1.63 1.76 0.12∗∗∗
Age 57.01 56.35 59.78 3.43∗∗∗
Relation to HH Head 1.67 1.66 1.71 0.05
Marital Status 2.15 2.14 2.22 0.09
Main Occupation 4.97 4.66 6.29 1.64∗
Years of Schooling 5.74 5.83 5.33 −0.51∗
Children (0-6 years) 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.01
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.02
Numeracy 2.05 2.13 1.69 −0.45∗∗∗
Health Status 1.40 1.38 1.46 0.08
BMI 23.64 23.70 23.41 −0.28
Fin. Decision Maker 1.57 1.56 1.60 0.03
Self Control 21.26 21.02 22.26 1.24
Risk Taking 3.95 3.99 3.78 −0.21
Fin. Risk Taking 3.94 4.04 3.57 −0.47∗∗
FL-Score 5.50 5.63 4.95 −0.68∗∗∗
Monthly Inc. 2017 19197.02 19313.71 18704.57 −609.14
Obj. Debt Index 0.00 −0.01 0.02 0.03
Subj. Debt Index −0.00 −0.01 0.03 0.04
Over-Indebtedness Index −0.00 0.01 −0.04 −0.05
Morning 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00
Midday 0.24 0.26 0.17 −0.09∗∗∗
Observations 748 604 144 748
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Figure D.1: CDF for the Expected Rank by Treatment, After the Main Quiz
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Table D.10: Linear Probability Model Participation in Game
Participation
Sex −0.070∗
(0.036)
Age −0.003∗∗
(0.002)
Fin. Risk Taking 0.018∗
(0.010)
FL-Score 0.020∗∗
(0.010)
Morning 0.089∗∗
(0.041)
Midday 0.134∗∗∗
(0.044)
Observations 679
Only significant variables reported, remaining variables are the same as in Table D.9.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table D.11: Descriptive Statistics for Excluded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample In Out Difference
Sex 1.65 1.64 1.67 −0.03
Age 56.40 56.16 57.75 −1.59
Relation to HH Head 1.68 1.70 1.56 0.14
Marital Status 2.14 2.13 2.24 −0.11
Main Occupation 4.68 4.79 4.08 0.71
Years of Schooling 5.87 5.92 5.60 0.32
Children (0-6 years) 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.08
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.26 0.13 0.13∗∗∗
Numeracy 2.13 2.14 2.04 0.11
Health Status 1.38 1.38 1.38 0.00
BMI 23.69 23.58 24.27 −0.68
Fin. Decision Maker 1.56 1.57 1.52 0.05
Self Control 21.05 20.94 21.62 −0.67
Risk Taking 3.98 4.02 3.74 0.28
Fin. Risk Taking 4.03 4.06 3.90 0.15
FL-Score 5.62 5.66 5.40 0.26
Monthly Inc. 2017 18523.65 18653.06 17798.04 855.02
Obj. Debt Index −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00
Subj. Debt Index −0.01 −0.02 0.05 −0.07
Over-Indebtedness Index 0.01 0.03 −0.10 0.13
Read Alone 1.45 1.44 1.49 −0.04
Difficulties 1.15 1.14 1.21 −0.08
Observations 555 471 84 555
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The Rationals
As mentioned above, so far we have excluded experiment participants who want to
buy more than they expect to earn. We refer to these persons as “rationals.” In this
section, we discuss whether these participants are actually rational or had difficulties in
understanding the experiment and how including these observations change our results.
Comparing our main sample against all rationals does not yield results that differ
substantially from those presented in Table D.11. However, if we divide the rationals
into those participants who want to buy more than expected earnings could pay for
but less than eight goods and those who want to buy exactly eight goods (which would
be the “truely” rational decision), we find interesting differences. The former group has
significantly lower education, numeracy, and financial literacy than the main sample.
We see this as evidence that they may have had difficulties understanding the game
(we will refer to them as non-rationals from here on). It does not seem to be the
case, however, that these are persons who generally have problems controlling their
own spending behavior (also outside the lab) because their debt to service ratio is
significantly smaller compared to the main sample (see Table D.12).
Table D.12: Descriptive Statistics for Non-Rationals (only significant effects reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Others Non-Rationals Difference
Years of Schooling 5.84 5.91 5.00 0.91∗∗∗
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.26 0.12 0.14∗∗
Numeracy 2.10 2.13 1.76 0.36∗
FL-Score 5.60 5.64 5.10 0.54∗
Debt Service Ratio 2017 0.23 0.24 0.14 0.09∗∗
Observations 532 490 42 532
The remaining rationals, however, not only have significantly higher numeracy and
financial literacy, as perceived by the interviewers, but also thought to have a better
understanding of the game (see Table D.13) (for non-rationals the difference is in the
opposite direction, but not significant). Thus, these participants might have taken
advantage of the set-up and reasoned that it is optimal for them to buy as many goods
as possible because of the large discount.
Including these two groups into the analysis, the results change as anticipated: the
effect of expected rank on goods turns insignificant and negligible (see Table D.14). All
other effects are almost unchanged.
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Table D.13: Descriptive Statistics for Rationals (only significant effects reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Others Rationals Difference
Main Occupation 4.70 4.76 3.48 1.28∗
Numeracy 2.16 2.13 2.78 −0.66∗
FL-Score 5.66 5.64 6.22 −0.58∗
Difficulties in Game 1.15 1.16 1.00 0.16∗∗∗
Observations 513 490 23 513
Table D.14: Consumption Decision including Rationals
Exp. Rank No. Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.373∗∗ =0.234 =0.254
(0.168) (0.199) (0.199)
Exp. Rank 0.048 0.054
(0.052) (0.052)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 511 511 511 511
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; A higher expected rank corresponds to a higher
expected performance.Controls: Health Status, Monthly HH income and Over-Indebtedness Index.
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Description of Variables
Debt Indices
Objective Debt
Index
It contains the equally weighted average of z-scores of three debt
indicators. The procedure of aggregating these specific outcomes is
adapted from Kling et al. (2007). It “improves statistical power” and
helps “to detect effects that go in the same direction” among indi-
cators (Kling et al., 2007, p.89). The debt index captures the debt
service to income ratio, the remaining debt to income ratio, and a
dummy variable turning one if the household paid late or defaulted
on a loan during the last twelve months.
Over-
Indebtedness
Index
The index contains two measures of over-indebtedness: Households
with a debt service to income ratio greater than 40% and households
with more than four loans. The literature has defined (kind of arbi-
trary) thresholds for the DSR indicator beyond which a household is
over-indebted. A household is deemed over-indebted, for example, if
its DSR exceeds - depending on the study - 0.3 to 0.5 (Chichaibelu
and Waibel, 2017). Hence, we set the over-indebtedness threshold at a
DSR of 0.4 following what we deem is best practice among researchers
(Georgarakos et al., 2010).
Sacrifice Index This index is adapted by Schicks (2013), which asks for several sac-
rifices households may make because they lack money. Like them,
we combine these indicators into one “sacrifice index” applying poli-
choric principal component analysis such that a continuous index is
created giving more weight to more serious sacrifices people have to
make and transforming the categorical responses into a continuous
measure (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009; Smits and Gu¨nther, 2017).
In total, we ask respondents about ten possible sacrifices both for a
shorter term (i.e. twelve months) and for a longer term (five years).
Unlike Schicks (2013), we do not pose questions about the accept-
ability of sacrifices made but ask only for the frequency of distress
events that occurred in the household. We added two questions intro-
duced by Smits and Gu¨nther (2017) and two new questions that are
more context-specific to the rural setting in North-East Thailand. De-
pending on the question asked, respondents could answer on a scale
from 1-3 (e.g. had to work much more, more, not more) or from 1-5
(e.g. had to buy less food: never, sometimes, regularly, often, almost
always, always).
Subjective Debt
Index
It equally weights and averages the standardized sacrifice index and
two assessments on whether the household has too much debt and
whether it has difficulties paying them off.
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Debt Measures
Debt Service to
Income Ratio
It is the ratio of all annual interest and principal payments on loans
divided by all annual income generating activities of the household.
Debt Position The question on whether the household has too much debt right now
is asked twice in almost identical fashion to check for response consis-
tency. For this reason, we combine both questions and calculate their
mean. The exact formulation of both questions is the following: “I
have too much debt right now” (Disagree fully, disagree strongly, dis-
agree a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a little, agree strongly,
agree fully) and “Which of the following best describes your current
debt position?” (I have too little debt; I have about the right amount
of debt; I have too much debt right now.).
Difficulties to Pay
Off Debt
Categorical question with answer options 1-“I have no difficulties pay-
ing off my debt”, 2-“I have some difficulties [...]”, and 3-“I have a lot
of difficulties [...]”.
Remaining Debt
to Income Ratio
The ratio relates a household’s actual, yearly debt burden to the
average income of 2016 and 2017.
Expectation
Biases
Bias Dummy Dummy taking the value 1 if expected median income from the prob-
abilistic expectations elicitation is larger than actual income.
Financial
Forecast Error
Difference between expected income in 2016 and actual welfare of the
household as evaluated in 2017.
Expectation
Measures
Actual welfare of
the household
Answer to “Do you think your household is better off than last year?”,
from 1-“much worse off” to 5-“much better off”.
Certainty Answer to “How certain are you that this income development will
truly become reality?”. The scale ranges from 1-“Very uncertain” to
4 “Very certain”.
Expected income Answer to “How do you think your average monthly income will
develop in the next twelve months?”, from 1-“Decrease a lot” to 5-
“Increase a lot”.
Probabilistic
expectations
Probabilities assessing how individuals assess future outcomes.
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Experiment
Measures
Treatment 1=Hard Quiz, 2=Easy Quiz.
Expected Rank Rank that participant expects to reach after taking the test quiz
from 1-“Least questions answered correctly” to 10-“Most questions
answered correctly”.
Number of Goods Amount of goods participant wants to buy.
Overconfidence Difference between expected and actual rank of participant.
Overborrowing Dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if participant wants to buy
more than earnings including endowment can pay for.
Overspending Dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if participant wants to buy
more than earnings excluding endowment can pay for.
Controls
Age Age of respondent in years.
Age Squared Squared term of age.
BMI Respondent’s Body Mass Index as of 2017.
Financial
Decision Maker
Answer to question “Who is responsible for making day-to-day de-
cisions about money in your household?” where means 1-“Myself”,
2-“Myself and someone else” and 3-“Someone else”.
Financial Literacy
Score
Our index is based on seven questions eliciting financial knowledge,
on nine assessments concerning financial behavior, and on three ques-
tions regarding financial attitude. The overall index is composed of
the sum of the sub indices and ranges between 0 and 22 with higher
numbers indicating a higher level of financial literacy.
Financial Risk
Taking
Answer to “Attitudes towards risk change in different situations.
When thinking about investing and borrowing are you a person who is
fully prepared to take risk or do you try and avoid taking risk?”, from
1-“Fully unwilling to take risks” to 7-“Fully willing to take risks”.
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Health Status Health status of the respondent in 2017: 1-“Good”, 2-“Can manage”,
3-“Sick”
Main Income
Dummies
We include four income dummies that tell us whether the main in-
come comes from farming, off-farm employment, self employment or
remittances.
Marital Status Respondent’s marital status: 1-“Unmarried”, 2-“Married”, 3-
“Widow”, 4-“Divorced/separated”.
Monthly Inc.
2017
Monthly household income in 2017
Number of
children
This variable is split in three age categories for the analysis. Num-
ber of children aged 0-6 years; Number of children aged 7-10 years;
Number of children aged 11-16 years.
Number of Elders Number of elder household members, defined as people older than 60
years.
Number of
Shocks
Number of experienced shocks in 2017.
Number of
Working
Members
Number of working household members.
Numeracy The numeracy index is based on six questions about simple arithmetic
problems. It ranges between zero and six. Zero, if the respondent
does not give any correct answer and six if the respondent gives only
correct answers.
Optimism We use the“Reevaluated Life Orientation Test” (LOT-R) of Scheier
et al. (1994) and add up the Likert-Scale answers to one score. The
scale ranges from 1-“Disagree fully” to 7-“Agree fully”. The final
score ranges from 1 to 23 where higher numbers indicate a higher
level of optimism.
Relation to HH
Head
Respondent’s relation to the household head: 1-“Head”, 2-
“Wife/Husband”, 3-“Son/Daughter”, 4-“Son/Daughter in law”, 5-
“Father/Mother”, 8-“Grandchild”, 9-“Nephew/Niece”, 11-“Other
relatives”.
Risk Aversion Equally weighted average of risk taking and financial risk taking.
Risk Taking Answer to “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risk?”, from 1-“Fully unwilling to
take risks” to 7-“Fully willing to take risks”.
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Self-Control We use the questions introduced by Tangney et al. (2004) and add
up the Likert-Scale answers to one score. The scale ranges from 1-
“Disagree fully” to 7-“Agree fully”. The final score ranges from 0 to
49 where lower numbers indicate a higher level of self-control.
Sex Sex of respondent: 1-“Male”, 2-“Female”.
Total HH
Education
Sum of years all working household members went to school.
Years of
Schooling
Years respondent went to school.
Big Five -
Personality Traits
Agreeableness A person, who scores high on Agreeableness (Item scale ranges from
1 to 7 for all items) has a forgiving nature, is considerate and kind
and not rude to others.
Conscientiousness A person, who scores high on Conscientiousnes does a thorough job,
works efficiently and is not lazy.
Extraversion A person, who scores high on Extraversion is communicative,
talkative, outgoing and not reserved.
Neuroticism A person, who scores high on Neuroticism worries a lot, gets nervous
easily and is not relaxed.
Openness A person, who scores high on Openness values artistic experiences, is
original and has an active imagination.
Additional
Controls
Experiment
Difficulties in
Game
Answer to “Did the respondent have difficulties answering ques-
tions?” with 1-“Not at all”, 2-“Yes, a little bit”, 3-“Yes, very much”.
Filled in by the enumerator.
Morning Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the interview took place in
the morning, i.e. before 11am.
Midday Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the interview took place
around noon, i.e. between 12am and 2pm.
Read Alone Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant could read
the experimental instructions without help. Filled in by the enumer-
ator.
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